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xviii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Article
VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16(l) and 78-22(3Xe)(i), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (URAP).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Where Appellants seek to have Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.li declared

unconstitutional, yet no plan under that statute is in effect, is the appeal on
constitutional issues moot?

Standard of Review:2 Mootness is a question ofjurisdiction, which may be
raised at any time, and which this Court may address as a question of law. See

Rule 37(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, this issue is a general
question of law. Furthermore, this Court may grant relief from an order of the

Public Service Commission only if the Appellants have been substantially preju
diced. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4).

2.

Is Section 54-4-4.1(1), vesting authority in the Public Service Commis

sion to adopt, by rule or order,

any method of rate regulation consistent with this title, including a
method whereby revenues or earnings of a public utility above a
specified level are equitably shared between the public utility and its
customers,

a.

i

an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power;

Hereinafter, statutory references will be to Utah Code Ann. unless

otherwise noted.

2 Appellants failed to state the standard of review and supporting authority
for any of the issues they raised, as required by Rule 24(a)(5), URAP.

b.

an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power; or

c.

an unconstitutional denial of due process?

Standard of Review:

These are general questions of law to be reviewed

under the correction-of-error standard. Savage Industries v. Tax Comm'n. 811
P.2d 664, 666-67 (Utah 1991); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).

3.

Does a public utility's power to reject a revenue sharing plan under

Section 54-4-4.1(2) constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or
judicial power, or a denial of due process to a third party?
Standard of Review: These are general questions of law to be reviewed
under the correction-of-error standard. Savage Industries v. Tax Comm'n. 811
P.2d 664, 666-67 (Utah 1991); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv, v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983).

4.

Are Appellants entitled to attorney's fees and/or costs, where they are

not provided for by statute or contract?

Standard of Review: Since this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it
is a question of law for this Court to determine.3

5.

Did Appellants properly marshall the evidence relating to the Public

Service Commission's adoption of a 12.2 %rate of return, and if so, was the Public

Service Commission's adoption of a 12.2 % rate of return supported by substantial

3 In Section VII, infra, U S WEST points out that Appellants' request for

attorney's fees, among other things, is an inappropriate attempt to invoke this

Court's original jurisdiction and that Appellants have not presented a factual

basis for attorney's fees.

evidence?

Standard of Review. The question whether Appellants properly marshalled
the evidence is a question of law for this Court. First Natl Bank v. Countv Bd. of

Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The review of the Commission's rate of

return finding is to be made under the substantial evidence test, under which it

will be sustained if "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv..
supra, 658 P.2d at 608.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUTES

The following constitutional provisions and statutes, which are set forth
fully in Addendum A to this Brief, are determinative of the issues in this case:

Constitutional Provisions: Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7; Art. V, Sec. 1; Art.
VI, Sec. 1; Art. VIII, Sec. 1, and Art. XII, Sec. 20.

Statutes: Sections 54-3-1, 54-3-7, 54-4-1, 54-4-4, 54-4-4.1, 54-7-12, 63-46b-10,
and 63-46b-16(4).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While most of Appellants' Statement of the Case is correct, there are some
errors and omissions.

Appellants assert that the filing for an earnings sharing plan by Respon-

dent U S WEST Communications, Inc. (hereinafter WU S WEST")4 was part of a
U S WEST general rate case. (App. Brief at 4). That is simply untrue. U S

WEST'S filing in the case (Case No. 90-049-03) was for the express purpose of
seeking approval of a sharing plan. (R. 3739-60). U S WEST did not initiate a

general rate case. It was the subsequent filing by the Division of Public Utilities

(hereafter "Division") of a petition to investigate U S WEST's earnings (Case No. 90-

049-06) that generated the general rate proceeding. (R. 4241-60). The two separate
proceedings were then consolidated for hearing. (R. 3875-82).

Appellants' Statement leaves out large portions of the procedural history of

the case, including descriptions of the comprehensive testimony filed with regard
to U S WEST's and the Division's proposed sharing plans. However, the Commis

sion's June 19, 1990 Report and Order sets forth a detailed procedural history (R.
5384-88). A copy of the Report and Order is attached as Addendum B. The order

also describes in some detail the evidence presented by the parties (R. 5462-69,
Addendum B). Rather than repeat that information here, Respondents refer the
Court to the Commission's Order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellants' Statement of the Facts is not a review of the facts presented

below. While it is 45 pages long, references to the record are minimal.s In fact,

4 Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc. should be distinguished

from its parent, U S WEST, Inc., which is not a party to this case.

5 While Appellants make reference to the transcript and to other items in

the record, they fail to cite the record in compliance with the requirements of Rule
24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

most of the 45 pages is dedicated to assertions and analysis that have nothing to do
with the factual record below. For example:

1.

Appellants assert that they were not treated fairly in the

manner in which Section 54-4-4.1 was enacted by the Utah Legislature.

(App. Brief at 11-12). Yet they cite nothing in the record to support their
assertion and make no claim that the statute was not legally enacted.

2.

Appellants relate their subjective conclusions about sharing

plans in general, their perception that the statute lacks appropriate
standards, and their subjective assessment of U S WEST's motivation in

seeking an incentive plan.

(Id. at 14-15). Yet none of the Appellants

testified in the hearing nor did they present any expert testimony.
3.

Appellants make unsupported assertions as to the market

share of gas, electric and telephone utilities in Utah, all without benefit of
citations to the record. (Id, at 15-16).

4.

Appellants relate a variety of alleged procedural problems (Id.

at 17-19), none of which serve as the basis for any of the substantive issues

raised by Appellants on appeal. The only purpose for their recitations is to
prejudice the case.

5.

Appellants present a lengthy argument as to their view of the

legal and economic underpinnings to utility regulation. (Id. at 20-40). In

these twenty pages there are only two footnotes citing to the record.6

6 Appellants' legal and economic analysis in their fact section serves as the

fundamental premise to their constitutional argument.
these issues in Section III, infra.
5

Respondents address

6.

Appellants present a lengthy discussion of why, in their view,

sharing plans are not valid (Id. at 40-50).

Appellants' limited references to the record below are not made for the purpose of
presenting a balanced view of the comprehensive testimony presented on incen

tive regulation/sharing plans,? but are obviously presented in an effort to prove a

proposition that is no longer at issue in this case: whether sharing plans are good
or bad. It is not at issue because the U S WEST and Division plans were rejected
by the Commission (R. 5477, Addendum B), and U S WEST opted out of the
Commission's plan.

(R. 5692-93).

Since no party in this case asserts that a

sharing plan is in effect, the general merit of sharing plans is not an issue that
this Court must determine. Thus, the only purpose of Appellants' demonization
of sharing plans is to inject irrelevant and prejudicial information into the case so

that the Court will be moved to accept Appellants' facial challenge to the constitu
tionality of Section 54-4-4.1.

A.

Incentive Regulation/Sharing Plans.

Thus, although Appellants'

diatribe against sharing plans is technically irrelevant, it is nevertheless impor
tant for the Court to gain a greater understanding of sharing plans, based on the

record below. Extensive testimony on sharing plans was presented by witnesses
for U S WEST, the Division and the Committee of Consumer Services (Commit

tee). The primary witnesses presented by U S WEST were Robert C. Fuehr (R.
7781-7801), Utah Vice President, Kirk R. Nelson (R. 7803-7981), Assistant Vice

7 The terms "incentive regulation" and "sharing plans" are synonymous
and are used interchangeably in this Brief.
6

President, Dr. William H. Davidson (R. 7982-8099), Associate Professor of Man

agement at the University of Southern California, and Phillip S. Selander (R. 81008225), Director-Network Facilities Engineering. The general position of U S WEST

was that a properly constructed sharing plan would create positive benefits to the

utility, its customers and to the state in general. The Division presented the
testimony of five of its staff members: Dr. George Compton (R. 7072-7159), Thomas
F. Peel (R. 6745-6884), Larry F. Fuller (R. 6924-92), Earl Brown (R. 6887-6923) and

Ingo Henningsen (R. 6993-7019). The Division, while less ebullient about sharing
plans than U S WEST, concluded that a plan could be constructed that could

result in lower rates for customers over traditional regulation and felt that a plan
that could be reviewed within 3 years was worth the experiment. The Committee
presented the testimony of two outside consultants: William W. Dunkel (R. 6082-

6561) and Michael L. Arndt (R. 6060-81). The Committee witnesses were generally
opposed to sharing plans, preferring traditional rate of return regulation.
Appellants presented no testimony.

Earnings sharing plans represent a recent trend in the regulation of

telephone utilities in the United States. While no two plans are identical, there
are two features that are common to most plans:

1.

Some form of rate freeze on essential services for a specified period of
time (usually 3 to 5 years). Thus, in most plans the utility gives up its
right to initiate a rate case for the term of the plan. (R. 7987, 8000)

2.

Some form of retroactive sharing of profits above a predetermined

level.

Thus, an inherent part of any plan includes the utility's

consent to some form of retroactive refunds to customers. (R. 78168307)

In addition to those items, plans often include service standards, service im

provement requirements, infrastructure upgrades, and other features designed to
protect ratepayers and to provide incentive to the utility to be more efficient,
service conscious, and responsive to customer desires for new services.

U S WEST's witnesses presented several reasons why an appropriately
structured incentive regulation plan was in the public interest:

• Incentive regulation focuses on beneficially harnessing profits
rather than limiting them, thus producing incentives that traditional
regulation is not equipped to provide. (R. 7808-09, 7815, 7987-89).
• Incentive regulation explicitly uses market forces (rather than

regulatory mandates) to guide the deployment of new technology invest
ments, while continuing to sustain universal service. (R. 7834, 7878-82).
• Incentive regulation encourages beneficial behaviors and the

achievement of regulatory goals in ways that traditional regulation
cannot.8 (R. 7809-10, 7813-17, 7819-21, 7984-90, 8002-8010). Specifically, under

traditional regulation U S WEST does not benefit from significant im
provements in efficiencies and marketing success since, through the rate
process, advances in these areas ultimately are flowed back 100% to

8 Many other jurisdictions have moved away from traditional regulation in
recent years. In the last few years, three states have adopted a form of deregula
tion, six have adopted rate caps, and 18 have adopted incentive regulation (R
7866).
S
8

ratepayers. (R. 8037-47, 8083-89).

. Incentive regulation would enable Utah to compete more effectively
with other states in attracting new telecommunications investments and

services.

This will occur sooner and in greater quantity than without

improved regulation. (R. 7808-12, 7815, 8031-33, 8036). It also provides
financial benefits that recognize increased risks for both customers and U S

WEST associated with new technologies and greater competition (both
among states and among companies). (R. 7815). It will therefore enhance

economic development in Utah. (R. 7787-93, 7796-99, 7838, 7987-89, 7991-92,
7998-8001,8008-10).

• Incentive regulation allows customers to share financially in
improvements triggered by the added incentives, in addition to the benefits
that will be derived from new services. (R. 7838).

• Incentive regulation encourages quality service, efficient

operations, prudent capital investments, new services and revenue growth
without rate increases. (R. 7808-14).

• Incentive regulation protects customers from rate increases in an

environment in which rate reductions cannot be expected to continue, while

providing extensive modernizations. (R. 7295, 7297-99, 7301-02, 7809, 7823).
While the Division characterized incentive regulation as an experiment (R.
6748), it recognized that there is always room for improvement in the manage
ment process and that it would be difficult to know the benefits of incentive

regulation unless it is actually tried. (R. 6752). Potential benefits include "addi-

tional sharable earnings benefitting both the ratepayer and shareholder along
with the more rapid deployment of new technology" and the reduction of regula
tory costs by eliminating contested rate cases. (R. 6753-55). It also provides
opportunities for refunds relating to prior periods, provides incentive to create and

market new services, and expedites the replacement of older technologies. (R.
6755). In addition to this qualitative testimony, Dr. Compton of the Division

presented a study in support of the Division's plan that quantitatively estimated
regulatory lag and other factors so that a plan could be developed that would
assure that ratepayers benefit from it. (R. 7073-7148).

The Committee opposed the concept of incentive regulation, making three
basic assertions: (1) the continuous lowering of rates is the norm in the telecom

munications industry - thus, incentive regulation is unnecessary (R. 6090-91); (2)
incentive regulation creates a disincentive for investment, while traditional

regulation promotes investment (R. 6142, 6150-59); and (3) utility employees
already have adequate incentives under traditional regulation (R. 6248).

In its Order, the Commission agreed with some of the propositions asserted

by the parties and disagreed with others (R. 5470-78), ultimately rejecting the
specific plans offered by U S WEST and the Division (R. 5477) and adopting a plan
of its own. Although rates were frozen and the Commission plan was designed to

last five years, the Commission reserved the power to "terminate the plan at any
time if it is convinced that the public interest justifies termination." (R. 5478-79).

It also contained provisions requiring the retroactive sharing of profits above
certain levels (R. 5479).
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While there was a voluminous record dealing with the claimed merits and

asserted problems with incentive regulation, one of the underlying premises of

Appellants' so-called fact statement is an inference that the plans presented by
U S WEST and the Division, as well as the plan adopted by the Commission,
represent drastic and reckless departures from the mainstream. Appellants, for
example, spend considerable energy in pointing out that incentive regulation is

not beneficial to the public and that the Commission should not have adopted any
kind of plan. The fact of the matter, however, is that sharing plans have been

adopted in many different state jurisdictions and that virtually every plan adopted
provides the utility with far greater opportunity for earning than would the
Commission plan.

At various points in the proceeding, parties presented updates as to the

status of sharing plans in other jurisdictions.9

The final exhibit presented was

U S WEST Exhibit 10R.4 (R. 8307, Addendum C), which summarized major
elements of plans approved in 16 jurisdictions. A review of that exhibit demon
strates that the plans proposed by U S WEST and the Division were well within the

mainstream of plans adopted elsewhere and that the plan adopted by the Com
mission, while containing elements similar to those other plans, is more restric
tive to the utility than other plans. The Commission plan would have allowed U S

9 The Division witness Thomas Peel presented a summary of plans in other
states. (R. 6876-84).
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WEST to earn a maximum return on equity of 14%.10 The authorized return on

equity established by the Commission was 12.2%. By contrast, for the plans in the

other 16 jurisdictions, the average authorized return was 13.13% and the point at
which sharing commenced was 13.94%, only .06% below the absolute maximum

earnings that U S WEST could achieve under the Commission plan. (R. 8307,

Addendum C). Thus, Appellants' inference that the incentive plans proposed
below were a major departure (to the detriment of ratepayers) from the main
stream simply is not supported by the evidence.

B.

Rate of Return. Appellants assert that the Commission's finding of a

12.2% return on equity is not supported by substantial evidence. In responding to
that claim, in Section VIII, infra, Respondents review portions of the evidence
presented that support that finding. Since that evidence is reviewed in Section
VIII, it will not be repeated here.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.

WTiatever the Court decides in this case, no sharing plan is in effect

or will go into effect. Therefore, with the exception of the rate of return issue, all

issues raised by Appellants in their appeal are moot. This Court has adopted a

io The Commission plan (R. 5479, Addendum B) worked this way:
Ratenaver Share

Up to 12.2%
12.2 to 13.2%
13.2 to 14.2%
14.2 to 17.0%
over 17%

0
80%
60%
50%
all

Maximum Company Earnings
-nings

Companv Total Companv
all
20%
40%
50%
0

12.2
.2
.4
1.4

0,0
14.0%
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strong policy of avoiding decisions on constitutional issues unless essential to

decide a case. Under this doctrine, the challenger must demonstrate that he or

she is being adversely affected by the statute. Since Appellants cannot make such
a demonstration regarding Section 54-4-4.1, their constitutional claims are moot.

Further, this Court has adopted a strong policy against rendering advisory
opinions, which is precisely what Appellants are seeking. Finally, the facts of

this case do not bring it within the only exception to the mootness doctrine adopted
by this Court.

2.

When a party challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the burden

rests heavily on the party making the challenge. That burden is particularly
heavy when the statute being challenged deals with economic matters.

This

Court presumes statues to be valid; when faced with two different interpretations
of a statute, the Court will choose the interpretation that validates the statute.

3.

Neither the Constitution nor the Public Utility Code requires cost of

service regulation as the only method that can be utilized by the Commission in

establishing "just and reasonable" rates.

The Public Utility Code only requires

that rates be "just and reasonable," but does not define for the Commission how it
should reach "just and reasonable" rates. Instead, the statutes set forth broad

policy statements to guide the Commission in setting rates. Section 54-4-4.1(1)
merely codifies for the Commission that it is free to adopt any method or formula
of rate regulation consistent with Title 54. The courts have held that it is the final
impact of the rate order that determines if the action of the Commission is

constitutional. As long as the rates are not confiscatory and procedural due

13

process has been followed, constitutional requirements have been met.

The

Commission is free to adopt other methods or formulas to achieve "just and
reasonable" rates and courts will not interfere with their choice. The Commis

sion establishes rates; rate of return is only one of the elements that goes into the

formula for setting rates. Those rates remain in effect until new rates are set by
the Commission. If the rates produce revenue that results in a return lower than

what was authorized by the Commission, the utility cannot make up the differ
ence retroactively. Likewise, if the utility earns more than the rate of return

authorized by the Commission, the utility keeps the difference until new rates are

established. Therefore, rates that have been found "just and reasonable" by the
Commission do not become "unjust and unreasonable" automatically when
earnings are either above or below the return authorized by the Commission in
the utility's last rate case.

4.

(a) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah

Constitution by unconstitutionally delegating legislative powers to the Commis
sion. Rate making is clearly the type of function that can be delegated to an
administrative agency such as the Commission. Courts have held that the broad

standards contained in the Public Utility Code are sufficient to guide the Commis
sion in establishing rates.

In addition, sufficient procedural safeguards are

contained in the Public Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act to
ensure that due process is met.

(b) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article V, Section 1 of the Utah

Constitution by delegating powers to the Courts to select a different method of rate

14

regulation than that chosen by the Commission.

In reviewing orders of the

Commission, Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the Commis

sion. The Court has never had nor ever asserted the power to establish a rate

regulation different from the Commission and thus no authority to establish rates
has been delegated to the Courts.

(c) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article I, Section 7 of the Utah

Constitution. Adequate standards are included within the Public Utility Code to
comply with due process. In addition, sufficient procedural safeguards are
included within the Public Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act in

order to satisfy due process. Finally, Section 54-4-4.1 is not so vague as to run
counter to due process.

(d) Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate state antitrust policies, including
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. In fact, state antitrust policies
envision that regulation of public utilities does not generally fall under state
antitrust statutes.

5.

Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-4.1, which allows a public utility to elect

not to proceed with a revenue sharing plan (i.e. requires utility consent to a
Commission-adopted revenue sharing plan) is neither an unconstitutional

delegation of legislative power, nor a deprivation of Appellants' due process

rights. There is no improper delegation, because the statute merely recognizes
the common law and constitutionally-based rule against retroactive rate making,
under which a utility could prohibit "revenue sharing" regardless of the existence

of Subsection 2. Furthermore, the grant of a consent power to a private party is

15

generally valid where it requires consent to waive a restriction, such as in the
statute in question. The granting of a veto power to pubic utilities over revenue

sharing plans, while other parties have no such power, does not violate due

process principles, because the public utility is in a unique position in a rate

proceeding, since only its earned revenue is at risk, and no other party has the

right or incentive to invoke the rule against retroactive rate making.
6.

The Court need not rule on the severability issue since no party

claims that a sharing plan can go into effect in this case. Nevertheless, in the
event the Court addresses the severability issue, since Subsection 1 is broader
than Subsection 2, the possible invalidation of Subsection 2 should not invalidate
Subsection 1.

7.

Appellant's request for costs and attorney's fees was raised for the

first time on appeal. Neither of the two theories upon which Appellants base their
request -the "substantial benefits" rule or the "private attorney general" doctrinehas been adopted by this Court; rather this Court follows the general rule that
attorney's fees are awarded only where allowed by statute or contract. Even if the

Court were to adopt the substantial benefits test, Appellants' claim clearly fails to
meet the test. The private attorney general doctrine has been rejected by the
United States Supreme Court and by the majority of state courts that have

addressed it on the ground that the doctrine is an impermissible judicial entry
into the province of the legislative branch. Nevertheless, even if the Court were to

adopt the private attorney general doctrine, Appellants' claim does not meet the

test.

Finally, Appellants' attorney's fees claim is procedurally and factually
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flawed and, if granted, would violate U S WEST's due process rights.
8.

Appellants have the burden of establishing that the Commission's

finding of a 12.2% return on equity was not based on substantial evidence.

Furthermore, it is Appellants' duty to marshall the evidence supporting the
finding, otherwise the finding is accepted as conclusive. Appellants failed to

marshall the evidence. In any event, it is clear from the record that the finding is
based on substantial evidence.

AUGUMENT

I.

APPELLANTS' APPEAL RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 54-4-4.1 AND ATTORNEYS' FEES IS MOOT.

A.

There is no earnings sharing nlan in effect.

The inescapable and uncontested fact is that no alternative method of

regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 presently exists or can exist for U S WEST in

Utah, unless and until one is adopted in a future proceeding before the Commis

sion. U S WEST and the Division proposed plans that were rejected by the
Commission. (R. 5477, Addendum B). Instead, the Commission adopted a plan of
its own (R. 5478-80), which U S WEST rejected under Section 54-4-4.1(2) (R. 5692-

93). Thus, Appellants' goal, which is that traditional regulation remain in effect,

continues to be fully achieved. No party is challenging that result on appeal, n
Thus, although Appellants seek to challenge the constitutionality of Section 54-4-

n
While U S WEST, in its Petition for Rehearing, asked the Commission
to reconsider its decision on the earnings sharing plan and adopt a plan more in
line with the one it proposed, U S WEST has not appealed the Commission's
decision not to do so. Likewise, the Division has not appealed the denial of its
plan.
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4.1, a determination of that issue would not affect the current means by which U S
WEST is regulated.
B.

A declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1 would not
affect the status quo, because the current rate order was issued

under traditional cost-of-service ratemaking procedures.

On the one hand, Appellants attack U S WEST's exercise of the statutory
right to opt out of a sharing plan, claiming the existence of such a right is
unconstitutional. However, they do not do so in order to allow the Commission's

sharing plan to go into effect, because they also claim that the Commission does

not have the constitutional right to adopt a non-traditional method of regulation
and that the Commission's plan should be declared invalid. Their argument, if
adopted, would therefore lead directly back to the status quo, because traditional
regulation is presently in effect.

No party asserts that any kind of plan under Section 54-4-4.1 is currently in

effect. As a consequence, whether Appellants' constitutional claims prevail or
not, the requested relief would not alter the rate order that now governs their
telephone service. Thus, all issues raised in Appellants' Docketing Statement
and Brief, with the exception of the issue relating to return on equity, are moot
and need not be decided by this Court.
C

The Court should not determine the constitutionality of a statute
unless it is essential to decide the case.

With the exception of the rate of return issue, the issues raised by Appel

lants go in various ways to the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1. In a long line
of cases, this Court has established the firm principle that it will avoid, where

possible, pronouncements as to the constitutionality ofstate statutes. The leading
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case on this issue is Hovle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980). In Hovle. the

Court outlined some basic principles:

The right and power of the judiciary to declare whether legislative
enactments exceed constitutional limitations is to be exercised with

considerable restraint and in conformity with fundamental rules.

One such fundamental rule of long-standing is that unnecessary
decisions are to be avoided and that the courts should pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute only when such a determination is

essential to the decision in a case. A constitutional question does not
arise merely because it is raised and a decision is sought thereon;
rather, the constitutionality ofa statute is to be considered in the light
of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the question and of its
particular application. An attack on the validity of a statute cannot be
made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not about to
be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.

Hoyle, 606 P.2d at 242 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). See State v. Rio Vista

Qil. Ltd,, 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1990) ("[a] fundamental principle ofjudicial
review is that, when possible, we refrain from deciding constitutional questions");

State v.Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985). Thus, this Court has adopted a
fundamental principle of judicial restraint on constitutional questions. Given the

fact that no earnings sharing plan is in effect, or could go into effect if Appellants
prevailed, it is not "essential" for the Court to determine the constitutionality of
Section 54-4-4.1 in this case.

D.

The constitutionality of a statute mav only he attacked when the
Challenger is adversely affected hv the statute's amplication.

Other cases state that in order for a party to have standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the statute must be in the process of being applied to
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the disadvantage of that party or there must be an immediate threat of its applica
tion:

The constitutionality of a statute is to be considered in the light of the
standing of the party who seeks to raise the question and of its
particular application; and a person may challenge the constitution
ality of a statute only when and as far as it is being, or is about to be
applied to his disadvantage.

Cavaness v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 351-52 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). In Sims v.

Smith. 571 P.2d 586 (Utah 1977), the Court stated that "before a party may attack

the constitutionality of a statute he must be adversely affected by that very statute."
571 P.2d at 587, quoting Pride Club v. State. 481 P.2H 669 fTTtah 1971^ In Duran v.

Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981), this Court stated that "[i]f the requested
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants, the case is moot and a court
will normally refrain from adjudicating it on the merits." Accord, Black v. Alpha
Financial Corp,, 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982); Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associ

ates, 646 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1982); State v. Kallas. 94 P.2d 414, 424 (Utah 1939).

It is undisputed that no plan of any kind is now in effect under the powers
granted to the Commission by Section 54-4-4.1. Indeed, U S WEST continues to be

regulated under the traditional regulatory regime that Appellants assert is

desirable and legally required. No possible outcome of Appellants' appeal would
change that fact. Furthermore, while U S WEST has appealed the Commission's
June 19, 1991 order, none of the issues raised by it go either to the Commission's

refusal to adopt its proposed plan or to the plan adopted by the Commission that

U S WEST elected not to accept. Appellants' interest in retaining traditional
regulation of U S WEST in Utah will not be affected in any way by a decision on the
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constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1. Therefore, Appellants' appeal on those
constitutional issues should be dismissed.

E.

The Court should not render advisory oninions. even on a reouest for
declaratory iudFrment.

After articulating its policy of restraint in dealing with constitutional

issues, this Court in Hovle set forth its strong policies relating to advisory opinions
and mootness:

A further fundamental rule is that the courts do not busy themselves
with advisory opinions, nor is it within their province to exercise the
delicate power of pronouncing a statute unconstitutional in abstract,
hypothetical, or otherwise moot cases.

It has been found to be far

wiser, and it has become settled as a general principle, that a
constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case in
hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues.

606 P.2d at 242 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). Other cases have reiterated the

strong policy against rendering advisory opinions:

Because of a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid advisory
opinions, we do not generally consider mooted questions on appeal . .
. . "The function of appellate courts, like that of courts generally, is
not to give opinions on merely abstract or theoretical matters, but only
to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some
party to the litigation, and it has been held that questions or cases

which have become moot or academic are not a proper subject to
review."

Reynolds v. Reynolds. 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah App. 1990), ouotins MacRae v.

Jflckson, 526 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Utah 1974). Accord. Black. 656 P.2d at 410-11;
Merhish, 646 P.2d at 731; Spain v. Stewart. 639 P.2d 166 (Utah 1981). In State v.
Stromquigt, 639 P.2d 171, 172 (Utah 1981), the Court made it clear that the test

whether a statute affects the legal right of a litigant is to be made in the context of
the current case, not some hypothetical future case:
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The defendant's abortive appeal to this Court can and does request
only an opinion of this Court as to the validity of a statute in which the

defendant has no further interest as it applies to the history of this
case.

This Court was not intended to be, nor is it endowed with

authority to render advisory opinions, and has said so many times.

(italics in original). No current rights of any party, including those of the Appel

lants, can possibly be impacted in this case by a determination of constitutionality
of Section 54-4-4.1. Thus, Appellants' effort to secure an advisory opinion from
this Court should be denied.

The principles enunciated above are equally applicable to Declaratory
Judgment Actions under Section 78-33-2.

The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act,

Sections 78-33-1 et seq., provides a means by which litigants can seek a judicial
declaration of their rights under statutes. Section 78-33-2 states:

Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or
whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute,
municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined
any questions of construction or validity arising under the instru
ment, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declara

tion of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.

This Court has held that actions under the Act are subject to the same limitations

discussed in prior sections of this memorandum. For example, in Baird v. State.

574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1978), the plaintiff sought and received a declaratory judgment
that a portion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional. On
appeal, this Court reversed, ruling that the district court should have held that "it

lacked jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion." 574 P.2d at 715. The Court's

discussion is highly instructive.

It first noted that plaintiff had pleaded no

"concrete facts . . . . indicating any specific injury sustained or threatened to
plaintiff personally." 574 P.2d at 715. Then, citing Lvon v. Bateman. 228 P 2d HIS
22

(Utah 1951), the Court stated:

In Lyon v. Bateman, this Court stated that while statutes authorizing
courts to render declaratory relief should be liberally construed, the
courts must, nevertheless, operate within the constitutional and

statutory powers and duties imposed upon them. The courts are not

a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory
opinions. To maintain an action for declaratory relief, plaintiff must
show that the justiciable and jurisdictional elements requisite in
ordinary actions are present, for a judgment can be rendered only in
a real controversy between adverse parties.
. . . Generally, courts have held that the conditions which must exist

before a declaratory judgment action can be maintained are: (1) a
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties must be

adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have a legally protect
able interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

To entertain an action for declaratory relief, there must be a justicia
ble controversy, for the courts do not give advisory opinions upon
abstract questions. The use of the term "rights, status and other legal
relations" in the declaratory judgment statute (§ 78-33-2, U.CA. 1953)
relates to a justiciable controversy where there is an actual conflict
between interested parties asserting adverse claims on an accrued
state of facts as opposed to a hypothetical state of facts.

Baircl, 574 P.2d at 717, quoting Lvon. 228 P.2d at 820; Backman v. Salt Lake
County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah 1962). The Baird court also made it clear that in order

to determine the legal validity of a statute, the party must show a direct injury
resulting from the statute:

To invoke judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action, claimant must show that he has sustained or is

immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that
action. It is insufficient to assert a general interest he shares in

common with all members of the public, viz., a generalized griev
ance.
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Baird. 574 P.2d at 717 (emphasis added).i2

While Appellants did not proceed under the Declaratory Judgment Act, its
principles are applicable to their claim. Since Appellants' claims for review in

their appeal would fail under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Appellants are
inappropriately attempting to do indirectly what they would not be allowed to do

under the Declaratory Judgment Act. They are, in effect, attempting to obtain a
declaration from the Supreme Court that they would have been unable to obtain
from the District Court.

A reading of Appellants' Docketing Statement and Brief shows that they are
adamantly opposed to sharing plans in general and that they believe such plans
are harmful to ratepayers (App. Brief at 40-52). Yet, nowhere do they acknowl
edge the obvious fact that no such plan is or has been in effect in Utah, nor the fact

that U S WEST remains subject to the kind of traditional regulatory treatment
Appellants believe is required. This Court can grant no specific relief in this case

that will change the fact that U S WEST is currently subject to traditional regula
tion. Furthermore, in Appellants' own words, they are "customers of U.S. West."

(Id. at 5). They claim no other status.13 Other than the possibility that U S WEST

12

The Court also quoted with approval the following statement from 1

Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, 2d ed. § 9, at 49-50:

A justiciable controversy authorizing entry of a declaratory judgment is one

wherein the plaintiff is possessed of a protectible interest at law or in equity
and the right to a judgment, and the judgment, when pronounced, must be
such as would give specific relief, (emphasis added).

13 As pointed out in footnote 48, infra, Appellants intervened in their own
behalf and not as representatives of a broader class.
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or some other utility may seek an earnings sharing plan in a future case that may
affect Appellants as utility customers, they have no present interest that can be
affected by this case. Thus, Appellants have not shown that they have sustained

any direct injury from the operation of Section 54-4-4.1, nor can they show that

they are "immediately in danger of sustaining" such an injury. Their appeal is
therefore moot and should be dismissed.
F.

This case does not fall within the only excention to the mootness
doctrine,

The Utah Supreme Court, in Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981),
adopted a limited exception to the basic principle that it will not rule on moot

issues. In Wickham. a former pretrial detainee filed a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the constitutionality of certain aspects of the jail conditions while he
was detained. On appeal, the defendants contended that plaintiff had no standing
since he was no longer a pretrial detainee. This Court held that, while the case

was technically moot, it fell within the following limited exception:
The principles that determine the justiciability of the instant case are
the well-established rules which permit a court to litigate an issue
which, although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the
time of appeal, is of wide concern, affects the public interest, is likely
to recur in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time any one
person is affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review.
629 P.2d at 899 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The Court cited as models for

the exception cases like Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) where, because of the
short human gestation period, the pregnancy would come to term before the

appellate process could be completed. Thus, in light of the fact that "present and
future detainees will suffer conditions at the jail for a period of time insufficient
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for a case to receive appellate review during the imposition of such conditions" the

Wickham Court held that it reflected "a continuing and recurring controversy
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court." 629 P.2d at 900.

This exception has been discussed in four subsequent cases, and in none of
them did the Court invoke the exception. In Merhish. this Court made it clear
that the exception applies only in extremely limited circumstances:

The extraordinary circumstances that occasionally provide an
exception to the mootness rule . . . are clearly absent in this case.
646 P.2d at 732 (emphasis added).

In State v. Davis. 721 P.2d 894 (Utah 1986), a criminal defendant asked this

Court to declare invalid a sentencing order that prescribed his criminal punish
ment. Despite the fact that the defendant had served his sentence and received a

termination of probation, he asked that the issue be considered under the excep
tion to the mootness rule. This Court described the exception this way:

The exception alluded to is where there is a continuing and recurring
controversy but, because of the short period for adjudication, appellate
review of the issue is effectively denied.
Davis., 721 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added). The Court held that the case did not fall
within the exception and refused to address the issue.

In Burkett v. Schewendim^n 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989), a motorist challenged

a driver's license revocation proceeding. Burkett's license was revoked for failing
to submit to a blood alcohol test. On appeal, he asked that the revocation be

reversed despite the fact that the one year period had already passed. The Court
noted that it occasionally invokes an exception to the mootness doctrine "when the

case presents an issue that affects the public interest, is likely to recur, and
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because of the brief time that any one litigant is affected, is capable ofevading
review." 773 P.2d at 44 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the case was

not an appropriate one in which to invoke the exception.

Finally, in Salt Lake Citv v. Tax Commission. 813 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1991), the

Court reaffirmed the exception but held that, because of a subsequent legislative
change, the issue in the case was unlikely to recur and was therefore moot.

In order to meet the terms of the exception, ail of the following require
ments must be met:

1.

It must be a public issue of wide concern;

2.

It must be an issue likely to recur; and

3.

Because of the brief time any one litigant is affected, the issue is
likely to evade review.

As a threshold matter, the third element cannot be met in this case because

no earnings sharing plan has ever affected Appellants in Utah.

The legal

authorities require that in order to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, the
rights or interests of the party making the challenge must have been affected (or

there must be an imminent threat of such an effect). In Wickham. the only case
where this Court has actually applied the exception, the plaintiff had actually
been affected by the jail conditions while he was a pretrial detainee. Likewise, in
Roe v. Wade, the plaintiff had been directly impacted by the restrictions of the

abortion law being challenged. In contrast, the only thing that has occurred in
this case was the consideration of earnings sharing plans under Section 54-4-

4.1—the result, however, was that no plan became effective and the status quo (the
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traditional regulation of U S WEST) has not changed. Thus, Appellants cannot
meet the basic threshold requirement to even allow consideration of the exception
to the mootness rule.

Even if Appellants were affected by an earnings sharing plan, they do not
meet the other elements of the exception on the specific issues they raise in their
Brief.

Points I and II. In Point I, Appellants assert that the opt out provision,

Section 54-4-4.1(2), is unconstitutional. (App. Brief at 59-67). In Point II, Appel
lants assert that if subsection 2 is unconstitutional, then all of Section 54-4-4.1 is

unconstitutional since, in their view, subsections 1 and 2 are not severable. (App.
Brief at 67-69). There is no basis to conclude that the issue will be likely to recur in

the manner it has in this case or that it will evade review. It is entirely possible
that the Commission could in the future adopt an earnings sharing plan (either of
its own making or proposed by another party) that the public utility will reject, but

which the Commission or some other party feels should be required regardless of
the attempt by the utility to reject the plan. If the Commission were to order such

a plan despite the utility's effort to reject it, both the constitutionality of subsection
2 and its severability from subsection 1 would be at issue.
Point III. Appellants argue that subsection 1 of Section 54.4.4.1—the basic

provision allowing the Commission to adopt alternative methods of regulation—is
unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. (App. Brief at 67-69). There is no basis to
conclude that the constitutionality of the subsection will evade review. In the

event the Commission adopts an alternative form of regulation under Section 54-4-
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4.1(1) in a future case and the utility accepts it, then the issue will be squarely
faced, either on appeal or at the District Court under the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the constitutionality of Section 54-44.1(1) will evade review.

Point IV. In Point IV, Appellants claim that the plan adopted by the

Commission is invalid because its adoption was procedurally flawed. (App. Brief
at 97-101). Yet the plan adopted by the Commission is not in effect. Further, since

there is no reason to believe that that precise plan will again be adopted in a future
case, this is not an issue that will likely recur, nor is there any basis to conclude

that it will evade review. If, in the future, an earnings sharing plan becomes
effective, it is that plan that should be reviewed. Since a review of the Commission

plan is purely hypothetical, it is obviously a moot issue.

Point VI. In Point VI, Appellants assert that they are entitled to attorney's
fees and costs associated with challenging the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1.
(App. Brief at 105-18). Since this issue is entirely derivative of the constitutional
question in Points I through IV, it should be dismissed along with them. It

should also be dismissed on the additional grounds set forth in Section VII, infra.
G. Snmmnry

This Court has adopted a strong policy against making a determination of
the constitutional validity of state statutes, except where "such determination is

essential to the decision in the case."i4 Likewise, this Court has consistently held

that a person has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only

14 Hoyk,606P.2dat242.
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where the statute is being applied "or is about to be applied to his disadvantage."15
It is undisputed that the determination of the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1 is
not essential to the decision in any case—it is equally undisputed that the statute
is not currently being applied to Appellants' detriment, nor is it about to be.

Further, this Court has adopted a strong policy against rendering advisory
opinions, which is precisely what Appellants are requesting this Court to do.

Appellants are asking this Court to render a decision that they would be unable to

obtain from a District Court under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Finally, none
of the issues raised by Appellants fall within the single limited exception to the
mootness doctrine adopted by this Court.

On this basis, Respondents respectfully request that this Court dismiss on
mootness grounds all issues except the rate of return issue.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD FOLLOW GENERALLY ACCEPTED RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN INTERPRETING THE VALIDITY OF
SECTION 54-4-4.1.

This section and the remaining sections of the Brief, with the exception of
Sections VII and VIII, address issues relating to the constitutionality of Section
54-4-4.1 and are only relevant if the Court declines to rule that those issues are
moot.

Prior to discussing the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1, it is essential to

review generally accepted rules of statutory construction used by the Court in
determining the constitutionality of statutes.
In Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 789

15 Cavaness. 598 P.2d at 352.
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P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1990), this Court declared that statutes are presumed to be
constitutional:

We first note the presumption of validity accorded legislative enact
ments when attacked on constitutional grounds. The burden is on
those who would have us strike down the statute.

In State v.Rio Vista Oil Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1349-50 (Utah 1990), this Court
reaffirmed these basic constitutional principles and stated:
It is axiomatic that statutes are presumed to be constitutional and

that the party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears the
burden of proving that it is invalid. This burden is especially heavy
when attacking an economic measure, [citations omitted]

In Utah Technology Finance Corn, v. Wilkinson. 723 P.2d 406, 412-13 (Utah
1986), this Court stated:

"Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires
that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the

legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legiti
mate objective." [quoting Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979)]

.... It is only when a legislative determination of public purpose is
so clearly in error as to be capricious and arbitrary that the judiciary
should upset it. . . .

In Kent Club v. Toronto. 305 P.2d 870, 873-74 (Utah 1957), the Court held that
legislation

should not be judicially declared invalid on the ground that it is
unintelligible or uncertain unless it is so imperfect and deficient as to
render it susceptible of no reasonable construction that will give it
effect, or the court finds itself unable to divine the purpose and intent
of the Legislature.

In Norville v. State Tax Commission. 97 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1940), the Court
held:

Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitu
tional and valid. When there is ambiguity in the terms of a statute or
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when it is susceptible of two interpretations one of which would
render it unconstitutional and the other bring it within constitutional
sanctions, the court is bound to choose that interpretation which
would uphold the statute, and to pronounce a statute unconstitution
al only when the case is so clear as to be free from doubt, [citation
omitted]

See also, Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Garfield Countv. 811 P.2d
184,187 (Utah 1991).

The burden on Appellants in this case—to demonstrate that Section 54-4-4.1

is unconstitutional—is especially heavy because statutes relating to utility rate

making are clearly economic measures. The rates charged by a public utility
have an enormous impact on the citizens of Utah and the state's economic well-

being.

Under these circumstances, the Court should particularly strive to

interpret Section 54-4-4.1 as a valid statute, even if it believes that there are two

reasonable interpretations, one that would render the statute unconstitutional,
and one that would make it valid.

III.

NEITHER THE CONSTITUTION NOR THE PUBLIC UTILITY CODE
MANDATES COST-OF-SERVICE RATE REGULATION AS THE ONLY
PERMISSIBLE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING JUST AND REASONABLE
RATES.

The central premise underlying all of Appellants' arguments is that

traditional cost of service rate regulation is the only method of rate regulation
authorized or permitted for natural monopoly public utilities.16 (App. Brief at 20-

16 Appellants' assumption that telephone companies are natural monopo
lies is subject to significant controversy before regulatory bodies throughout the
nation, given the tremendous changes that are taking place in the telecommuni
cations industry. However, even assuming telephone companies are natural
monopolies, Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. Therefore, this brief will
not address this issue.
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33). Furthermore, their argument relies upon a corollary premise that under

traditional cost of service rate regulation, the authorized rate of return used by the
Commission is an absolute constraint on utility earnings, such that earnings that
exceed that rate of return are presumed illegal. Neither of these premises finds
any support in any section of the Public Utility Code (Title 54), the Utah or United

States Constitutions, or fundamental principles of rate making.
This section of Respondents' Brief will demonstrate that the Commission is

bound to follow broad policy statements in the Public Utility Code, but is not
required to achieve just and reasonable rates through any particular means. In

particular, the objectives of a sharing plan are to encourage more efficiency in the

utility than would otherwise occur under traditional regulation, by providing the
utility an incentive to earn a return higher than it would under traditional

regulation, but requiring the utility to share a portion of that higher return with
its customers. Thus both the utility and the customer could be better off under

"incentive" regulation than under traditional regulation. However, regardless of

the merits of the debate over such forms of regulation, neither the Public Utility
Code nor the Constitution prohibit an attempt to achieve these objectives by
altering traditional regulation.
A.

The Public Utility Code authorizes the Commission to set iust

and reasonable rates, but does not require the Commission to
utilize anv p^rtf ndar method in doing so.

The Public Utility Code requires that utility rates shall be "just and reason

able" and provides general guidelines as to what that phrase means. However, it

does not specify any particular method or formula to be utilized in setting just and
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reasonable rates.

Section 54-3-1 states that rates must be just and reasonable and suggests
some criteria that may be reviewed in determining whether or not they are. It
does not establish any method for setting rates.17

Section 54-4-4(1) also provides that the Commission must set just, reason
able, non-discriminatory, and sufficient rates and sets forth procedural prerequi
sites including the necessity of a hearing and an order. However, the method of
setting rates is not addressed.18

Section 54-4a-6 provides objectives for the Division of Public Utilities in the

performance of its activities "in the public interest." Among the objectives, the
Division is to present "objective and comprehensive information, evidence and

17 In pertinent part, Section 54-3-1 provides:

All charges made .... by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable.
Every unjust or unreasonable charge made ... is hereby prohibited and

declared unlawful. ... All rules and regulations made by a public utility
affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the public shall be just
and reasonable. The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include,

but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of
customer, economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and

on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide periodic
variations in demand of such products, commodities or services, and
means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy, [emphasis
added]

18 In pertinent part., this statute provides:

Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing that the rates
. . . charged or collected by any public utility for any service or product
. . . are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in
anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that such rates . . .

are insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable

or sufficient rates ... to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall
fix the same by order as hereinafter provided.
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recommendations" to the Commission to "provide for just, reasonable, and

adequate rates."^ The statute does not require that any particular methodology be
utilized in achieving those objectives.

Many other sections of Title 54 refer to rates or to procedures involved in
setting rates for utilities.20 Many others do not mention rates, but establish

19 Subsection 4 enumerates several standards to guide the determination of
what is "just, reasonable, and adequate:"
For purposes of guiding the activities of the Division of Public

Utilities, the phrase "just, reasonable, and adequate" encompasses,
but is not limited to the following criteria:

(a) maintain the financial integrity of public
utilities by assuring a sufficient and fair rate of return;

(b) promote efficient management and operation
of public utilities;

(c) protect the long-range interest of consumers in

obtaining continued quality and adequate levels of
service at the lowest cost consistent with the other
provisions of Subsection (4).

(d) provide for fair apportionment of the total cost
of service among customer categories and individual
customers and prevent undue discrimination in rate

relationships;
(e) promote stability in rate levels for customers

and revenue requirements for utilities from year to year;
and

(0 protect against wasteful use of public utility
services.

20 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-2 [requiring the filing and posting of rate
schedules], 54-3-3 [providing for changes in rate schedules], 54-3-4 [providing for
joint tariffs], 54-3-7 [requiring utilities to charge the rates contained in their filed
schedules], 54-3-8 [forbidding preferences or unreasonable discrimination in

rates charged various customers], 54-3-9 [allowing sliding scales in rates and
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procedures that are applicable in setting rates.21 However, none describes, much

automatic adjustments in rates], 54-3-19 [restricting charges relative to the
distance involved in the service], 54-4-2 [authorizing the Commission to conduct
investigations and to hold hearings and enter orders based upon such investiga

tions], 54-4-12 [allowing the Commission to set joint rates], 54-4-22 [indicating that
rates may be based upon the value of properties or investments in the state and
that no increase in rates may be found justified if the increase will result in

earnings in an amount greater than a fair return on the value of properties],
54-7-9(3) [providing procedures that must be followed by customers in complain
ing about rates], 54 7-12 [providing detailed procedures that must be followed

when any party seeks a rate increase or decrease], 54-7-20 [allowing reparations
of rates charged under certain circumstances], 54-8b-3 and 54-8b-4 [authorizing
the Commission to exempt certain utilities or services from rate regulation],
54-8b-6 [forbidding telecommunications corporations from subsidizing unregulat
ed services through regulated services], 54-8b-10 [allowing the Commission to
impose a surcharge on rates to assist in providing telecommunications devices to

hearing and speech impaired persons], 54-8b-ll and 54-8b-12 [directing the
Commission to make available high-quality, universal telecommunications

services at just and reasonable rates for all classes of customers and allowing the
Commission to establish a surcharge to assist in these objectives] and 54-10-4
[directing the Committee of Consumer Services to assess the impact of rate
changes on residential and small commercial customers].

2i Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-3 [utilities cannot change their rates without

filing new schedules with the Commission]; 54-3-7 [the utility charges filed with
the Commission may not be deviated from, no refunds or rebates are to be made];
54-3-8 [no preferences are to be given]; 54-4-1 [the Commission is granted power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate the utility and to supervise all of its
business and to do all things necessary to accomplish the matters set forth in the

Public Utility Code]; 54-4-2 [the Commission has power to investigate compliance
with its orders, to hold hearings with notice and to prepare findings and orders
based thereon]; 54-4-4 [mandating the Commission to establish just and reason
able rates after hearing and by order]; 54-4-23 [the power to establish a system of
accounts to be utilized by the utility and to review a utility's records];"54-4a-l
[general oversight regulatory power of the Division of Public Utilities]; 54-7-9
[authorizing the Commission or consumers to file a complaint against the utility];
54-7-12 [providing procedures to be followed any time rates are increased or
decreased]; 54-7-13 [allowing the Commission to rescind or amend an order

previously made after notice and an opportunity to be heard]; 54-7-15 [allowing any
party to seek review or rehearing of a Commission order]; 54-7-17 [procedures to
obtain a stay of a Commission order pending judicial review of the order]; 54-7-20
[giving customers a remedy to recover improper charges by utilities]; 54-7-21 to 25
[giving the Commission authority to enforce the Public Utility Code and its orders

and to impose penalties upon and to enjoin a utility]; 54-10-1 et seq. [establishing
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less mandates, the traditional cost of service ratemaking process that Appellants
claim is the only permitted method of rate regulation.
B.

There is no constitutional requirement that rates he set utilizing
traditional cost of servire ratemaldng,

Although Appellants do not directly argue that traditional cost of service

rate making is required under the state or federal constitutions, such an argu
ment is a logical extension of their premise that traditional cost of service rate

making is the only proper form of rate making for natural monopoly utilities, and
is clearly relevant in considering whether Section 54-4-4.1 is constitutional.

The issue of the constitutionality of alternative types of regulation has

arisen in several different contexts. It has been universally held that, so long as

the end result of rate making is just and reasonable, no constitutional infirmity
exists as a result of the rate making method employed. Furthermore, courts have

held that rate moratoriums in which rates are held at fixed levels for varying
periods of time are constitutional.

1. The end result and not the method of rate regulation determines
whether rate making is constitutional
From the outset of rate regulation, various interests have contended that

certain methods or approaches to rate making were constitutionally required.
For example, an argument similar to Appellants' was made by Utah Power &
Light Company ("UP&L") in the 1940s. In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944), UP&L argued that its rate base should

the Committee of Consumer Services and making it representative of residential
consumers and small business in Commission proceedings].
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be calculated on current fair value, rather than on original cost less depreciation,
as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law. Id. at 545-46. This Court

rejected that argument, at least in part on the basis of Federal Power Commission
v. Hope Natural Gas Co.. 320 U.S. 591 (1944):

The Hope case stands squarely for the doctrine that it is the final

impact of the rate order which is controlling insofar as Federal
constitutional limitations are concerned. So long as the rate set does
not confiscate the property devoted to public service, the rate order

will not be held to violate substantive constitutional principles. The
legislature is free to determine its own economic policy in regard to
the fixing of rates. Its power to set rates is, however, still circum
scribed by two constitutional limitations: (1) substantive constitu

tional law requires that the rates finally set shall not be confiscatory;
and (2) the requirements of procedural due process must still be
followed.

UP&L. 152 R2d at 553.

In UP&L, the Utah Supreme Court made it clear that there are only two
constitutional limitations on the authority to regulate utility rates. The first-that

the rates not be confiscatory-protects utilities from rates set so low that they do not
provide a fair return on the capital invested in utility service. Id. at 568.22 The

second-that procedural due process must be followed-protects all parties involved

by ensuring that the Commission affords notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Any method of regulation that complies with these two requirements is constitu

tionally valid. Significant by its absence was any mention ofa constitutional right
in ratepayers or the utility to have rates established in any particular manner.

Thus, while the Constitution sets limits on how low rates may be set, it has not

22 See also, Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co v Public Serv
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. On v
Public Serv. Comm'n 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
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mandated any upper limit on rates.23

The holding of Hope, as approved by the Utah Supreme Court in UP&L. has

been widely accepted and followed. It has been the basis for holding that various

alternative methods of rate regulation are constitutional. For example, in In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases. 390 U.S. 747, reh. denied, 392 U. S. 917 (1968), the

United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prevent the
setting of maximum or price ceiling rates.

In Wisconsin v. Federal Power

Commission, 373 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1963), the Court upheld area rates based on
reasonable financial requirements of the industry rather than on those of an
individual company.

Recently, in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch. 488 U.S. 299 (1989), the United

23 Although the Constitution has not set an upper limit on rates, this Court
has provided the Commission guidelines on its duties to set just and reasonable
rates. In Lewis v. Wvcoff Co.. 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 264, 259 (Utah 1966), the

Court stated that the Commission has the duty "of seeing that the public receives
the most efficient and economical service possible."

In Committee of Consumer

Services v. Public Service Comm'n. 595 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 1979) ["Wexpro I"], the
Court stated that

it is the duty of a public utility corporation to operate in such a
manner as to give to the consumers the most favorable rate reason

ably possible. This duty stems from the fact the State has conferred

on the utility of [sic] the exclusive right to sell and distribute gas. As
a consequence, the utility bears a trust relationship to its customers

and must conduct its operations on that basis and not as though it
were engaged in a private enterprise with no restrictions as to its
income.

These cases assist the Commission in entering a finding when it adopts a new
form of regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 that the rates that result from the new

form of regulation meet the "just and reasonable" test. Furthermore, the Utah

Supreme Court has never expressly held that there is a constitutional ceiling on
utility rates.
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States Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require the inclusion of
investments in discontinued or abandoned generating facilities in rate base, even
though the investments were prudent when made.

The basis for the Court's

holding was an act of the Pennsylvania Legislature prohibiting consideration of
canceled plants. Holding that the statute did not violate the United States Consti
tution, the Court said:

It cannot seriously be contended that the Constitution prevents state
legislatures from giving specific instructions to their utility commis
sions. We have never doubted that state legislatures are competent

bodies to set utility rates. And the Pennsylvania PUC is essentially
an administrative arm of the legislature. . . . We stated in Permian
Basin that the commission "must be free, within the limitations

imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to

devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse
and conflicting interests." ...

Similarly, an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitution
al attack by questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that
produced it. "It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which
counts." [Citing Hope.1 The economic judgments required in rate

proceedings are often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single
correct result. The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these
economic niceties. . . . The Constitution protects the utility from the
net effect of the rate order on its property. . . .
Hope clearly held that "the Commission was not bound to the use of

any single formula or combination of formulae in determining
rates." ... In Wisconsin v. FPC, ... the Court observed that:

"[T]o declare that a particular method of rate regulation
is so sanctified as to make it highly unlikely that any
other method could be sustained would be wholly out of
keeping with this Court's consistent and clearly articu
lated approach to the question of the Commission's
power to regulate rates. It has repeatedly been stated
that no single method need be followed by the Commis
sion in considering the justness and reasonableness of
rates."
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The adoption of a single theory of valuation as a constitutional
requirement would be inconsistent with the view of the Constitution

this Court has taken since Hope Natural Gas, supra,. . . . The
designation of a single theory of rate making as a constitutional
requirement would unnecessarily foreclose alternatives which could
benefit both consumers and investors. The Constitution within broad

limits leaves the States free to decide what rate-setting methodology
best meets their needs in balancing the interests of the utility and the
public.
Mat 313-16.

Under Barasch. it is apparent that the traditional cost of service method is

not the only constitutionally permitted method of rate making.
2.

Plans which freeze rates for a reasonable period of time are not
unconstitutional

!n Columbia Gas of West Virginia. Inc. v. Public Service Commission. 311

S.E.2d 137 (W.Va. 1983), the utility challenged the constitutionality of a statute

allowing the commission to place a moratorium on rate increases for natural gas
utilities for a period of one year. At the time the statute became effective, the
utility was in the midst of a rate proceeding. The statute granted the commission
discretion to suspend the proceeding during the period of the moratorium or to
proceed with the case as if the statute had not been enacted. The commission

proceeded with the case and found a rate increase justified, but then entered an

order suspending the effectiveness of the increase during the moratorium. On

appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute.

Similarly, rate freezes or moratoriums ranging up to three years in length
have passed constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Permian Basin. 390 U.S. at 781

(two and one-halfyears); Trustees of Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas.
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Electric Light and Power Co.. 83 N E. 693, 701 (1908) (three years).

The revenue sharing plan adopted by the Commission, if accepted by U S

WEST, would not even have acted as a moratorium. U S WEST and other parties

would have been free to request changes in rates during the period of the plan,
which would have terminated the plan. Surely, if a complete moratorium passes
constitutional muster, such a revenue sharing plan would also.
C

Even without the statute, the Commission has hroad authority in
determining how to regulate rates.

In UP&L, the Court considered UP&L's principal argument that, even if

rate regulation based on original cost rate base was constitutionally permitted, it
was contrary to the Public Utility Code. After reviewing several provisions of the
Public Utility Code, the Court concluded:

These sections give the Commission general jurisdiction over

utility rates. They empower the Commission to do all things neces
sary to supervise and regulate every utility in this state. They provide
that rates are to be just and reasonable and direct the Commission to

fix just and reasonable rates by order after hearing. These sections
are broad and sweeping in scope. The limitations placed on the
exercise of full legislative powers by said sections are: first, that the
Commission proceed by notice and hearing; and second, that the
rates established conform to the standard of "just and reasonable."
These sections contain no mandate that rates be based on a fair value
rate base.

IIP&L, 152 P.2d at 555. Similarly, the Public Utility Code, as it exists currently,
contains no mandate that traditional cost of service regulation is the only autho
rized method of setting rates.24

24 Appellants acknowledge that there is a wide range of different methods

of rate regulation across a spectrum from cost of service rate making, to value of
service ratemaking (used in transportation), least cost ratemaking, bidding,
prospective rate setting on an average cost basis, affirmative price controls,
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Since UP&L, the Court has reaffirmed on several occasions that the

Commission's authority in setting rates is broad. See, e.g.. Mountain States Tel,
& Tel, Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 754 P.2d 928, 931-32 (Utah 1988); KearnsTribune Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 682 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1984).

This Utah authority is supported by many cases from other jurisdictions.
For example, in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Montana Department of Public

Service Regulation. 752 P.2d 155, 157 (Mont. 1988), the court stated:
In determining what is just and reasonable, the PSC is not restricted
to any single formula, if the method followed and the order entered

when applied to the facts and viewed as a whole do not produce an
unjust or arbitrary result.' ....

The PSC has the power to adopt any non-arbitrary method it chooses.

In People's Organization for Washington Energy Resources v. Washington
Utilities & Transportation Commission. 711 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1985), private and
public consumer agencies challenged rate orders of the commission on the

ground that it did not have authority to allow amortization by the utility of costs
associated with a canceled nuclear generating facility in setting rates.

On

appeal, the court, noting the complexity of the issue presented, said:

Most states delegate their rate making power to regulatory agencies
in very broad terms, basically just directing them to set those rates

which the agencies determine to be just and reasonable. Washington
is such a state. "[T]he statutory direction to the Commission in rate

"social contract ratemaking", banded ratemaking, "incentive" ratemaking, etc.
App. Brief at 74. However, Appellants go on to assert, without citation of authori

ty, that "[c]ost of service ratemaking is the universally developed system of
ratemaking for natural monopoly utilities . . ." Id. Such a sweeping statement is
plainly in error, as shown in UP&L. Hope, and Barasch. Even if it were true, it
would not mean that the Constitution nor the Public Utility Code mandates cost of
service ratemaking.
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setting is broadly stated." The statutory mandate to the WUTC is to
set fair, reasonable and sufficient rates.

People's Organization. 711 P.2d at 324-25.

(Italics in original, citation

omitted.)

In Maryland People's Counsel v. Heintz. 516 A.2d 599 (Md.App. 1986), cert.
denied, 522 A.2d 393 (Md. 1987), the Maryland commission set rates for an

intrastate, interLATA carrier within a range of reasonableness allowing the
carrier flexibility in altering rates within the range.

The court described the

Commission's action as follows:

With respect to the establishment of these flexible rates, the Commis

sion found that it was not wholly appropriate to rely exclusively on
cost-of-service evidence and the "traditional" rate-making revenue
requirement methodology ....

516 A.2d at 602. The order was challenged on the bases that the revenue require
ment established by traditional cost of service analysis is the only amount that can
be utilized in establishing a just and reasonable rate, and that the amount so

established sets a maximum ceiling on just and reasonable rates.
In response to these contentions, the court said:

There is no requirement that there must be any given percentage of
return on the fair value of property. Between the lowest return that is

not unreasonable to the point of being confiscatory and the highest
that is not inordinate, there is a rather wide zone in which a return
may be reasonable under some circumstances and not under others.

[Quoting with approval Baltimore Transit Co.. 112 A.2d 687 (Md.
1955)] .. .

If the Commission is permitted leeway to determine the rate
base and rate of return, but prohibited from exercising discretion in
arriving at a just and reasonable rate based on those figures, this
would exalt form over substance. . . .

Moreover, there is nothing in rate making which requires that
44

of return be a fixed percentage. All that is required is that the Commission
determine a "reasonable return." [Citation omitted.]
516A.2dat606.

These cases illustrate that regulatory commissions are not bound to follow

the traditional cost of service approach in setting rates. That is particularly the
case where a legislature has specifically authorized the commission to consider

and adopt alternative approaches, as it has done in Utah. If the Legislature had

intended that the Commission could only establish "just and reasonable" rates by
use of a cost-of-service approach, it could easily have so stated in the statute. That
it has left the statutory standard in broad terms should be taken as an indication

of its intent to grant the Commission discretion to determine rates through other
methodologies. Section 54-4-4.1 simply clarifies that the Commission has such

broad discretion, including the authority to adopt revenue sharing plans.
D.

The Commission is required to set rates, not rate of return

A basic flaw in Appellants' argument is the premise that the rate of return

utilized in setting rates is a limit which is not guaranteed, but which cannot be
exceeded. This premise is wrong.
There is nothing in the Public Utility Code that directs the Commission to

set a rate of return that a utility may not exceed. To the contrary, Sections 54-4-4(1)

and 54-4-7(12) specifically talk about the Commission setting rates, and Section
54-3-7 requires utilities to charge the rates set by the Commission.

If the Commission set a rate of return that could not be exceeded, then

earnings in excess of that rate of return would be illegal and subject to refund,

even though the utility was compelled by law to charge the rates that produced the
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"excess" earnings.

However, in Utah Dept. of Business Reg, v. Public Serv.

Comm'n. 720 P.2d at 420-21 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated in
reference to rate making that:

This process places both the utility and the consumers at risk that the

rate-making procedures have not accurately predicted costs and
revenues.

If the utility underestimates its costs or overestimates

revenues, the utility makes less money. By the same token, if a
utility's revenues exceed expectations or if costs are below predic
tions, the utility keeps the excess, (emphasis added)

Another case indirectly supports the proposition that rate of return may be
a tool, but is not the end result, of rate making. In Utah Dept. of Business Reg, v.
Public Serv. Comm'n. 614 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1980) ["Wage Case"], the Court consid

ered whether the Commission could increase Mountain Fuel Supply Company's
("MFS") rates on the basis of two wage increases which occurred within several

months after the conclusion of a general rate case. The order approving the
increase found that the increase would not result in MFS earning in excess of a

reasonable rate of return, but did not find the resulting rates just and reasonable.
In reversing the order, the Court said:

One of the most significant deficiencies in the order was the omission
of any finding the new rates were just and reasonable. Mountain

Fuel urges such a finding is implicit within the finding concerning
the reasonableness of the rate of return .... [I]t was impossible to
determine whether the rates were just and reasonable without

consideration of the other factors involved in making such a deter
mination.

614 P.2d at 1246. Obviously, the Court did not regard rate of return as the sine qua
non of rate making, as the Appellants do.
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E-

Rates that have been found iust and reasonahle do not become uniust
or unreasonable iust because thev result in earnings in excess of or
below the authorized rate of return.

Appellants' argument that rates set pursuant to a revenue sharing plan

under Section 54-4-4.1 will be unjust and unreasonable is based on an assump
tion, made without citing any supporting authority, that if rates charged result in

earnings in excess of the rate of return set by the Commission, they are unjust
and unreasonable. In essence, they argue that earnings that exceed an autho
rized rate of return are ipso facto unjust and unreasonable, even when those
earnings are the direct result of the rates set by a regulatory commission, which

the public utility is required by law to charge. This argument not only ignores
decisions of this Court, it ignores overwhelming authority from throughout the
country that rates approved by a regulatory commission in a final order generally
are presumed just and reasonable until found otherwise after hearing. Indeed,
regardless of whether a utility is earning above or below its authorized rate of

return, if it failed to charge the rates set by the Commission, it would be in
violation of Section 54-3-7.

American Salt Co. v. W.S. Hatch Co.. 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987); Denver &

Rio Grande R.R. v. Public Util. Comm'n. 73 Utah 139, 272 P. 939 (1928); and UtahIdaho Cent. R.R. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n. 64 Utah 54, 227 P. 1025 (1924), hold

that rates set in final orders are just and reasonable and are not subject to
reparations under Section 54-7-20.

It is universally accepted that public utilities are required to charge rates
established by a commission in a general rate case and that such rates are
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presumed just and reasonable until changed. For example, in Michigan Bell Tel.

Co. v. Michigan Public Serv. Comm'n. 24 N.W.2d 200 (Mich. 1946), the Michigan
Supreme Court held that

when a regulatory body has prescribed a rate to be charged for the
future by a public utility and subsequently decides that such pre
scribed rate should be reduced, it cannot penalize the utility for
collecting the rate during the period elapsing between the date of the
order prescribing the rate and the date of the subsequent order
reducing it.
Id. at 204.

In Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison. T. & S. F. Rv. Co.. 284 U.S. 370 (1932),

the Supreme Court of the United States held that, where the rate charged by a
railway carrier was established by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission

("ICC"), the ICC could not thereafter subject the carrier to reparations by declar
ing that the rate it had previously fixed was in fact unreasonable.

In State ex rel. Rovnton y, Public Serv. Comm'n. 11 P.2d 999 (Kan. 1932), the

Kansas Supreme Court,, interpreting the words "unjust and unreasonable"
reached a similar holding. The court stated:

It seems clear that when a rate has been the subject of a deliberate
inquiry in which the carriers, the shippers, and the commission's

own experts have participated, as well as any and all other persons
who cared to take a hand in it as the statute provides and permits,
any rate so prescribed by the commission and put into effect by the
carriers may be confidently collected and retained by them as their
very own, without misgiving that at some future time a further

hearing of the commission may be had and more evidence taken and
a different conclusion reached and those rates condemned as
unreasonable and reparation certificates allowed for the difference
between the rates which the commission did authorize and the rates

which it should have authorized. Such a method of regulating public
utilities has none of the earmarks of due process of law nor of the

simplest notions of justice. Nor would it be worth the while of any

shipper to receive such a reparation certificate, for it would not serve
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as a justiciable basis of recovery. That point, at least, was laid at rest
by [Arizona Grocery].
Id. at 1006-07 (citations omitted).

The law in other jurisdictions comports with that in Utah and supports the

sound rule that rates set by a commission in a general rate case are presumed
"just and reasonable." They do not become ipso facto unjust and unreasonable
simply because they result in earnings in excess of or below the rate of return
used in setting them.
IV.

THE LEGISLATURE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY EMPOWER THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TO ADOPT A REVENUE SHARING
PLAN.

This section of the Brief will address Appellants' arguments dealing with
the unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to the Commission and to the

Courts (App. Brief at 70-81). In addition, this section of Respondents' Brief will
address the due process claims (Id. at 81) and antitrust policy constraints (Id. at
92) raised by Appellants.
Appellants state that "[t]hese issues arise in the event that the Court does

strike down the exercise of the veto power granted the utility . . . and in the event
the Court rejects Appellants' argument that the statute is not severable and must

be stricken in its entirety." (Id. at 70). In those circumstances, Appellants argue
that the Commission's decision to adopt a method of "incentive rate making" and
the specific plan adopted would then be resurrected as the standing order of the
Commission, and would therefore be ripe for review. (Id.) Appellants argue that
the Court should therefore determine whether the incentive plan adopted by the
Commission meets constitutional and statutory challenges.
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Respondents disagree. If the Court strikes down Subsection 2 of Section 54-4-

4.1, the Court need not determine any additional constitutional or statutory issues
concerning Section 54-4-4.1 or the validity of the plan adopted by the Commission.

As was stated in the section on mootness (Section I, supra), no plan is currently in
effect in Utah as a result of U S WEST exercising its option under Subsection 2.
Any decision to place an incentive plan in effect absent Subsection 2 should be left

up to the Commission in a subsequent proceeding and not determined by the

Court in this proceeding. The validity of any incentive plan, including its consti
tutionality, adequacy of findings of fact, and compliance with the Administrative
Procedures Act, could be determined if and when the Commission determines to

order a form of regulation different than is currently in effect today and someone
appeals that decision to the Court. It appears to Respondents that if the Court

determines that Subsection 2 is unconstitutional, it would be up to the Commis

sion in a subsequent proceeding to determine if a change in current regulation is
warranted. No incentive plan should be deemed in effect in the event Subsection 2
were declared unconstitutional.25

A-

The power to adopt a revenue sharing nlan or anv method of regula
tion consistent with Title 54 does not constitute an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.

Appellants argue that the power to adopt any method of regulation consis

tent with "this title" in Section 54-4-4.1 means "that if the statute is upheld, the

25 Although Respondents believe that no revenue sharing order would be in

effect if subsection 2 is declared unconstitutional absent an additional order by the
Commission, Respondents would have no objection to a remand to the Commis
sion to determine if a change in current regulation should occur.
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Commission can adopt any method of rate making it chooses and the limitation

that the rates must be just and reasonable' ceases to have any independent
meaning." (App. Brief at 70).

Appellants also state that if a method of rate

making expressly authorizes the collection of revenues in excess of those found to

be "just and reasonable" by the Commission, the concept of justness and reason
ableness will have lost all meaning as a guide in proceedings (Id. at 71).
As was stated previously, see § III(B), supra, the Constitution does not

mandate or limit the Commission to the type of regulation defined by Appellants.
No constitutional limitation is placed on permitting a method of rate regulation
that would allow the utility to earn above the authorized rate of return found by the
Commission in an earlier proceeding to be reasonable.

The whole theory of

"incentive" regulation is that the end result-the rates that will be charged
customers during the revenue sharing plan period-would continue to be "just

and reasonable." The economic principle that is espoused in a revenue sharing
plan is that by allowing the utility to earn above its authorized rate of return, the

utility would be induced to decrease costs compared to what would have happened
under traditional regulation, so that the customer would be as well off or better off

than under traditional regulation. As Appellants point out (App. Brief at 74),

there is a wide range of different methods of rate regulation across a "spectrum"
from cost of service rate making, to value of service rate making (used in trans

portation), least cost rate making, bidding, prospective rate setting on an average
cost basis, affirmative price controls, "social contract rate making," banded rate
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making, "incentive" rate making, etc.26

When considering either a revenue sharing method of rate regulation, or
any of the methods listed in Appellants' Brief, the Commission would continue to

be required to find that the result of the method of rate regulation selected produc
es "just and reasonable" rates. The essential point is that the Constitution does

not restrict the Commission to selecting only the method of rate regulation defined
by Appellants, but frees the Commission to select a method of rate regulation
which best suits the factual and economic conditions being presented to it.
1.

The commission is entitled to engage in legislative functions so
long as the functions are delegable functions.

Appellants argue that the delegation within Section 54-4-4.1 violates Article

VI, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution, which provides;27
The legislative powers of the state shall be vested:

1.

In a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be
designated the Legislature of the State of Utah.

2.

In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter stated: . . .

26 App. Brief at 74. It should be pointed out that the Commission is current

ly conducting two least cost planning proceedings. In the Matter of the Analysis
of Least Cost Power Plan for Pacific Corp. Docket No. 90-2035-01, the Commission
is investigating the role of least cost planning the electric utilities will use in
Utah- In the Matter of the Analysis of an Integrated Resource Plan for Mountain

Fuel Supply Companv. Docket No. 91-057-09, the Commission is currently
conducting an investigation into the use an integrated resource plan will have in
establishing rates and terms and conditions of service in Utah. Further, the
Commission in In the Matter of the Petition of The Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Companv for Exemption from Regulation of Various Central

Dffice Based Services, Case No. 86-049-07, Report and Order (1-25-88) at 17-18, the
Commission adopted banded rates for certain U S WEST services.
2? App. Brief at 73.
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Appellants cite several cases in which the Utah courts have declared laws

unconstitutional because they delegated an essential legislative function such as

defining a crime or imposition of a tax to an administrative agency. They cite no
cases holding that rate regulation of a public utility cannot be delegated to an
administrative agency such as the Public Service Commission.

2.

The authority to set rates is a delegable legislative function-

Section 54-4-4.1 can only be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority if the power to regulate rates is a non-delegable function or if the

legislature did not provide adequate standards or procedural safeguards to guide

the Commission in regulating rates. It is undisputed and is universally accepted
that legislatures may delegate their authority to regulate rates to administrative
agencies.

In Peoples' Organization v. Washington Utility and Transportation

Commission, 711 P.2d 319, 325 (Wash. 1985), the Washington Supreme Court
observed:

The function of rate making is legislative in character and may be
directly exercised by the Legislature itself or, as in the usual case, by
administrative bodies endowed to that end ....

In this state, the Legislature has conferred the rate making power on
the WUTC, subject of course, to appropriate judicial review.

No Utah case has been found with such an explicit statement of the princi
ple that rate making is a delegable function. However, in Utah Dept. of Business
Regulation v. Public Serv. Commn. 614 P.2d 1242 at 1250 (Utah 1980), this Court
observed, in construing its powers to declare a rate order void and order a refund:
To undertake such a course would be tantamount to this Court
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engaging in rate-making which is strictly a legislative power, for the
P.S.C. in fixing and promulgating rates acts merely as an arm of the
Legislature.2«

There can be no doubt that the Legislature may delegate to the Commission
the authority to establish rates without violating Article VI, Section 1.

3.

The cases cited by Appellants for an unconstitutional delega
tion oflegislative powers are inapplicable.

Three of Appellants' cases, State v. Green. 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1990),
State v.Gallion. 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977) and State v. Goss. 11 P.2d 340 (Utah 1932)
involved criminal prosecutions which were found unconstitutional because the

laws or regulations under which the defendant was prosecuted involved the

delegation to another entity of the essential legislative authority to determine what
is a crime. The Supreme Court made it clear in these cases that delegation of

authority to define a crime is different than many other types of delegations. In
Gallion. 572 P.2d at 690, the Court stated:

There is a certain peril involved if administrative procedures can be
applied to the criminal law ... a determination of the elements of a

crime and the appropriate punishment therefor are, under our

Constitutional system, judgements, which must be made exclusively
by the legislature.29

Appellants also rely on Tite v. State Tax Commission. 57 P.2d 734 (Utah

1936) and Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission. 48 P.2d 526,

28 See also Kearns Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n. 682 P.2d 858,
860 (Utah 1984); Utah Dent, of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service Comm'n. 658 P.2d
601, 621 (Utah 1983); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Serv.

£ommh, 155 P.2d 184, 187-188, reh. denied, 158 P.2d 935 (Utah 1945); Utah Power
and Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 152 P.2d 542, 546-53 (Utah 1944); Mulcahv
v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 117 P.2d 298, 302 (Utah 1941).

29 See also State v. Green, supra, 793 P.2d at 916, n. 8.
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528 (Utah 1935). Both cases involved imposition of taxes or penalties associated

with taxes. In Tite, the Tax Commission was prohibited from determining the
amount of penalty that should be assessed for non-compliance with a law requir

ing tax stamps to be affixed to cigarettes. The Court distinguished cases involving
public utility commissions to whom authority had been granted "like the power to
fix reasonable rates."

In Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission. 48 P.2d 526

(Utah 1935), the decision of the Tax Commission was overturned, not because it
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, but because the Tax
Commission had misinterpreted the statute. 48 P.2d 526 at 528.

In Rowell v. State Board ofAgriculture. 99 P.2d 1 (Utah 1940), the Supreme
Court struck down a statute that fixed the minimum market price for milk. The

Court noted that the Legislature had not set forth any objectives, purposes,
standards, measures or gauges to guide the Board in determining how the price
ofmilk should be fixed. Id. at 3. The Public Utility Code is replete with objectives,
purposes, and standards, the most.notable being the "just and reasonable"

standard applicable to rate making. This standard has been upheld as being
adequate in Utah. The crucial difference between Rowell and the instant case is

that the Public Utility Code provides an acceptable statutory standard that meets
the requisite constitutional test.

Appellants also cite Athay v. State Dept. of Business Regulation. 626 P.2d

965 (Utah 1981). In Athay. an individual brought an action against the Depart

ment of Business Regulation for refusing to seat her at a state sanctioned psychol-
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ogist examination. She was denied admission because the statute required her to

have a course of studies in a doctoral program which was "primarily psychologi
cal." The Court determined that this standard was not sufficient. This decision

c

c

annot be used to stand for the proposition that "just and reasonable," "adequate,"

or other such standards included in the Public Utility Code are constitutionally
insufficient. In fact, Utah courts have held just the opposite.
4.

The Utah Public Utility Code contains a^e fluate standards and
procedural safeguards to satisfy constitutional challenges.

Appellants argue that Section 54-4-4.1 is an unconstitutional delegation
because "it provides no legislatively defined standards by which the Commission

shall make its choice and persons effected [sic] by the choice can judge or chal

lenge the wisdom or merits of the choice made." (App. Brief at 75) This argu
ment ignores the plain language of the Public Utility Code, which does set

standards to guide the Commission's actions. It is also contrary to well reasoned

authorities which hold that it is not necessary for the Legislature to provide

standards as long as it provides safeguards against improper action by the
Commission.

Section 54-4-4.1 provides that "[t]he commission may, by rule or order, adopt
any method of rate regulation consistent with this title . . . ." [Emphasis added.]

Title 54, the Public Utility Code, contains a myriad of standards with regard to
rate regulation with which any method of regulation adopted by the Commission
must comply. See Point III(A), supra.
Even if the phrase "consistent with this title" were absent from Section 54-4-

4.1, it is unlikely that the statute would be found unconstitutional for lack of
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adequate standards. Throughout their entire brief, Appellants look at Section 54-44.1 as an isolated statute.

It is a well-accepted principle of law that statutes

dealing with the same subject matter must be viewed as a whole. See Osuala v.

Aetna Life & Casualty Co.. 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980); see also State ex rel.
Cannon v. Learv. 646 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982); Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268
(Utah 1980).

Appellants cite White River Shale Oil v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 700 P.2d 1088

(Utah 1985) as the case that establishes the basic standards governing delegation

of legislative power to the Commission.30 We agree. White River clearly estab

lishes that standards such as "just and reasonable," "adequate," or "public
interest" are sufficient legislative standards to avoid a constitutional challenge for
lack of adequate standards.

In White River. Utah Power and Light challenged the statute authorizing
the Commission to issue cease and desist orders on the grounds that it was an

unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority. This Court said:

As long as this delegation of authority is accompanied by adequate
guiding standards and procedural safeguards to ensure that decision
making by the- Commission is not arbitrary and unreasoned, it is a
constitutional delegation.
700P.2datl091.

Section 54-7-4.5, the statute granting the Commission authority to issue
cease and desist orders, has no standards for the Commission to apply in deter
mining when it was appropriate to issue a cease and desist order. Nevertheless,

so See App. Brief at 72, n. 108
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on the question of the adequacy of standards, this Court stated:
The provisions of the entire Public Utilities Act, U.C.A., 1953, § 54-1-1

to 11-10 (1974 and Supp. 1983) must be considered in determining
whether there are sufficient guidelines established by the legislature.
However, the primary sources of guidance are the declarations of

legislative goals and policies which an agency is to apply when
exercising its delegated powers.

These declarations need only be as specific as the circumstances
warrant. The legislature need not lay down a detailed and specific
set of guidelines which covers every conceivable problem that might
arise in implementing the legislation.

It is sufficient if there are

general policies and standards articulated which provide direction to

an administrative body possessing the expertise to adapt the legisla
tive goals to varying circumstances.

It is undisputed that the PSC has been charged with the responsibili
ty of regulating utilities in the public interest and that it has the
necessary expertise to do so. Broad standards such as "reasonable",
"unnecessary" and "public convenience and necessity" have been
held to be sufficient as standards even though incapable of precise
definition. "Public interest" certainly falls within this class of
standards and, when read in light of the entire Public Utility Act, is
not so broad as to result in an improper delegation of authority.
White River. 700 P.2d at 1091-92 (footnotes omitted).3i

Standards of this type have universally been held to be sufficient to avoid
constitutional delegation challenges. In Llovd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conserva
tion Committee. 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975), the Court held that a statute which

allowed the Utah Air Conservation Committee to "establish such emission

requirements ... as in its judgement may be necessary to prevent, abate or control

air pollution" was a proper delegation of legislative power. Quoting from or citing

31 Other broad public utility standards have been upheld as adequate. See
New York Central Securities Com, v. United States. 287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932) ["public
interest"]; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 319 U.S. 190, 225-226 (1943)

["public conveyance, interest or necessity"]; Citv Services Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n,, 416 P.2d 736 (Kan. 1966) ["in the interest of oil and gas conservation"].
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other cases with approval, the Court said:
The provisions of the entire air conservation act must be considered

in a determination of whether there are sufficient guidelines estab
lished.

". . . Recognizing these facts the legislature acted to prohibit or
control air contamination to the extent possible in the interest of
health and the enjoyment of life or property. It is true that the

standards set forth are broad, but they are nevertheless adequate."
[quoting Southern Illinois Asphalt v. Environmental Protection

Agency. 303 N.E.2d 606, 611 (111. App. 1973)]

In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company v. State Department of Health, the
court stated that in areas of legitimate legislative activity where
precision was determined to be impossible, the courts have held such

broad standards as "reasonable" and "necessary" sufficient as
standards, although incapable of precise definition.
545 P.2d at 500 [citation and footnotes omitted].

The establishment of rates is the precise type of legitimate legislative

activity where general standards such as "just and reasonable," "necessary,"
"adequate," and "public interest" are sufficient to withstand a constitutional

challenge, although incapable of precise definition. Since there is no statutory or
constitutionally required method of rate making and rate making is not suscepti

ble to a scientific definition that is always appropriate, the Legislature delegated
authority to the Commission to regulate rates, guiding them by general concepts
which are contained in the Public Utility Act. Absent such flexibility, the very
expertise that the Court recognizes in the Commission in applying these broad
legislative goals would be lost. Appellants' argument is an attempt to limit the
ability of the Commission to apply its expertise to differing economic circumstan
ces that affect the public utilities in this state.
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5.

No Standards Are Required If A Delegation Is Accompanied
With Adequate Procedural Safeguards.

The view that a legislature may constitutionally delegate authority to an

administrative agency only if the delegation is accomplished by sufficient stan
dards is becoming outdated and has been losing ground for some time. In Lloyd

A. Frv Co.. supra, this Court cited I Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 2.08 p.
113 for the proposition that:
[T]he law of delegation would be strengthened if the courts were to deemphasize statutory standards and to emphasize the degree of
procedural safeguards.
". . . Putting some words into a statute that a court can call a legisla
tive standard is not a very good protection against arbitrariness. The
protections that are effective are hearings with procedural safe
guards, legislative supervision and judicial review. . . ."
545 P.2d at 501 [footnotes omitted].

In Warren v. Marion Countv. 353 P.2d 257 (Ore. 1960), this view was

expressed more strongly where the constitutionality of a county building code was
challenged. The Oregon Supreme Court, also citing Davis and another adminis
trative law treatise, said:

There is no constitutional requirement that all delegation of legisla
tive power must be accompanied by a statement of standards circum

scribing its exercise. It is true that a contrary view has frequently
been expressed in adjudicative cases, particularly the earlier ones,
but the position taken in such cases is not defensible. It is now
apparent that the requirement of expressed standards has, in most

instances, been little more than a judicial fetish for legislative
language, the recitation of which provides no additional safeguards
to persons affected by the exercise of the delegated authority. Thus,
we have learned that it is of little or no significance in the adminis
tration of a delegated power that the statute which generated it stated
the permissible limits of its exercise in terms of such abstractions as

"public convenience, interest or necessity" or "unjust or unreason
able" or "for the public health, safety, and morals" and similar
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phrases accepted as satisfying the standards requirement.

. . . [T]he important consideration is not whether the statute delegat
ing the power expresses standards, but whether the procedure
established for the exercise of the power furnishes adequate safe
guards to those who are affected by the administrative action.
353 P.2d at 261 [citation omitted, italics in original].

There are adequate procedural safeguards in place to ensure that any
method of regulation adopted by the Commission pursuant to Section 54-4-4.1 is

subject to notice, hearing, and judicial review.32 Even if the Public Utility Code
did not contain adequate procedural safeguards, the Commission's rules and the

Administrative Procedures Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l et seq.) also apply to
proceedings before the Commission and supply adequate procedural safeguards.
In Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Citv of Seattle. 665 P.2d 1328 (Wash.), cert, denied,
464 U.S. 982 (1983), various industrial customers sought to set aside a rate order of

the City of Seattle on various grounds including that the statute authorizing the
city to set rates did not contain any procedural safeguards and was, therefore,

unconstitutional.

The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument,

stating:
Procedural safeguards need not inhere in the statute itself.

If the

statutory delegation provides inadequate guidelines, the procedural
safeguards may be provided by the administrative body.
Id. at 1333 [citations omitted.]

In conclusion, in addition to adequate legislative standards such as "just

32 See in particular the discussion of procedural safeguards in Point
III(A). Appellants clearly had ample opportunity to participate in the rate
making process, and to challenge it judicially, as evidenced by this appeal.
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and reasonable," adequate procedural safeguards exist within both the Public
Utility Code and the Administrative Procedures Act to ensure that notice, hear

ing, and judicial review occur for any order issued by the Commission pursuant
to Section 54-4-4.1.

a

The power to adopt a revenue sharing plan does not constitute an
unconstitiifrnnfll Relegation of judicial power.

Appellants argue that

[t]o the extent that Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.1 and the statutes delegat
ing power to the courts to review Commission decisions delegates
power to a reviewing court to modify or select a different method of
rate regulation than that chosen by the Commission, it would

constitute a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Utah
Constitution, Article V, Section 1 . . .

(App. Brief at 81). It is inconceivable that this Court would ever attempt to

establish rates, let alone a method of rate regulation under the statute. Appel
lants' argument is a complete misreading of the type of authority the Court has
exercised over Commission decisions.

The review by the Supreme Court of Commission decisions is consistent
with Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Since Marburv v. Madison. 5

U.S. (1 Craneh) 137 (1803), it has been accepted constitutional law that the
judiciary may review the acts of the legislature.

This review also extends to

administrative bodies that have had legislative duties properly delegated to them.
Justice Marshall stated:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.

If two laws

conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each. . . .
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The Utah Supreme Court has approved the concept of judicial review
described in Marburv in Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). The
Utah Supreme Court acts within constitutional bounds when it reviews orders of

the Commission to see if they comport with the constitutions of the state and the

United States, if they violate any laws established by the Legislature, or if they are
arbitrary or capricious.

The suggestion that the statute delegates power to the reviewing Court to

modify or select a different method of rate regulation than that chosen by the
Commission is based on a misunderstanding of the Court's role in the rate
making process.

In Telecommunications Resellers v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 747

P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah 1987), the Court set forth the extent of its review of rate
orders:

Nor does this Court have authority to modify or partially set aside a
PSC order. . . . We have occasionally remanded matters to the PSC

with guidelines, ... or with suggestions as to possible future disposi
tions. . . . Nonetheless, upon hearing a petition, this Court is only
empowered to affirm or set aside a PSC order.33 [citations omitted]
In Utah Dept. of Business Regulation v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 614 P.2d
1242, 1250 (Utah 1980), the Court stated:

The Division further urges this Court to declare the order of the

P.S.C. invalid and void from its inception, and to order the amounts
collected thereunder to be refunded.

To undertake such a course

would be tantamount to this Court engaging in rate-making, which is
strictly a legislative power, for the P.S.C. in fixing and promulgating
rates acts merely as an arm of the Legislature. The review by this
Court of the orders of the P.S.C. is confined to the legal issues of

33 See also Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Serv.

Comm'n. 155 P.2d 184, 188 reh. denied, 158 P.2d 935 (1945); Salt Lake Transfer Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n.. 355 P.2d 706, 711 (Utah 1960).
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whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the

P.S.C; whether the P.S.C. has exercised its authority according to
law; and whether any constitutional rights of a complaining party
have been invaded or disregarded. Any interference by this Court
beyond the aforementioned limits would constitute an interference

with the law making power of this state.
It is apparent that the Court does not have and has never asserted the

authority to select a different method of rate regulation than that utilized by the
Commission or to modify the Commission's method. If the Court determined that
there is a defect in an order of the Commission, the Court can reverse the order

and remand it to the Commission for further proceedings.

Thus, Appellants'

argument has no merit.
C

Section 54-4-4.1 does not violate Article T. Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution relating to due process of law.

Appellants claim that the enactment and subsequent application of Section
54-4-4.1 violates their due process rights under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah

Constitution, and that application of the statute may constitute a confiscation of

their property. 34 This argument fails when viewed in light of state and federal
constitutional law.35

34 Appellants cite several cases for this proposition, but none is directly on
point. Appellants rely principally on Mevers v. Blair Tel. Co.. 230 N.W.2d 190
(Neb. 1975), and its progeny, which state that consumers are entitled to the same
protection against confiscation of property as utilities. This case was decided in

the context of a utility that was providing woefully inadequate service. The
Nebraska commission ultimately reduced rates because of the service problems.
These cases are in no way analogous to the instant case. Utah Copper Co. v.

Public Util, Comm'n, 59 Utah 191, 203 P. 627 (1921), does not apply due process
principles to ratepayers.

35 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that decisions by the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution are highly persuasive to the application of the due process
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1.

Appellants have not identified a due process property interest
in utility rates or ratemaking methodology.

The requirements to establish a constitutionally protected property interest
under the due process clause are set forth in Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564
(1972):

The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already
acquired in specific benefits. . . .

... To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more

than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legiti
mate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institu

tion of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportu
nity for a person to vindicate those claims.

Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 576-77.

Appellants have not identified the specific property interest they claim they
are being deprived of without due process of law. The gist of their argument is

that they were not be able to participate meaningfully in a proceeding under the
Statute'without additional standards.

It has been a recognized principle of constitutional and public utility law

that utility customers do not have a protected property interest in their utility rates

clause in the Utah Constitution. See Untermever v. State Tax Comm'n. 102 Utah
214, 129 P.2d 881, 885-86, rev'd on other grounds, 316 U.S. 645 (1942).
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under the due process clause. See, e.g., Miles v. Idaho Power Co.. 778 P.2d 757,
766-67 (Idaho 1989); In Re Implementation Of Utility Energy Conservation
Improvement Programs. 368 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Minn. App. 1985). Utah law has
not entitled Appellants to rely on the due process clause of the state constitution to
attack ratemaking methodologies that displease them.36

The Legislature has established other avenues by which Appellants can

complain about rate increases, rate decreases or rate-making methodologies.
These avenues are found in the Public Utility Code.

2.

Even if Appellants have a "property interest" in their utility
rates, the requirements of due process have been addressed
under the Public Utility Code.

In many respects, the arguments presented by Appellants relating to
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution (App. Brief at 81-92) are the same or

similar arguments made by Appellants relating to the delegation of legislative
powers to an administrative agency. Appellants argue that they are deprived of

due process because Section 54-4-4.1 contains no standards to govern rate making.
As has been previously established, the Public Utility Code as a whole provides
sufficient standards to guide the Commission.

The United States Supreme Court has set forth the requirements for due
process in Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill. 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) where

36 It has been held that a utility has no due process property interest in a
particular ratemaking methodology. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas

Public Serv. Comm'n. 593 S.W. 2d 434 (Ark. 1980); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v.

Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 S.W.2d 924 (Ark.Ct.App. 1986). Surely
individual consumers, who have less to lose, cannot be said to have due process
rights in any ratemaking methodology.
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it stated:

The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an
opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a

fundamental due process requirement.

The principles of due process have been discussed by the Utah Supreme
Court in two public utility cases. In Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 96 P.2d 722, 725 (Utah 1939), the Court stated:

The . . . question [of due process] is self-answered because we have
held that in this case there was due process of law. The Commission

conformed to every step laid down by the statute with the exception of
the 20 day period heretofore discussed and found to be directory only. .
. . "The essential elements of due process of law are notice, an
opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding
adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction
of the case." [quoting 12 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 573]

In Salt Lake Countv v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 510 P.2d 923 (Utah 1973), the

Court reaffirmed these principles. In Salt Lake County, the Salt Lake County
attorney did not attend all of the Commission hearings in a rate proceeding. The
Court determined that the County had not been deprived of due process of law,
stating as'follows:

-We think the plaintiff hardly can complain of surprise or lack of
notice. The record abounds with facts reflecting that it knew what
was astiring, and when, where, and why it was. Opportunity to
examine everything, cross examine anyone and otherwise to become

autoptic in this case, after its intervention was granted. It absented
itself from some of the hearings, and later, with permission, walked
out of the last it attended, with the urgence of the Commission that

counsel's body might repose in absentia, but with the county's body
politic still occupied a ringside seat in this encounter. Since plaintiff
intervened it was particeps at all times, and actually, before its
counsel's departure it joined in a pleading asking for the very re
allocation which it now negates.
Id. at 924.
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Hardly can Appellants claim that it has not had an opportunity to fully
participate in the proceedings before the Public Service Commission. Counsel for

Appellants participated in the proceedings and cross examined witnesses. (E.g.
R. 1331-52,1577-1604,1622-42,1795 -1806,1950-58,1997-2000, 2024-34, 2076-85, 272649).

Appellants chose to present no evidence to the Commission. The level of

their participation cannot be used as a denial of their due process.
Appellants cloak their due process argument into what they claim is the
lack of notice within Section 54-4-4.1 itself of standards the Commission will use

in adopting a rate regulation methodology. This argument is in part a duplica
tion and in part a variation on the argument that the statute is an unconstitution

al delegation because it does not contain sufficient standards (see Point IV(AX3),
supra).

The Public Utility Code is comprised of a series of standards, not just to
provide a mechanism by which the Commission may establish rates, but also to

afford parties due process rights of notice and hearing in rate making proceed

ings. There are many sections of the Public Utility Code that provide procedural
standards for purposes of rate setting which applied to the adoption of a method of

rate regulation under Section 54-4-4.1. Any method of rate regulation adopted
pursuant to Section 54-4-4.1 would have to comply with all of these restrictions.

Appellants cite Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture. 99 P.2d 1 (Utah 1940) to

support their due process argument.

In that case, the Utah Supreme Court

struck down a statute which fixed the minimum market price for milk. The

Court noted that the Legislature had not set forth any objectives, purposes,
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standards, measures or gauges to guide the Board in determining how the price
of milk should be fixed. Id. at 3. As was stated, supra Section IV, the Court has

upheld the standards adopted by the legislature to guide the Commission as being
adequate.

Appellants also cite at Athav v. State Dept. of Business Regulation. 626 P.2d

965 (Utah 1981) to support both their due process argument and their delegation of
legislative powers argument. As was stated previously, the courts have held that
the "just and reasonable" standard is a sufficient guideline for the Commission
unlike the standard discussed in Athav.

Appellants also argue that the statute violates the due process clause

because of vagueness (App. Brief at 89). The United States Supreme Court has
outlined the standards that are applicable to statutes to determine if they are
impermissibly vague. In Connolv v. General Const. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
the Court stated:

[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.

In more recent times, the United States Supreme Court has held that
differing standards of vagueness apply to criminal and civil statutes. In Village

of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman Estates. Inc.. 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982),
the Court said:

The degree of vagueness that the constitution tolerates - as well as

the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement - depends
in part on the nature of the enactment. Thus, economic regulation is
subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is
often more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic
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demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult
relevant legislation in advance of action. Indeed, the regulated
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the regula
tion by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative process.
A Michigan Appellate Court set out specific standards which can be

utilized in reviewing public utility statutes to determine if they are vague. In

Attorney General v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 411 N.W.2d 469, 471 (Mich. App. 1987),
the Court stated:

First, the act in question must be read as a whole; the provision in
question must be construed with reference to the entire act. Next, the

standard should be as reasonably precise as the subject matter
requires or permits. Third, if possible, the statute must be construed

as being valid, that is, it must be construed as confirming adminis
trative, not legislative, power and as giving discretionary, not
arbitrary, authority. Last, the statute must satisfy due process
requirements.

Section 54-4-4.1 meets all of these criteria. It states that the Commission

has authority to adopt any method of rate regulation that is consistent with the

Public Utility Code, including a method under which an equitable sharing of
earnings above some level occurs. When the statute is read with the entire Public

Utility Code in mind it is apparent that its purpose is to clarify that the Commis
sion is not limited to only one method of rate regulation. All of the same stan

dards, rules and regulations, safeguards of the Public Utility Code and the

Administrative Procedures Act apply to any method of rate regulation adopted by

the Commission pursuant to this statute. The statute is reasonably precise given
the subject matter. Rate making is a complex matter which does not lend itself to
specific rigid formulas. Section 54-4-4.1 does not grant the Commission unbridled

authority. It restricts the Commission to adopting methods of rate regulation
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consistent with Title 54. This type of discretion has been found to be sufficient to
guide the Commission.

Appellants also argue that adopting an order under Section 54-4-4.1 would

violate the Utah Administrative Rules Act (UARA). The UARA clearly distin
guishes between rules and orders, and establishes that rule making is not
applicable where an agency proceeds by order, rather than by rule. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46a-2(14Xa) defines a "rule" as:

An agency's written statement that:

i.

is explicitly or implicitly required by state or federal statute or

ii.

other applicable law;
has the effect of law;

iii.
iv.

implements or interprets a state or federal mandate;
applies to a class of persons or another agency.

Section 63-46a-2(9) defines a "order" as "an agency action that determines the legal
rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other interests of one or more specific
persons but not a class of persons." Section 63-46a-2(14)(c)(i) specifically provides

that "rule" does not mean "order" and Section 63-46a-2(14)(c)(vii) specifically
provides that "rule" does not mean "rulings by an agency in adjudicative proceed
ings." In the present case the Commission chose to proceed under Section 54-4-4.1

by means of an order without following the procedural requirements of the
UARA. Such an order does not fall within the definition of a "rule" because it is

not a written statement that is required by statute or other applicable law, does not

implement or interpret a legal mandate, and does not apply to a class of persons
or another agency. Instead, the Commission's order issued in this proceeding, if
accepted by U S WEST, would have determined the legal rights and duties of U S
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WEST but not of other telephone corporations or other public utilities in the State

of Utah. The Commission's order in this case constitutes a ruling in an adjudica
tive proceeding which is outside the meaning of a "rule."
Appellants' reliance on Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 720 P.2d 773

(Utah 1986) is misplaced.

First, the operative section of UARA have been

amended since Williams was decided.37 Second, Williams simply held that the
Commission could not reverse a long standing policy of asserting jurisdiction over
one-way paging services by means of a letter to one party, but rather had to engage
in rule making in order to make such a change. In the present case, the Com

mission's adoption of an incentive rate plan for U S WEST did not change policy
regarding any other public utility.

Even if the Court determined that rule making is an appropriate procedure

for the Commission to follow, no incentive plan is currently in effect to cause any
harm to Appellants. Respondents have indicated that if the "veto" provision is
found unconstitutional, the incentive plan ordered by the Commission in this case

should not go into effect absent further proceedings by the Commission. Finally,
the purpose of UARA is to provide an opportunity for public comment prior to any
agency action. Appellants can hardly claim that they have not been given an

opportunity to present their views on incentive regulations at the hearings that

37 Prior to 1988, UARA denned "rule" as a "statement of general applicabil

ity . . . that implements or interprets the law or prescribes the policy ofthe agency
in the administration of its functions . . . ." The current version of UARA defines
"rule" as quoted above.
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occurred before the Public Service Commission.38

D.

State antitrust policy does not prohibit adoption of anv method of rate
regulation consistent with the Public Utility Code including a method

of revenue sharjnf-

The arguments presented by Appellants (App. Brief at 92-96) relating to
Utah antitrust statutes and Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution are

completely misplaced in a proceeding attempting to declare unconstitutional a

provision of the Public Utility Code. Appellants themselves acknowledge that

Utah's constitutional provision and statutes regarding antitrust do not prohibit
adoption of a revenue sharing plan. (App. Brief at 93). Rather, Appellants argue

that "the basic policy of protecting the public interest by ensuring that private
economic power shall be subject to a competitive process or effectively regulated"
requires rejection of a revenue sharing rate regulation plan because U S WEST

would be able to earn "monopolistic profits" under such a plan. Id.

In essence, Appellants are presenting an economic/regulatory policy
statement that is not mandated by any law. In fact, the Utah Legislature has

explicitly recognized revenue sharing plans as being valid methods of regulation.
Utah law does not define nor prohibit "monopoly profits," it has never required
that the Commission establish a single point rate of return, nor has it ever held

that earnings above an authorized rate of return are unlawful. The Public Utility
Code requires that rates be "just and reasonable" without specifying limits as to

38 All parties were given an opportunity to present briefs on the issue of
incentive regulation. U S WEST (R. 5156-90), the Division (R. 5201-22), the Com
mittee (R. 5136-55), MCI (R. 5191-5200) and Contel (R. 5126-35) filed briefs.
Appellants chose not to file a brief.
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what the Commission may deem to be a "just and reasonable" rate.

The legislature establishes both the state's antitrust policy and the state's
utility regulation policy. Since the legislature has specifically authorized revenue

sharing plans, it must be presumed that it did so with the state's antitrust policy
in mind. Appellants' antitrust argument has no merit, and should be rejected by
the Court.

V.

THE LEGISLATURE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY EMPOWER A PUBLIC
UTILITY TO REJECT A REVENUE SHARING PLAN.

Appellants did not first address the constitutionality of the substance of

Section 54-4-4.1, which empowers the Commission to adopt alternative forms of

regulation consistent with Title 54, including revenue sharing plans. Rather,
they argue in Point I of their Brief that Subsection 2 is unconstitutional because it

allows a public utility to "elect not to proceed" with a revenue sharing plan adopted
by the Commission. This section of Respondents' Brief will demonstrate that the
statutory recognition of such a right in utilities suffers from no constitutional
infirmity.

A-

The Power to reject a revenue sharing nlan does not constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative nower 39

In a strained extension of their unconstitutional delegation argument,

39 Although Appellants assert in the heading to Point I of their brief that

Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.1(2) is an unconstitutional delegation ofjudicial power to
a private party, they do not cite any legal authority dealing with delegation of
judicial power, nor do they otherwise make a discernibly separate argument on
delegation of judicial power. Accordingly, this section will be confined to the
question of delegation of legislative power.
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Appellants contend that, because utilities have the right to opt out ofany revenue

sharing plan adopted by the Commission, Section 54-4-4.1(2) unconstitutionally
delegates legislative and judicial power to private persons.40 Appellants fail to
recognize that Section 54-4-4.1(2) is in essence a codification of the firmly estab

lished rule against retroactive rate-making, under which it is generally unlawful
to require a customer to make up lost profits for a utility or to require a utility to
return earnings above its authorized rate of return to ratepayers. See, e.g. Section
54-4-4(1) (empowering the Commission to determine just and reasonable rates "to
be thereafter observed and in force"); Arizona Grocery Co. v, Atchison. T. & S.F.

Rv. C°.. 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); Utah Dep't of Business Regulation v. Pnhlin

40 App. Brief at 59-65. Note that the veto power exists only with respect to
revenue sharing plans, not with respect to other forms of regulation that the
Commission may adopt, such as traditional, cost-of-service regulation. Utah
Code Ann. §54-4-4.1(2).

The two federal cases cited by Appellants have nothing to do with delegation

of legislative power to private persons, and are easily distinguishable from the

present case. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v, Chadha.462US 913

(1983), the court struck down a statute that permitted one branch of Congress to
invalidate, by resolution, a decision of the Executive Branch to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States, holding it to be a violation of
separation of powers in that the Congress was permitted to overrule the exercise

of executive authority without pursuing the constitutionally mandated legislative
process. In Consumer's Union of U, S.. Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n. 691 F.2d
575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd sub nom., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer

Energy Council of America, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), the court invalidated a statute

that permitted Congress to veto any rule promulgated by the FTC. As in Chadha.
it was held to be a violation of the separation of powers provisions of the Constitu
tion. The court expressly declined to decide whether there was an improper
delegation of administrative power to Congress without any standards for the
exercise of that power.

In the present case, the statute does not purport to grant powers of one

branch of government to another, nor to give one branch ofgovernment veto power
over the acts of another branch. Utility rate making is a strictly legislative
function, which may be delegated to an administrative agency. See discussion,
Point IV(A), supra. Thus there is no issue of separation of powers in this case.
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Service Comm'n. 720 P.2d 420-21, 423 (Utah 1986) ("[I]f a utility's revenues exceed
expectations or if costs are below predictions, the utility keeps the excess. . . . [A]ll
rate making must be prospective in effect. . . ."); see also Public Utilities Comm'n

v. United Fuel Gas Co.. 317 U.S. 456, 464, reh. denied, 318 U.S. 798 (1943). The only
difference is that under the statute, the utility is permitted to exercise its right to

challenge retroactive rates by notice to the Commission, rather than through
judicial proceedings. Thus even without the statutory veto power over revenue

sharing plans, a utility would still have a de facto veto power.

See, People v.

Waisvisz. 221 HI. App. 3rd 667, 582 N.E. 2d 1383, 1386 (1991) ("[A] mere grant of
authority by the legislature to a private entity to exercise, with the full backing of

the law, a right possessed by the entity at common law is not an impermissible
grant of legislative power.")

The rule against retroactive rate making is not simply a common law
prohibition, but has been held to be based on state and federal constitutions. In

Straube v. Bowling Green Gas Co.. 227 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1950), the Missouri
Supreme Court, citing Arizona Grocery, stated as follows:

When the established rate of a utility has been followed, the amount
so collected becomes the property of the utility, of which it cannot be

deprived by either legislative or judicial action without violating the
due process provisions of the state and federal constitutions.41

41 Accord, South Central Bell Telephone Co, v. Louisiana Public Servicp

Comm'n, 594 So.2d 357 (La. 1992); Citv of El Paso v. Public Utility Comm'n. 1991
WL 155113 (Tex. App. 1991); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n. 794

P.2d 1165, 1170 (Kan. App. 1990); In re Central Vermont Public Service Corp . 473

A.2d 1155, 1158 (Vt. 1984); State ex rel. Barvick v. Public Service Comm'n. 606
S.W.2d 474, 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); General Telephone Co. v, Michigan Public

Service Comm'n, 78 Mich. App. 528, 260 N.W.2d 874, 21 P.U.R. 4th 569 (Mich App.
1977)5 Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n. 90
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Thus, whether or not the veto power is stated explicitly in the statute, if the

Commission were to adopt a revenue sharing plan against the will of a utility, it
could result in a deprivation of the due process rights of the utility and would

result in a violation of the statutory requirement that rates be set prospectively

only.42 Thus, contrary to Appellants' argument, Section 54-4-4.1 would probably

be declared unconstitutional, as applied to a revenue sharing plan, if the utility's
right to reject such a plan were not incorporated into the statute, either expressly
or impliedly.

Appellants assert that the "principles prohibiting [delegation of legislative
power to a private party] are so self-evident, that such a naked delegation of power

to a private party is seldom tried by a state legislature." (App. Brief at 61) However,

they fail to note that vesting certain types of consent power in private parties has
withstood constitutional challenge. For example, in State Theatre Co. v. Smith.

276 N.W.2d 259 (S.D. 1979), the court rejected an argument that a statute permit
ting affected neighbors to "veto" the amendment of a zoning ordinance was an

N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588, 19 P.U.R. 4th 318 (N.M. 1977).

42 The foregoing discussion is sufficient response to Appellants' argument
that it is unconstitutionally unfair (i.e. a deprivation of due process) for a veto
power to rest in the public utility, but not in others, such as themselves. The veto

power could only affect a plan in which a utility was being asked to relinquish its
existing right to retain earned revenues. That right belongs solely to the utility.
Other parties do not have the right to require a utility to make refunds of earned
revenues. In fact, it has been held that utility ratepayers do not have a vested due

process right in utility rates. If the PSC adopted a revenue sharing plan that
required customers to make up lost profits, such a plan would violate the rule
against retroactive rate making and therefore would not be consistent with Title
54. See infra, Section IV(C)(1).
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unconstitutional delegation of power. The court explained:
The validity of consents has long been debated; the absence of
standards relating to the giving of consents has been a major ground

for the invalidity of consent statutes. There appear to be two catego
ries of consent statutes: those requiring consent to establish a
restriction and those requiring consent to waive a restriction. The
former are invalid and the latter valid.

276 N.W.2d at 263. Similarly, in Brock v. Superior Court. 9 Cal. 2d 291, 71 P.2d 209,
213 (1937) (dealing with a statute regulating the marketing of citrus, which

required the approval of private parties before the director of agriculture could
enter into a marketing agreement), the court stated that "a statute is not invalid

merely because it provides for consent of interested persons to the contemplated
regulation." Thus Appellants' over broad statement that all delegations of consent
power to private persons are unconstitutional is in error. 43 ln the present case,

where the power to veto a revenue sharing plan is in effect a power to consent to a
waiver of the rule against retroactive ratemaking, there is no constitutional
infirmity.

Appellants cite Revne v. Trade Comm'n. 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563, 3
A.L.R.2d 169 (1948) and Union Trust Co. v. Simmons. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190

(1949), in support of the proposition that it is unconstitutional for the Legislature to

43 See generally, Annot., Delegation of legislative power to nongovernmen
tal agencies as regards prices, wages, and hours, 3 A.L.R.2d 188 §§ 5-7 & fn. 3

(1949) (citing legal journal articles). The annotation also notes: "As regards
delegation of the rate-making power to private corporations, it should be remem

bered that in the past public utilities frequently received by franchise the power to
fix rates." Id. at 192. See also, Jaffe, "Law making by private groups," 51 Harv L
Rev. 201, 218, (1937).
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delegate legislative authority to a private entity.44 In Revne. the statute under

44 The other cases cited by Appellants in support of the proposition that no

legislative power may be delegated to private parties are distinguishable. Appel
lants' Brief at 61-62, n. 95. In none of the cited cases did a private party have an
already existing constitutional right, which was statutorily recognized by the
legislature, as in this case.

In Rowell v. State Board of Agricult.nrP. 98 Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940), the
court did not even address delegation ofpower to a private party.
In Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n 556 P.2d 289 (Cal

1976), the court found there was no unconstitutional delegation to a private party,

because there were implicit safeguards to guide an administrator's actions in

ordering a highway crossing abolished. In fact, the court stated: "Acts of private
parties prerequisite to operation of a statute containing valid standards for action
do not constitute unlawful delegation." 556 P.2d at 293 (emphasis added).
In Colorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 298

(Colo. 1985), the court refused to find an unconstitutional delegation of power to a

utility, where the public utilities commission approved a tariff that allowed the

utility to make adjustments of its purchased gas cost estimates without prior
approval of the commission.

In Corvallis Lodge No. 1411 v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n. 677 P.2d 76

(Or. App. 1984), the court invalidated a statute that delegated certain power to

commercial liquor vendors, not because the power was delegated, but because

there were not sufficient procedural safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of
that power.

In- Industrial Comm'n v. C&D Pipeline. Tnr, 607 P.2d 383 (Ariz App. 1979),

the court found an unconstitutional delegation of power because it allowed labor

unions to set wages which the commission was bound to accept. In the present
case, in contrast, any revenue sharing plan must receive Commission approval.
cf- Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation. 130 Ariz. 550, 637 P.2d
1053 (1981) (upholding a statute requiring the racing commission to recognize an

agreement between permit holders regarding scheduling of races)
In Deer Mesa Corp. v. Los Tres Valles Special Zoning District. 103 N.M.

675, 712 P.2d 21 (N.M. App. 1985), the court invalidated a statute that permitted
private individuals to create a special zoning district without any limitation on the
size and location of the district. Again, the basis for the court's ruling was that
there were no standards, not that all delegations of authority are per se invalid.
Cf- State ex rel Angel Fire Home and Land Owners Ass'n v. South Cent. Colfax

County Special Hospt Dist,, 110 N.M. 496, 797 P.2d 285, cert, denied, 110 N.M. 330,
795 P.2d 1022 (N.M. App. 1990) (upholding a statute authorizing private persons
petitioning for creation of a special hospital district to draw boundary lines for the
district, because sufficient limitations and standards existed).

In the present case, the utility's right to reject a revenue sharing plan
cannot be deemed to be a delegation oflegislative power, because utilities already
possess such a power, through the rule against retroactive rate making.
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review delegated authority to the Utah State Barber Board, an organization
composed of barbers in the state, to set minimum prices and other conditions of
service for barbers in Utah. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because

it authorized this private entity to establish a price schedule contrary to the public
interest. The Court acknowledged that

the legislature may properly delegate to some administrative body the
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provisions of the law
are to function, and also, that one of the methods of initiating activity
on the part of that administrative body may be by petition of the
citizens concerned. Such procedure is not in and of itself defective as

an improper delegation of legislative authority.
192P.2dat567.

Obviously, the fact that a utility may initiate a proceeding to consider an
alternative form of rate regulation under Section 54-4-4.1 does not result in an

unconstitutional delegation under the explicit language of Revne. In addition,

the fact that a utility may opt out of a revenue sharing plan is hardly the equiva
lent of the utility setting its own prices and conditions of service, as the barbers

did in Revne. If a utility opts out of a revenue sharing plan, the Commission
would still have the authority to set the utility's rates and otherwise to regulate its
service.45 Unlike the situation in Revne. under Section 54-4-4.1, no utility may
unilaterally set its own rates or terms of service; any plan of rate regulation must
be approved by the Commission.

In Union Trust Co. v. Simmons. 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949), also cited

by Appellants, the Court held that a statute that required the consent of all other

45 In fact, pursuant to that power, the Commission reduced U S WEST's

rates by $19.8 million as part of its order in this case. (R. 5481, Addendum B)
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banks in a city before any bank could establish a branch in that city was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The basis for the decision, which

distinguishes that case from the one at bar, is that the statute allowed third party
competitor banks to prevent an administrative agency from exercising its existing
authority to approve branch banks. Thus the competitor banks, acting contrary to
the public interest, could impose their will on the public by refusing to allow
another bank to establish a branch. In the case at bar, on the other hand, the

Commission retains authority to approve any revenue sharing plan. The veto
power merely insures that a utility retains its existing constitutional right to
assert the rule against retroactive ratemaking. Therefore, it is not an unconstitu
tional delegation of legislative power.
In a more recent case, Utah Technology Finance Corn, v. Wilkinson. 723

P.2d 406 (Utah 1986), this Court held that there was no unconstitutional delega
tion of legislative power, where the Legislature established a corporation to
promote economic development through assistance to high technology business
es, funding it with $1,000,000 of public money. This Court stated:

"Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires
that the judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature
where disagreement is founded only on policy considerations and the
legislative scheme employs reasonable means to effectuate a legiti
mate objective." [quoting from Baker v. Matheson. 607 P.2d 233 (Utah
1979)] .... "[A]cts of the Legislature are presumed constitutional,
especially when dealing with economic matters based on factual

assumptions." [quoting from Rio Algom Corn, v. San Juan County.
681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984)] It is only when a legislative determination
of public purpose is so clearly in error as to be capricious and
arbitrary that the judiciary should upset it. . . .

What is public purpose varies and changes with the times. . . . "The
strong presumption of the act's constitutionality will not be overcome

simply because the plaintiffs economic forecasts differ from those of
the legislature." [quoting from Wilson v. Connecticut Product
Development Corp.. 167 Conn. Ill, 355 A.2d 72 (1974)]

In the present case, Appellants' efforts are primarily motivated by their
preference for a single economic theory: cost of service rate regulation. In Section

54-4-4.1, the Utah Legislature has recognized that other forms of utility regula

tion, including revenue sharing plans, may be appropriate for the changing
times, especially in industries that are increasingly subject to competition. This

Court should defer to the Legislature's effort, which is neither arbitrary nor
capricious, to address current economic reality by permitting revenue sharing
plans that are consistent with Title 54.

B.

The power to reject a revenue sharing plan does not constitute a
denial of due process.

Appellants cite no authority in support of their argument that a utility's
power to reject a revenue sharing plan under Section 54-4-4.1(2) is a denial of their

due process rights.

(App. Brief at 65-67). Rather, they complain that the mere

existence of a veto power "vests leverage in the utility regulated over every aspect

of the ratemaking process," and that other parties do not also have a veto power.
IApp. Brief at 65, 66).

Remarkably, Appellants claim that they were precluded

from offering their preferred version of incentive ratemaking, although there is

absolutely nothing in the record to show that they even attempted to file a proposed
plan, much less that they were precluded from doing so.

Appellants' argument that all parties to a rate proceeding should be on

equal footing (i.e., that all parties should have a veto power if the utility has one) is
unpersuasive when considered in light of the fact that under a revenue sharing
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plan, only the utility's earned revenue, received from the collection of lawful,
tariffed rates—which would otherwise be protected by the rule against retroactive

rate making—would be at risk. No other party to a rate proceeding, including
Appellants, bears a similar risk under a revenue sharing plan. Hence it is
appropriate that only the utility have power to reject a revenue sharing plan.

Thus it cannot be a deprivation of due process or equal protection^ for a utility
alone to have the power to reject a revenue sharing plan.47
VI.

THIS COURT NEED NOT RULE ON THE SEVERABILITY ISSUE
NEVERTHELESS, IF SUBSECTION 2 OF SECTION 54-4-4.1 IS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE ENTIRE STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITU
TIONAL.

No sharing plan is in effect at this time. Indeed, no party (including

Appellants) is taking the position that the Commission's plan should go into
effect, whatever the Court's decision on the constitutional issues raised in this

case. Appellants argue that the Commission plan would be resurrected by a
decision invalidating Subsection 2 but not Subsection 1. However, Appellants
further argue that the Commission plan should then be overturned on other

grounds (App. Brief at 97-101). Respondents also take the position that the

Commission's plan should not go into effect. Any decision to place a sharing plan
into effect in the absence of Subsection 2 should be left up to the Commission in a

46 Although Appellants mention equal protection (App. Brief at 66), they do
not further develop an argument on this issue, probably because it is so apparent
that in a rate proceeding, the utility's position is unique, and no other party is
similarly situated.

47 It may be observed that the Commission also has power to reject any

proposed revenue sharing plan.
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subsequent proceeding or on remand, at which time the Commission would have

the opportunity to consider such a plan in the light of the fundamentally different
legal premise that would be occasioned by the invalidation of Subsection 2. Given

the unanimity of the parties to this proceeding that no plan is in effect or should
go into effect, whatever the Court decides, there is no need for the Court to

determine the severability issue.

However, in the unlikely event that Subsection 2 were struck down, Re

spondents do not agree that Subsection 1 would necessarily fall, because Subsec
tion 1 is broader than Subsection 2. Subsection 1 authorizes the Commission to

adopt any form of regulation consistent with Title 54, including sharing plans.
Subsection 2, on the other hand, allows a utility to opt out of a sharing plan, but
not other forms of regulation. As discussed in Section V.A, supra, the obvious
purpose of that provision is to continue to protect the utility (in the absence of its

consent) from a plan that would violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking.
Thus, if Subsection 2 were struck down, no sharing plan that requires retroactive
refunds ofearnings could be put in place without the consent of the utility.
However, to the extent that the Commission, pursuant to Subsection 1, were

to adopt a form of regulation that does not violate the rule against retroactive
ratemaking and was in all other respects consistent with Title 54, there is no
reason that an invalidation of Subsection 2 should prevent the Commission from
taking such an action.
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VII.

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES NOR COSTS
FROM US WEST.

A.

Background.

Appellants intervened in the Commission proceeding in September 1990 on

their own behalf and not in any kind of representative capacity.48 In the Commis
sion proceedings, Appellants made no indication of an intention to seek to recover

costs and attorneys fees.

Indeed, it was not until they filed their docketing

statement with this Court that Appellants claimed a right to costs and attorneys

fees49 and it was not until their Brief was filed that Appellants disclosed that they
were seeking attorney's fees from U S WEST. (App. Brief at 118-19). While citing
several theories, Appellants rely on two exceptions to the general "American" rule
that attorney's fees are awarded only when either a statute or contractual
provision so authorize: (1) the "Substantial Benefits" rule and (2) the "Private
Attorney General" doctrine. (App. Brief at 108-16).

For the reasons set forth hereafter, Appellants' request for costs and

attorney's fees from U S WEST must be denied, whatever the outcome of Appel
lants' constitutional challenge.

48 In their Petition to Intervene, Appellants alleged that "[ejach of the

petitioners uses the services of [U S WEST] . . . and each is vitally affected by the
regulation plan used and rates charged by that entity in this state" and that "[t]he
petitioners' legal and financial interests may be substantially affected by the
proceedings in this matter." (R. 4135-36). The Order granting Appellants'
intervention request makes it clear that they are intervening in their individual
capacities and not on behalf of anyone else. (R. 4130-31). Appellants have done
nothing to change their status.

49 Appellant's Docketing Statement, at 10, 14.
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B.

Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Procedurally Flawed

1.

Appellants' Claim Fails to Meet the Basic Principles of
Procedural Due Process.

Not only did Appellants claim attorney's fees from U S WEST for the first
time in their Brief, they ask this Court to establish the amount of such fees and

require U S WEST to pay them as a part of this case. In other words, without any

of the fundamental protections of due process - such as notice, an opportunity to
engage in discovery, the requirement that the claimant present evidence in

support of their claim,50 and an opportunity for U S WEST to present responsive

evidence - Appellants ask this Court to assume that all of their factual allegations
are true and require U S WEST to pay their attorney's fees. If their request were

granted, it would constitute a gross violation of U S WEST's due process rights,
rights which have been established by decisions of both the United States and Utah

Supreme Courts. In Morgan v. United States. 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938), the U.S.
Supreme Court stated:

But a 'full hearing'—a fair and open hearing—requires more than
that. The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them.

This Court recognizes the same principles. In Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,
1212-13 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:

Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness.

50 Under Utah law, a party asserting a claim for attorney's fees has the
burden of proof to support an award of attorney's fees by evidence in the record.

See Section VII.C, infra.

86

To satisfy an essential requirement of procedural due process,, a
'hearing' must be prefaced by timely notice which adequately informs
the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet ....
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a

formula with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circum
stances. Rather, the demands of due process rest in the concept of
basic fairness of procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to
the case and just to the parties involved.
Since there was no request for attorney's fees below, and since the fundamentals

of due process cannot be met through the briefing process the parties are current
ly engaged in, an award of attorney's fees by this Court would violate U S WEST's
due process rights.51

2.

Appellants are Inappropriately Attempting to Invoke the
Original Jurisdiction of the Court.

Appellants' effort to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court is legally imper
missible.

Because the attorney's fees issue was not raised below, Appellants'

effort to raise the issue for the first time on appeal is an inappropriate attempt to
invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court. The extent of this Court's original

5i Furthermore, U S WEST and Appellants are not opposing parties in the
same sense that a plaintiff and defendant in a civil suit are. By their nature,
administrative hearings, like the one conducted in this case, do not place parties
in the same kind of adversarial position vis-a-vis each other as adversarial

proceedings in a court.
It is axiomatic that, in order to pursue a claim for
damages, a party must appropriately invoke the jurisdiction of the court from

which the remedy is sought.

In a legal action where damages are sought, a

claimant has the duty to file a complaint under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that is sufficient to outline the factual basis and legal theory under which the

claim is made. Unless one were to take the surreal position that these require
ments are met by a single sentence in a Docketing Statement and an argument in
a Brief, Appellants have utterly failed to meet these basic requirements.
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jurisdiction is defined and limited by Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitu
tion:

The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all

extraordinary writs and to answer questions ofstate law certified by a
court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by
statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary for the
exercise by the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete deter
mination of any cause.

[emphasis added). Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2) and (3). Thus, the original

jurisdiction of this Court extends only to questions of state law certified by a
federal court and to the issuance of extraordinary writs. Obviously, a request for
attorney's fees does not fall into either area.

In order for Appellants to have pursued an attorney's fees claim against

US WEST (or any other party) they should have challenged the constitutionality of
the statute in the district court and raised the attorney's fee issue at that time.52
In the cases cited by Appellants, the attorney's fees claim was raised in the

original lawsuit.53 In none of the cases did the party seeking attorney's fees

52 Appellants could possibly have challenged the constitutionality of the
statues under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq.. or,

in the event an unconstitutional sharing plan went into effect that was causing
Appellants harm, they could have sued to have the plan declared invalid and to
recover damages for themselves and potentially for all ratepayers pursuant to a

class action under Rule 26, URCP. To the extent that Appellants could articulate
a basis to support an award ofattorney's fees they could have made it a part of the
case. In that event, there would be a clear plaintiff and defendant, notice that
such fees were being claimed, and an opportunity to present evidence. None of
these attributes of due process are present in the current posture of the case.
53 Arnold v. Dent, of Health Services. 775 P.2d 521, 523 (Ariz. 1989) (attor
ney's fees awarded by trial court); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Citv of

Berkeley, 226 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268, 274 (Ct. App. 1986) (attorney's fees sought in
remand proceedings; court noted that plaintiffs had sought attorney's fees in
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attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the appellate court, as Appellants are
attempting to do here.
3.

Because Appellants Failed to Raise the Issue of Attorney's

Fees Below. Thev are Precluded from Raising it on Appeal.
As Appellants acknowledge, the issue of attorney's fees was not raised
below.54 The Court of Appeals in Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 788 P.2d 1049 (Utah

App. 1990), held that the failure to raise a request for attorney's fees at the trial

court precluded a request for them on appeal. Appellants attempt to distinguish

C&H, claiming that all the exceptions to the rule against awarding attorneys fees
are equitable in nature and cannot be asserted before an administrative agency.
While that may be true, the fact is that any ground for appeal from an order of the

Commission must be preserved in a petition for rehearing. Utah Code Ann. § 54-

7-15(2)(b) states unequivocally that "no applicant may urge or rely on any ground
not set forth in the application [for rehearing] in an appeal to any court."55 This

amended complaint so that defendants were on notice of claim); Crawford v. Los

Angeles Bd. of Education. 246 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (Ct. App. 1988) (attorney's fees
awarded by trial court); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners. 520 P.2d 10, 27
(Cal. App. 1974) (attorney's fees awarded by trial court); Mandel v. Hodges. 127

Cal. Rptr. 244, 247-48 (Ct. App. 1976) (attorney's fees awarded by trial court);
Northington v. Davis. 593 P.2d 221, 222-23 (Cal. 1979) (attorney's fees awarded by
trial court); Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Cal. 1977) (attorney's fees
awarded by trial court).

54 App. Brief at 117-118. In fact, in none of the pleadings or briefs filed by
Appellants below, including Appellants' July 15, 1991 Motion for Rehearing, was
there even a glimmer of an indication that they were seeking recovery of attor
ney's fees and costs.

55 As noted in Section VILB.l, supra, the failure of Appellants to raise the

issue below is fatal for another reason: U S WEST was never given adequate
notice that Appellants were asserting an attorney's fees claim against it. Now, on
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Court, in Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commis

sion. 789 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1990), recently reaffirmed the principle that "an issue

is not preserved for consideration on appeal unless it has been specifically raised
in a petition for rehearing before the PSC.W

Appellants, by their own admission,

failed to do so.

C.

Because Appellants' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Based on a Fun

damental Factual Flaw. Appellants Have Failed to Meet Their
Burden of Proot

In their Docketing Statement, Appellants stated the issue relating to their
request for attorney's fees this way:

Whether Petitioners are entitled to their attorney fees and costs for
challenging the constitutionality of a statute and Commission Order

which might cost the consumers ofUtah millions of dollars in higher
phone rates than they might otherwise pay if the Commission's
Order or the plan proposed by U. S. West is allowed to go into effect
(App. Docketing Statement at 10; emphasis added). This statement either shows

an incredible naivete on Appellants' part or is a deliberate attempt to mislead the
Court. The basic premise of Appellants' claim is that their actions will save the

ratepayers of Utah potentially millions of dollars in preventing either the Com

mission's plan or U S WEST's plan from taking effect. 56 ln reality, Appellants
are "saving" ratepayers from a non-existent threat.

appeal, U S WEST has no opportunity to engage in discovery or to present evidence
on the issue. This deprives U S WEST of its basic due process rights to notice,
discovery, and an opportunity to confront and respond to the evidence presented
against it.

56 Appellants claim that their appeal will result in "benefits to be realized
. . . in the immediate future [which] largely reside in the realm of monies
consumers of telephone service will not have to pay because of the Commission's
unconstitutional and unlawful order." (App. Brief at 107).
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Contrary to Appellants' inference, U S WEST's plan was definitively
rejected by the Commission. (R. 5469-77). Furthermore, no party asserts that the
Commission plan is in effect. U S WEST opted out of the plan (R. 5692-93) and no

other party claims that it is or should be in effect, including Appellants. Thus,
Appellants' claim that their action will save ratepayers millions of dollars has
absolutely no basis in fact.

Furthermore, even if the Commission plan were in effect, there is no basis
for a factual conclusion that the plan will cost consumers millions of dollars. An
examination of the Commission plan shows that the Commission retained full

authority to terminate the plan, whenever it determined that it was not operating
in the public interest. (R. 5479, «fl 7, Addendum B). Thus, the acceptance by this
Court of Appellants' assertion that the Commission's plan will cost ratepayers
millions would be inappropriate. The plan is not in effect, and even if it were,

there is no factual basis to conclude that it would harm ratepayers.
A party claiming attorney's fees bears the burden of proof to establish the

award. Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah App.
1990); Jones v. Muir. 515 A.2d 855, 859 (Pa. 1986). Such "an award . . . must be

supported by evidence in the record." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988), Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 226 (Utah App. 1991). The factual
basis for Appellants' claim has simply not been demonstrated.

In fact, Appel

lants placed no evidence in the record below either as to the factual basis for their

claim for attorney's fees or the amount of such fees. They have therefore failed to
meet their burden of proof.
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D.

Neither of the Two Theories Relied Upon hv Appellants - Substantial
Benefit or Private Attorney General - Has Been Adopted in Utah.

In a long line of cases regarding attorney's fees, this Court and the Court of

Appeals have adopted the "American" rule: "In Utah, attorney fees are awarded
only if authorized by statute or by contract." E.g.. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764

P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale. 776 P.2d 643, 648
(Utah App. 1989); Cobabe v. Crawford. 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah App. 1989); Govcrt

Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163, 173 (Utah App. 1990).

In the federal arena and in some states, courts have recognized some
equitable exceptions to the American rule. A commonly accepted exception is the
so-called "common fund" rule.

Under that rule, attorney's fees have been

awarded "to the successful plaintiff when his representative action creates or
traces a common fund, the economic benefit of which is shared by all members of
the class." Hall v, Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 n.7 (1973). Under the common fund doctrine

there must be an identifiable fund from which the fees are paid and the beneficia
ries must be easily identifiable. Aleveska Pipeline Co. v. Williams Society. 421

U.S. 240, 264-65, n. 39 (1975); Boeing Co. v. Van Oenert. 444 U.S. 472, 479 (1980).

This exception has been adopted in numerous state jurisdictions,57 although not
in Utah.58 Appellants do not rely on the "common fund" theory, recognizing that
57 E^Hamer y, Kirk, 356 N.E. 2d 524, 528 (111. 1976); Van Emmerik v.
Montana Dakota Utilities Co. 332 N.W. 2d 279, 282, (S.D. 1983); Jones v. Muir 515
A.2d 855, 858 (Pa. 1986); Shelby Countv Comm'n v. Smith. 372 So.2d 1092, 1096-97
(Ala. 1979) Dennis v. State. 451 N.W. 2d 676, 687-88 (Neb. 1990).

58 Appellants' assertion (App. Brief at 106) that this Court adopted the
"common fund" exception in Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990) is a gross
mischaracterization. Plumb involved a review of the level of the District Court's
92

there is no fund (App. Brief at 107-08).

Another common exception to the American rule that has been adopted by
many courts is the "bad faith" exception:

[I]t is unquestioned that a federal court may award counsel fees to a
successful party when his opponent has acted 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons!'"

Hall v. Cole, supra. 421 U.S. at 5. This exception has been statutorily adopted in
Utah.59 Appellants do not rely on this exception either.

Neither the "substantial benefit" nor the "private attorney general" excep
tion - the exceptions relied upon by Appellants - has been adopted in Utah.

E.

Even If the Substantial Benefit Doctrine Had Been Adopted in Utah.
It Does Not Support Appellants' Claim.

The "substantial benefit" rule is an extension of the common fund rule - the

major difference is that under the substantial benefit rule, no defined fund is

necessary. Appellants rely on the "substantial benefit" rule in support of their

attorney's fees claim. (App. Brief at 108-09). A reading of Appellants' principal
case, Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977) and other authorities related to

award of attorney's fees in the thrift settlement. The basis for the attorney's fees
award was a written agreement between the class representative and class
counsel and was not based upon the "common fund" exception to the American
rule. The only reference to "common fund" in the Court's opinion was obviously
not for the purpose of adopting the exception. Ir].. at 740. This Court in Turtle
Management v. Haggis Management. 645 P.2d 667, 671 n. 1 (Utah 1982) made it

clear that it has not ruled on this exception.
59 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991).
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this rule demonstrates that Appellants' reliance on this theory is utterly mis
placed.60

Appellants grossly misrepresented the "substantial benefits" rule in their

Brief. They quote Serrano for the proposition that the rule permits "the award of
fees when the litigant, proceeding in a representative capacity, obtains a decision

resulting in the conferral of a 'substantial benefit' of a pecuniary or nonpecuniary nature." 569 P.2d at 1309 (App. Brief at 108). They failed, however, to
imote the next sentence from Serrano:

In such circumstances, the Court, in the exercise of its equitable
discretion, thereupon may decree that under the dictates of justice
those receiving the benefit should contribute to the costs of its produc
tion.

569 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added). Thus, Appellants failed to mention a major
part of the substantial benefits rule: that it is the beneficiaries of representative's
actions who pay the fees. All courts that have adopted the "substantial benefit"
rule make it clear that the fees are to be paid by those who benefit. The seminal
case is Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). Mills was a derivative

action brought by minority shareholders to set aside a merger based on a mislead

ing proxy statement. In Mills, the Court upheld an award of attorney's fees from
the corporation on the basis of the substantial benefit rule which permits
reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a
substantial benefit on members of an ascertainable class, and where

eo Not all courts have adopted the "substantial benefit" rule. For example,
in Hamer v. Kirk. 356 N.W. 2d 524, 528 (111. 1976), the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled that "in the absence of a fund, a plaintiffs attorney is not entitled to attor
ney's fees merely because he has conferred a benefit upon members of a class."
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the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes

possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately
among them.

M. at 393-94 (emphasis added). Thus, the substantial benefit rule requires (1) the
conferral of a benefit to a class that can be readily identified and (2) the court must

be in a position to spread the attorney's fees proportionately among the class.
Accord, Hall, supra, 412 U.S. at 5-7, Doe v. State. 579 A.2d 37, 48-49 (Conn. 1990);
Jones y, Muir, 515 A.2d 855, 860-61 (Pa. 1986); Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota
Utilities Co.. 332 N.W. 2d 279, 283-84 (S.D. 1983).

In applying this rule, the courts in other states have consistently rejected

efforts to recover fees from parties who are not beneficiaries of the class represen
tative's acts. For example, in Doe, a class action resulted in an injunction against
state officials from restricting payment for abortions for indigent women. The

plaintiffs appealed from a trial court ruling denying them attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs claimed attorney's fees from the state on the basis that they had benefit

ted all poor women in the state. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected plain
tiffs' request for attorney's fees, concluding that "the plaintiffs' have not conferred
a substantial benefit upon all those whom they seek to impose the financial burden
of their counsel fees." 579 A.2d at 49. In an effort to avoid the conclusion that a

benefit had not been conferred upon all the citizens of Connecticut, plaintiffs
(much like Appellants in this case) argued that they "have conferred a benefit

upon all citizens of this state by challenging unconstitutional actions by the state."
The court rejected this claim, stating that it would expand the substantial benefit

doctrine "beyond its underpinnings." Id. In Van Emmerik. plaintiff sought to
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recover attorneys fees from utility companies who had collected sales taxes
pursuant to a sales tax statute that was later invalidated. The trial court denied

the request.

On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out

that "we see no benefit accruing to the utilities as a result of appellant's law suit."
332 N.W. 2d at 283.

In this case, Appellants seek attorney's fees from U S WEST. Yet, in their

argument they assert that if they are successful in their appeal "the}'- will have

conferred a substantial benefit upon the ratepayers of U.S. West and a potential
lbenefit upon all the ratepayers of other rate regulated natural monopoly utilities

in this State who may have sought similar treatment." (App. Brief at 109; empha
sis added). Nowhere do the Appellants claim that their appeal is in the best
interest of or for the benefit of U S WEST. Thus, Appellants have failed to meet one

of the basic elements of the "substantial benefit" rule.61 Likewise, they fail to meet
the requirement that they be operating in a representative capacity. This is not a

class action; further, Appellants' Petition to Intervene makes it clear that they
entered the case to protect their own financial interests.62

While the substantial benefit rule has not been adopted in Utah, Appellants,

61 If Appellants were to seek attorney's fees from all ratepayers, they would
fail under another aspect of the "substantial benefits" rule, which requires that
"the classes of beneficiaries [be] small in number and easily identifiable [so that]
there was reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be shifted with some

exactitude to those benefitting." Aleyeska. supra, 421 U.S. at 265, n. 39. Jones v.
Muir, supra. 515 A.2d at 861 (denying attorney's fees under substantial benefit

rule on the ground that the benefits "were supposed to accrue to the general
public."); Doe v. State, supra, 579 A.2d at 49.
62 See footnote 48, supra.
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as a matter of law, would not meet the requirements of the rule even if it had been
adopted in Utah.
F.

The Private Attorney General Doctrine is Clearly the Minority Rule
in the United States and Should he Rejected hv this Court.

The second theory upon which Appellants rely is the "Private Attorney
General" doctrine. Under this rule, attorney's fees can be awarded to a litigant
where the litigant is forced to step in and litigate an important societal interest
that broadly benefits the public. The leading case in favor of the doctrine is
Serrano v. Priest. 569 P.2d 1303, 1312-16 (Cal. 1977).

1.

Appellants Have Failed to Meet Their Burden of Establishing
the Elements of the Private Attorney General Theory in this
Case.

As will be discussed below, this doctrine, unlike the common fund and

substantial benefit rules, has not been widely adopted by the courts in this country
- it remains in the distinct minority. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that it
were the law of Utah, it is clear that Appellants have failed to meet their burden in
demonstrating its elements in this case.
In order to meet the rule, three distinct factors must be satisfied:

(1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated
by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the
magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, (3) the number of
people standing to benefit from the decision.

Serrano, 569 P.2d at 1314. Appellants claim that the first element is met because

they are vindicating important statutory and constitutional rights.

Yet, it is

undisputed that no sharing plan will go into effect, whatever the Court's decision

on the constitutionality of Section 54-4-4.1. Thus, at this point, the constitutional
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issues are of purely academic interest. In light of that fact, it would be impossible
to conclude that a matter of great societal importance hangs in the balance.

With regard to the second factor - the necessity of private enforcement and
the burden on Appellants - Appellants claim that the public authorities (the

Commission, Division and Committee) actively failed to undertake their duty of
challenging the statute and that Appellants were therefore forced to bring their
appeal. What they fail to take into account is the fact that the Commission, based

on what it considered good authority, did not feel it appropriate for it to determine
the constitutionality of a statute granting it powers. (R. 5059-62). Further, both

the Division and Commission believe the statute is constitutional. And, while the
Committee raised questions as to the constitutionality of the opt out provision (R.
4806-10), it also opposed incentive regulation in general (R. 5136-54). Since no

incentive or sharing plan is or will be in effect, the Committee apparently did not

feel it necessary to appeal.

The fact is that there is no necessity for private

enforcement since, even under Appellants' view of proper rate regulation,
nothing injurious to the public can result from this case.

If U S WEST or another

utility in the future seeks a sharing plan under the statute, there will be every
opportunity for the issues raised by Appellants to be considered.

The third element - the number of people standing to benefit - fails for the
same reason. Nothing that results from this case will put ratepayers in Utah in

any different position than they are now in, since U S WEST is currently subject, to
traditional regulation.
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2-

The Private Attorney General Doctrine Should Not be Adopted
in Utah-

In 1976, the United States Supreme Court strongly rejected the private
attorney general doctrine in Aleveska Pineline v. Wilderness Society. 421 U.S. 240

(1976). In 1977, California accepted the doctrine in Serrano. In the sixteen years
since Aleyeska and Serrano, only four jurisdictions - Arizona, Idaho, Wisconsin

and Oregon - have adopted the private attorney general doctrine.63 During that
same period, decisions in eight states - Washington, Connecticut, Massachu
setts, Illinois, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Alabama expressly rejected the doctrine.64

In Aleyeska, a group of environmental organizations sued to prevent the

issuance of permits for construction of a pipeline in Alaska. Although subsequent

legislation rendered their effort unsuccessful, they were awarded attorney's fees
on the theory that they had protected substantial public interests. On appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected that theory. The Court noted that Congress, while

63 Arnold v. Arizona Dept. of Health, 775 P.2d 521 (Ariz. 1989): Hellar v.
Cenamisa, 682 P.2d 524 (Id. 1984); Watkins v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n.

345 N.W. 2d 482 (Wise. 1984); Umrein v. Heimbi^mer. 632 P.2d 1367 (Ore. App
1981).
^

64

Blue Skv Advocates v. State. 727 P.2d 644, 648-49 (Wash. 1986); Doe v.

Heinfz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1322-23 (Conn. 1987); Doe v. State. 579 A.2d 37, 48 (Conn.
1990); Pearson v. Board of Health . 525 N.E. 2d 400 (S.Ct. 1988); Hamer v. Kirk. 356
N.E. 2d 524, 527-28 (111. 1976); Van Emmerik v. Montana Dakota Utilities Co.. 332

N.W. 2d 279, 284 (S.D. 1983); Jones v. Muir. 515 A.2d 855, 861 (Pa. 1986); Providence
Journal Co, v, Mason, 359 A.2d 682, 688 (R.I. 1976); Shelby Countv Comm'n y.
Smith, 372 So. 2d 1092, 1096-97 (Ala. 1979). In addition, courts in Colorado and

Nebraska have cited with general approval cases rejecting the private attorney
general doctrine. People v. District Court,. 808 P.2d 831, 835 (Colo. 1991); Dennis v.
State. 451 N.W. 2d 676, 687-88 (Neb. 1990).
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recognizing the American rule, has made
specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorney's fees
under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.
. . . Under this scheme of things, it is apparent that the circum
stances under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range
of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for
Congress to decide.

421 U.S. at 260, 262 (emphasis added). The Court was particularly impressed by
the fact that Congress had "carved out" numerous statutory exceptions to the
general American rule. In light of that fact, the Court concluded that the federal
courts

are not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance

of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick
and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue
and to award fees in some cases but not in others, depending upon
the courts' assessment of the importance of the public policies
involved in particular cases.
Id. at 269. On this basis, the Court concluded that "it is not for us to invade the

legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by
respondents . . . ." Id. at 271.

Likewise, the Utah legislature has adopted specific and explicit statutes
allowing attorney's fees in a variety of situations.^ Among these statutes are the

65 E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 7-15-1(3) (Supp. 1991) (bad checks); 13-11-17.5

(Supp. 1991) (consumer sales practice); 13-lla-4(2)(c) (Supp. 1991) (truth in
advertising); 13-14a-7 (Supp. 1991) (equipment repurchase from retail dealers); 1315-6(3) (Supp. 1991) (business opportunity disclosure documents); 13-16-7(3) (Supp.
1991) (motor fuel marketing practices); 13-23-7 (Supp. 1991) (health spas); 13-24-5
(Supp. 1991) (trade secrets); 14-2-1 & 2 (Supp. 1991) (suit under bond - failure to
obtain bond); 31A-15-108 (1991) (action against unauthorized insurer); 34-27-1
(1988) (suit for wages); 34-28-13 (1988) (assignment of wage claims); 38-1-18 (1988)

(enforcement of mechanic's liens); 45-3-5 (1988) (action for abuse of personal
identity); 57-11-17(2) (1990) (land sales practices); 57-15-9 (1990) (security interests
in real estate); 57-22-6(3)(e) (Supp. 1991) (unfit premises); 62A-11-410(2) (1989)
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provisions that codify the "bad faith" exception to the American rule, Utah Code

Ann. § 78-27-56, and that allow attorney's fees in suits brought against peace
officers and other governmental employees for violations of the Fourth Amend

ment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. § 78-16-3. Thus, the rationale underlying the
Aleyeska decision applies directly in Utah. The Utah legislature has acted in a

variety of situations to statutorily allow an award of attorney's fees to protect

various state rights. Appellants, who can cite no statute allowing the recovery of
attorney's fees in this type ofcase, are thus asking this Court to "invade the [Utah]
legislature's province" and redistribute litigation costs.

Each of the state decisions rejecting the private attorney general doctrine

has explicitly agreed with the rationale articulated in Aleveska. For example, in
Doe v. Heintz. the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:

In view of this legislative policy of selecting the special situations
where attorneys' fees may be awarded, we agree with the trial court
that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to establish under the private
attorney general doctrine a broad rule permitting such fees ....

526 A.2d at 1323. In Blue Skv Advocates, the Washington Supreme Court cited
language from Aleyeska and stated that w[w]e are convinced of the wisdom of this
reasoning for our state system and adopt it." 727 P.2d at 649. In Shelby Countv.

the Alabama Supreme Court responded to Serrano by stating that "[w]e, however,
are not inclined to make such a drastic change in Alabama law and overrule such

(failure to withhold child support); 63-30c-l et seq. (1989) (recovery by public
officers of attorney's fees for defense of actions under Article V); 70C-7-204 (1990)
(violation ofConsumer Credit Act); 76-9-406 (1990) (violation ofprivacy offenses); 7811-10 (1987) (actions against peace officers); 78-16-3 (1987) (actions for 4th

Amendment violations); 78-27-56 (Supp. 1991) (actions or defense in bad faith); 7837-9 (1987) (mortgage foreclosures).
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a clear line of precedent without legislative authorization." 372 So. 2d at 1097.

Respondent U S WEST submits that the rationale of Aleyeska. particularly

in light of the broad ranging state statutes allowing attorney's fees in a variety of
situations, should be followed by this Court, since it maintains an appropriate
balance between the judicial and legislative branches of government.
G.

Appellants Have Failed to Articulate Anv Rational Basis for a Claim
of Attorney's fees Against U S WEST.

The sole basis for Appellants' claim that U S WEST should pay Appellants'
attorney's fees is contained in these two sentences:

The practical problem with determining who should pay Appellants'
costs and attorney's fees is also easily resolved in this case. They
should be paid by the major proponent of this unconstitutional
statute, U.S. West.

App. Brief at 118-19.66 If the implications of this statement were not so serious,
the claim would be laughable.

Appellants cite no authority to support their claim for attorney's fees on the
theory that favoring a piece of legislation renders one legally liable to someone

who later challenges the legislation.67 They do not address the bizarre chilling
impact that such a standard of liability would have on the fundamental democrat

ic right of citizens - including corporations - to seek legal change through
legislative action. They ignore the fact that the plan proposed by U S WEST was
rejected by the Commission and that the plan ultimately adopted by the Commis-

66 Those two sentences comprise the entirety of Appellants' "case" against
U S WEST for attorney's fees.

67 It is virtually unimaginable that any court has ever imposed liability on
a party on the ground that they favored a piece of legislation.
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sion was as unacceptable to U S WEST as it is to Appellants.

It is a fundamental principle of Utah law that a party seeking damages

from another party must articulate a legally cognizable basis for the relief sought.
By any standard, Appellants have failed to do so.

Their claim for costs and

attorney's fees should therefore be rejected.

VIII. THE COMMISSION'S FINDING OF A RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY OF
12.2% WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Appellants presented no testimony dealing with rate of return nor did they
(or their counsel, Mr. Barker) participate in the hearings held in December 1990,
when the rate of return witnesses for U S WEST, the Division and the Committee

were cross-examined. (R. 531, 695). Despite their non-participation on this issue,
Appellants attempt to overturn the Commission's finding of a 12.2% return on
equity, claiming it is not based on substantial evidence.
A.

Appellants failed to marshall the evidence in support of a 12.2% rate
of return.

The sole ground for Appellants' attack on the Commission's rate of return

finding is their claim that "the Commission's adoption of a 12.2% rate of return is
unsupported by substantial evidence."

(App. Brief at 101).

Under the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), the reviewing court can grant relief if

the Appellant has been substantially prejudiced by an action of the agency that "is
based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before

the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). While the substantial evidence test
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of the UAPA grants courts greater latitude than prior standards, Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989), it also imposes greater
duties upon a party seeking to challenge the agency's finding:

It is also important to note that the "whole record test" necessarily
requires that a party challenging the Board's findings of fact must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that
despite the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contra
dictory evidence, the findings are not supported by substantial
evidence.

Id. at 68 (italics in original). Accord, First Nat'l Bank v. Countv Board of Equal
ization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) ("party challenging the findings . . . must
marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings"); West Vallev Citv v.

Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
Appellants did not marshall the evidence in this case relating to the rate of
return issue. While Appellants filed a 121 page brief, their treatment of the rate of

return is scant. They dedicate only one paragraph to it in their fact section and

less than four pages to it in their argument,68 despite the fact that the four
witnesses who addressed the rate of return issue filed 600 pages of testimony and
exhibits (R 5976-6012, 6018-22, 6595-6607, 6612-6735, 7041-71, 7307-7510, 7512-7780)

and the transcript of their cross-examination extended for over 400 pages. (R. 530941) In addition, U S WEST, the Division and Committee filed extensive post

hearing briefs. (R. 4714-59). Despite this voluminous record, there is not a single

68 App. Brief at 51-52, 101-05.
104

reference to the factual record in Appellants' argument.69 Thus, Appellants have
not even attempted to meet their duty of marshalling the evidence. Instead, as

Appellants acknowledge, their entire argument is based on a facial analysis of the
Commission's order. This is how Appellants characterized their challenge in
this manner:

Once again, the Commission's Report and Order - on its face —

demonstrates that there was no record evidence to support a finding
of a 12.2% rate of return.

App. Brief at 102 (emphasis added). Appellants have utterly misperceived their
duty in challenging a finding based on lack of substantial evidence. The question
is not whether the Order "on its face" sets forth sufficient evidence to support the
finding; rather, the question is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record

to support the filing. In failing to marshall the evidence on this issue, Appellants'
challenge to the rate of return finding must fail, particularly in the face of the
principle that a failure to marshall causes the challenged finding to be treated as
conclusive:

If indeed [appellant] is challenging the finding that she was termi
nated for a failure to adhere to the store's coupon policy, she has

failed to meet her burden of marshaling the evidence in support of
that finding. Therefore, we accept the Board's finding as conclusive.

Nelson v. Den't of Employment Security. 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah App. 1990)
(emphasis added); Merriam v. Board of Review. 812 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah App. 1991);

69 See App. Brief at 101-05. In their argument on this issue, Appellants
quote the Order five times and never cite the factual record. That is the full extent

of their effort to persuade the Court that the 12.2% return is not "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
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Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review. 775 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah App. 1989).
Because Appellants failed to marshall the evidence, the Commission's

finding of 12.2 percent return on equity must be treated by this Court as conclu
sive.

B.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support a 12.2% rate of
1.

Appellants' Analysis is Misleading and Flawed.

Appellants' challenge to the Commission's rate of return finding is based
solely on a facial review of the order rather than a substantive review of the
evidence presented.

Appellants' discussion of the Commission's 13 page analysis of rate of
return (R. 5397-5409, Appendix 1) is highly selective and completely misleading:
Appellants point out the Commission's statement that U S WEST has

been able to raise capital at an 11.8 percent rate of return and that
capital costs had been trending downward (App. Brief at 102).

Appellants attribute the Commission's finding of a rate of return
higher than 11.8 percent as being based on an unsubstantiated

finding that conditions in the industry and the economy are unsettled
in the near term. (Id. at 102-03).

Based solely on the Commission's statement that "[t]his is a time

when states are in a sense competing for high-tech additions to and

™ The Division takes the position that the Commission's finding of a 12.2%
rate of return is supported by substantial evidence. However, the Division did not
participate in this portion of the Brief.
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refinements of telecommunications plant and equipment" (R. 5409,
App. 1), Appellants assert that the Commission's decision to raise

the rate of return from 11.8% to 12.2% is a regulatory bribe made to
persuade U S WEST to invest more in the telecommunications
infrastructure in Utah. (Id. at 103-04).

What is most amazing about Appellants' argument is what they did not
mention. There is not a single reference to any of the models used to estimate

costs of capital, such as the discounted cash flow model (DCF) and the capital
asset pricing model (CAPM).

Yet, the Commission's Order discusses these

issues at length. (R. 5402-08, Addendum B). And, while Appellants profess
outrage that the Commission raised the rate of return, they fail to mention, let

alone discuss, the specific reasons that the Commission gave for doing so:
Without dispute, capital costs have declined since the previous rate of
return decision of 11.8 percent, and even since the filing of direct
testimony. Taken alone, this would argue for reduction in allowed

return. But other compelling factors have a role to play. The record

on risk-return comparability, while not complete, on balance suggest
ing increasing risk; the questioned reliability of model results during
unsettled moments in the economy and industry; the large, even
contrary, difference in results obtained by witnesses for the Com
pany compared with witness Compton for the Division using CAPM;

the knowledge that the utility may to a degree be shedding certain
utility characteristics; and the ambiguous record on expected
behavior of stock price, are all influential considerations which must

be evaluated in the context of a wide range of cost of equity results
obtained by witness application of models.

The Commission con

cludes there is no reason to grant an award at the upper end of the
range, and indeed there are reasons why this would be error. The

Commission is convinced a reduction in the current equity return,
though advocated by witnesses for the Committee and the Division,
would likewise be in error, given the risk implications of the chang
ing industry and the status of the general economy in relation
thereto.
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R. 5407-08, Addendum B; emphasis added. Thus, contrary to Appellants' infer
ence, the Commission did not just arbitrarily raise the return.

Instead, the

Commission examined a variety of results produced by several different models,

relying primarily on the DCF model. It looked at conditions in the economy and in
the industry and the fact that U S WEST "may to a degree be shedding certain
utility characteristics." On balance, the Commission chose to establish a rate of

return that was neither at the top of the range proposed by U S WEST's witnesses

— 14.5 to 15 percent — nor at the bottom of the range suggested by other witness
es — 11.1 to 11.6 percent.

As to the assertion that the rate of return finding is a regulatory bribe,
Appellants' reading of the Order ignores all other reasons cited by the Commis
sion. Their argument is a cynical effort to attribute motives to the Commission

that the order does not bear out. All the Commission was saying is that there is a
relationship between rate of return and investment decision making, and that this
relationship, along with other relevant considerations, should be considered in

deciding the rate of return issue. (R. 5409, Addendum B). If, as Appellants infer,
the Commission raised the rate of return to "bribe" U S WEST to invest more in

Utah, one can only wonder why the Commission in the same order mandated that
U S WEST place a fiber backbone system and modernize 41 central offices. (R. 546062, Addendum B). Obviously, the Commission did not believe it needed to bribe U S

WEST to make investments the Commission considers necessary.
2.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Commission's Finding.

While it is Appellants' burden to marshall all of the evidence supporting the
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finding, even a cursory review of the evidence demonstrates that the Commis
sion's rate of return finding is supported by substantial evidence.?!

Consider first of all the DCF evidence.

All witnesses presented DCF

analyses. U S WEST witness Cummings presented several DCF analyses. His
DCF analysis of U S WEST alone produced a calculated rate of return of 12.2% —

an analysis of all seven Regional Holding Companies (RHCs)?2 produced a 12.8%
return (R. 7562-71, 7590, 7640). Using independent telephone companies, Mr.

Cummings' DCF analysis resulted in a calculated rate of return of 14.3%; using
comparable non-regulated companies, his DCF result was 15.2%. (R. 7567, 764142). Dr. Morin, another witness sponsored by U S WEST, obtained a DCF calculat

ed rate of return for the RHCs of 13.11%, 13.74% for both independent telephone

?i Although there is no precise definition of substantial evidence, it is clear

that it is more than a "scintilla" and less than a preponderance. Grace Drilling
Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 1989); First Nat'l Bank v.
Countv Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (defines "substantial

evidence" as the "quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion").

?2 The RHCs are the seven companies created to provide local exchange
services following the AT&T divestiture. U S WEST, Inc., the parent company of
Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc., is one of them. The seven RHCs

are engaged in similar business activities, have similar bond ratings, size and
capital structure and are subject to similar economic and regulatory risks. (R.
7370-71, 7422, 7424-25). Dr. Marcus, the Committee witness, pointed out that the
RHCs are the most comparable companies to U S WEST (R. 883-84). U S WEST

took the position that it was inappropriate for the Commission to base its finding
of U S WEST's return on a single company rate of return, particularly in light of
the Supreme Court decision in the Hope and Bluefield cases that emphasize the
need for setting a return at levels earned by "other enterprises having correspond
ing risks." Federal Power Commission v. Hope National Gas Co.. 320 U. S. 591,
603 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n.

262 U. S. 679 (1923). The Hope and Bluefield cases have been expressly followed by
this Court in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission. 107 Utah 155,
152 P.2d 542 (1944).
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companies and gas distribution utilities and 14.92% for high-quality industrials.
[R. 7342-81, 7424-30). Dr. Compton, the Division's witness, took an approach that
looked only at U S WEST, rather than comparing it to other companies.. He found
a 12.2% return for U S WEST, Inc., parent of Respondent U S WEST Communica

tions, Inc., which he then reduced to reflect what he perceived to be less risk for U

S WEST Communications, Inc., the regulated entity. He ultimately proposed an
11.5% return on equity (R. 6731, 7053-60). However, when doing an analysis of the
RHCs, Dr. Compton produced an RHC average DCF calculated rate of return of
12.5%. (R. 7054). Like Dr. Compton, Dr. Marcus (the witness for the Committee)

did a DCF analysis of U S WEST, Inc. that supported his recommendation of a

rate of return of 11.3% for the regulated entity, although he also did an analysis of
the DCF of the RHCs, which he estimated at 12.3% (R. 884).

In addition, the Division presented an exhibit (R. 6653), showing the
comparative DCF rate of return results for Pacificorp, the parent of Utah Power

and Light, Questar, the parent of Mountain Fuel, and U S WEST, Inc., the parent
of Respondent U S WEST Communications, Inc. The record showed that the rate
of return found by the Utah Commission for both Utah Power and Mountain Fuel
was 12.1%. (R. 866). The exhibit showed that the relative DCF calculated rates of

return for the three companies were: Pacificorp at 10.7%, Questar at 11.1% and
U S WEST, Inc. at 11.9%. (R. 6633). Thus, comparing U S WEST to the other
major regulated utilities in Utah, its required return was higher.

Since the

commission had set the return on equity for Mountain Fuel and Utah Power at
12.1% as recently as 1991, it is entirely consistent with the evidence that it set U S
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WEST's return at a higher level, in this case a modest increase to 12.2%. The

point is that there is a wealth of DCF evidence that supports a finding of a rate of
return from 11.3% to over 14%. The Commission's finding falls well within that
range.

In addition to the DCF testimony, there was considerable testimony
regarding the changes in the industry and to U S WEST that impact its risk. (R.
7334-35, 7338-41, 7393, 7546-50). Another U S WEST witness testified as to the

uncertain nature of the United States economy and U S WEST's financial pros
pects (R. 7302). Dr. Morin testified at length regarding the problems of relying on

a single methodology - such as DCF - in estimating rate of return, particularly in
unsettled economic times (R. 7347-48). Both he and Mr. Cummings presented
other approaches (R. 7382-88, 7431-33, 7572-81, 7643-48), whose calculations
resulted in rate of return estimates well above 12.2%.73

While the foregoing represents only a portion of the evidence presented on

rate of return, it demonstrates beyond question that the Commission's finding is
based on substantial evidence in the record.

CONCLUSION

Respondents respectfully request that the Court:

1.

Dismiss the issues raised in Points I-IV and VI of Appellants' Brief

73 While the Commission showed a clear preference for the DCF approach,
it did not reject the other approaches. Indeed, one of the reasons cited by the
Commission for its 12.2% finding was that a variety of considerations "must be
evaluated in the context of a wide range of cost of equity results obtained by
witness application of models." (R. 5408, Addendum B).
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on the ground that they are moot or, in the event the Court does not dismiss these

points on mootness grounds, Respondents request that the Court determine that
both subsections of Section 54-4-4.1 are constitutional and deny Appellants'
requests for costs and attorney's fees.

2.

Affirm the Commission's finding that a 12.2 percent return on equity

is reasonable.

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
AND

STATUTES

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
ARTICLE VIII

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sec. 7. [Due process of law I
,No Pen;on shall be depnved of life lil^rt

eny. w.thoutdue procej• oflaw

U'^

Section 1. [Judicial powers - Courts ]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a

supreme court, in a trial court ofgeneral jurisdiction

known as the district court, and in such other courts

as the Legislature by statute mav establish The Su
preme Court, the district court, and such other courts
designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts
not ofrecord shall also be established bv statute ]984

ARTICLE V

DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Settion

!• fThree departments of government, j

^"Se^w 1Tfh?e dePart™nt* "f government.]

shall £7 , °f^ S«ven,n,ent of the State of Utah

^psiative,
la ,veV1ththe Executive,
Knt° tHr"e distim-1
and the d^«m,nts;
Judical; and the
no
*n Son0"'
°f the" ^ ^ "hail ex^
el
^ ^P^tammg to either of the others

ARTICLE XII

CORPORATIONS

P« son charged with the exercse „f powers proper"

pt in the case. .,erem expressly directed lir p,r.

Sec. 20. [Trusts and combinations prohibited.]
Any combination by individuals, corporations, or

associations, having for its object or effect the control
ling of the price of any products of the soil, or ofany
article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of

exchange or transportation, is prohibited, and hereby
declared unlawful, and against public policy. The
ARTICLE VI

Legislature shall pass laws for the enforcement of

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

this section by adequate penalties, and in case of in
corporated companies, if necessary for that purpose, it
may declare a forfeiture of their franchise.

Section I.

[Power vested in Senate, House and
People.]
The Legislative power of the State shall be vested.

1. In a Senate and House of Representatives which
shall be designated the Legislature of the State of
Utah.

2 In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter
stated:

The legal voters or such fractional part thereof, of
the State of l.tah as may be provided b> law. ijnder
such conditions and :n -uch manner and within such

time as may be provided by law, may initiate anv
tie-ired iegislat.on and cause the same to be suhmit-

tec to a vote of the people for approval or rejection, or
may require any law passed by the Legislature ex
cept those laws pas.-oi by a two-third.-! vote <f the
members elected to each house uf the Legishit'..ft-' to
be -uomitt-'d to the voters of the State before -uch
biv-

-h.dl take effect.

The legal \oter- or such fractional part theP'of a.s
mov he provided by iaw. of any legal subdivi-). >n of
the State, under .-uch conditions and in such :n.inner

and within such ;;:"r:e a- may be provided bv law, mav
initiate any desired legislation and cause the \.mt to

be submitted to a vote of the people of said legal -ub-

division tor approval it rejection, or may require anv
lav. nr ordinance pa-.-ed b> the L»w making bmiv ot'
said leeal subdivision to be submitted to the voters

thereof betbre such a.v, or ordinance shall iake'-ffecl
It**)
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STATUTES

5-1-3-1. Charges must be just; service adequate;

54-4-4.

rules reasonable.

All charges made, demanded or received by any

public utility, or by any two or more public utilities,
for any product or commodity furnished or to be fur
nished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered,
shall be just and reasonable. Every unjust or unrea
sonable charge made, demanded or received for such

Classification and fixing of rates after
hearing.

(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a

hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or
classifications, or any of them demanded, observed,
charged or collected by any public utility for any ser
vice or product or commodity, or in connection there
with, including the rates or fares for excursion or

product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited

commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations,

and declared unlawful. Every public utility shall fur
nish, provide and maintain such service, instrumen

practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such

talities, equipment and facilities as will promote the
safety, health, comfortand convenienceof its patrons,
employees and the public, and as will be in all re
spects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All
rules and regulations made by a public utility affect

ing or pertaining to its charges or service to the pub
lic shall be just and reasonable. The scope of defini
tion "just and reasonahle" may include, but shall not
be limited to, the cost of providing service to each

category of customer, economic impact of charges on
each category of customer, and on the well-being of
the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide ner'Mic
variations in demand of such products, commodities

or services, and means ofencouraging conservation of
resources and energy.

54-3-7.

1B77

Charges not to vary from schedules —
Refunds and rebates forbidden — Ex

ceptions.
Except as in this chapter otherwise provided, no
puhlic utility shall charge, demand, collect or receive
a greater or less or different compensation for any

product or commodity furnished or to be furnished, or
for any service rendered or to be rendered, than the
rates, tolls, rentals and charges applicable to such
products or commodity or service as specified in its
schedules on file and in effect at the time, nor shall

rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or classifications,
or any of them, are unjust, unreasonable, discrimina
tory or preferential, or in anywise in violation of any
provisions of law, or that such rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, charges or classifications are insufficient, the
commission shall determine the just, reasonable or
sufficient rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifi
cations, rules, regulations, practices or contracts to be
thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the
same by order as hereinafter provided.
(21 The commission shall have power to investigate
a single rate, fare, toll, rental, charge, classification,
rule, regulation, contract or practice, or any number
thereof, or the entire schedule or schedules of rates,

fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules,
regulations, contracts and practices, or any number
thereof, of any public utility, and to establish, after
hearing, new rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges, clas
sifications, rules, regulations, contracts or practices,
or schedule or schedules in lieu thereof.

(31 The commission, in its determination of just
and reasonable rates, may consider recent changes in
the utility's financial condition or changes reasonably
expected, but not speculative, in the utility s reve
nues, expenses or investments and may adopt an ap
propriate future test period, not exceeding twelve
months from the date of filing, including projections
or projections together with a period of actual opera
tions in determining the utility's test year for ratemaking purposes.
1975

any such public utility refund or remit, directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any device, any por

54-4-1.1.

tion of the rates, tolls, rentals and charges so speci
fied; nor extend to any person any form of contract or
agreement, or any rule or regulation, or any facility
or privilege except such as are regularly ,m<: uni

(li The commission may, by rule or order, adopt
any method of rate regulation consistent with this
title, including a method whereby revenues or earn
ings of a public utility above a specified level are
equitably shared between the public utility and its

formly extended to all corporations and persons; pro
vided^ that the commission may, by rule or order,
establish such exceptions from the operation of this

prohibition as it may consider just and reasonable as

to any public utility.

19M

Rules to govern rates — Shared earn
ings.

customers.

;^i Not later than til) davs from the entry of an
order or adopi on of a rule adopt.ng a method ol rate
regulation wo reby revenues or earnings of a public
utility above . specified level an' equitably -lar-d

between the public utility and its customers, the punUc utility may elect not to proceed with the method of
54-4-1.

General jurisdiction.

The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the busi
ness of every such public utility in this state, and to

do all things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or conve
nient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction;
provided, however, that the Department of Transpor
tation shall have jurisdiction over those safety func
tions transferred to it by the Department of Transpor
tation Act.

1975

rate regulation by filing with the cmmission a n-'. :•
that it does not intend to proceed with the method ..>i
rate regulation.

I99°

54-7-12.

Rate increase or decrease — Procedure
— Effective dates —

Electrical or tele

phone cooperative.
11)

As used in this section:

1a1 "Rate increase" means any direct increase
in a rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a

public utility or any modification of a classifica
tion, contract, practice, or rule that increases a
rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a public
utility
ibi "Rate decrease" means any direct decrease
in a rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a
public utility or any modification of a classifica
tion, contract, practice, or rule that decreases a
rate, fare, toll, rental, or other charge of a public
utility.
(2) <ai Any public utility or other party that pro
poses t& increase or decrease rates shall file ap
propriate schedules with the commission setting
• forth the proposed* rate increase or decrease,
fb'i The commission shall, after reasonable no

tice, hold a hearing to determine whether the
proposed rate increase or decrease, or some other
rate increase or decrease, is just and reasonable.
If a rate decrease is proposed by a public utility,
the commission may waive a hearing unless it
seeks to suspend, alter, or modify the rate de
crease.

•c 1 Except as otherwise provided in Suhsertions i;j! and i4i. no proposed rate increase or
decrease is effective until after completion of the
hearing and issuance of a final order by the com
mission concerning the proposed increase or de
crease.

13> The following rules apply to the implementa
tion of any proposed rate increase or decrease filed by
a utility or proposed by any other party and to the
implementation of any other increase or decrease in
lieu of that proposed by a utility or other party that is
determined to be just and reasonable by the commis

uS)(a) exceeds the increase finally ordered, it
shall order the utility to refund the exce.-- to
customers. If the commission in its final or

der on a utility's revenue requirement finds
that the interim decrease order under Sub
section (31(a) exceeds the decrease finally or
dered, it shall order a surcharge to customers
to recover the excess decrease.

(c) If the commission fails to enter its order

granting or revising a revenue increase within
240 days after the utility's schedules are filed,
the rate increase proposed by the utility is final
and the commission may not order a refund of
anv amount already collected by the utility un
der its filed rate increase.

id) (i) When a public utility files a proposed
rate increase based upon an increased cost to

the utility for fuel or energy purchased or
obtained

from

independent

contractors,

other independent suppliers, or any supplier
whose prices are regulated by a governmen
tal agency, the commission shall issue a ten
tative order with respect to the proposed in
crease within ten days after the proposal is
filed, unless it issues a final order with re

spect to the rate increase within 2U days af
ter the proposal is filed.
(ii) The commission shall hold a public

hearing within 30 days after it issues the
tentative order to determine if the proposed
rate increase is just and reasonable.
(4) la) Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this title, any schedule, classification, practice, or

rule filed by a public utility with the commission
that does not result in any rate increase shall
take effect 30 days after the date of filing or
within any lesser time the commission may

grant, subject to its authority after a hearing to
suspend, alter, or modify that schedule, classifi
cation, practice, or rule.

ihl When the commission suspends a schedule,

sion:

13! On its own initiative or m response to an
application by a public utility or other partv. :he
commission, after a hearing, may allow any pro

classification, practice, or rule, it shall hold a
hearing on the schedule, classification, practice.

posed rate increase or decrease, or a reasonable
part of the rate increase or decrease, to take ef
fect, subject to the commission's right to order a
refund or surcharge, upon the filing of the util
ity's schedules or at any time during the pen
dency of its hearing proceedings. The evidence
presented in the hearing held pursuant to this

ici For purposes of this Subsection •-('. anv
schedule, classification, practice, or ru,e 'v\..< in

or rule before issuing its final order

troduces a service or product not previously •>!-

fered may not result in a rate increase,

if)) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of
this title, whenever a common carrier files with
the commission any schedule, classification,

subsection need not encompass all issues that

practice, or rule that does not result in an in

may be considered in a rate case hearing held
pursuant to Subsection (2Kb), but shall establish

crease in any rate, fare, toll, rental, or charge,
the schedule, classification, practice, or rule shall
take effect 30 days after the date of filing or at

an adequate prima facie showing that the in
terim rate increase or decrease is justified,
ib) li) If the commission completes a hearing
concerning a utility's revenue requirement
before the expiration of 210 days from the
date the rate increase or decrease proposal is
filed, it may issue a final order within that
period establishing the utility's revenue re
quirement and fixing its interim allowable
rates before it determines the allocation of

the increase or decrease among categories of
customers and classes of service.
(ii) If the commission in its final order on

a utility's revenue requirement finds that
the interim increase order under Subsection

any earlier time the commission may grant, sub
ject to the authority of the commission, after a
hearing, to suspend, alter, or modify the sched
ule, classification, practice, or rule
ib) li) Notwithstanding any other provision
of this title, whenever a common carrier files
with the commission a request for an in
crease in rates, fares, tolls, rentals, or
charges based solely upon cost increases to
the common carrier of fuel supplied by an

independent contractor or independent
source of supply, the requested increase shall
take effect ten days after the filing of the
request with the commission or at any ear
lier time after the filing of the request as the
commission mav by order permit.

63-4bb-10. Procedures for formal adjudicative
proceedings — Orders.

(ii) The commission shall order the in

crease to take effect only after a showing has
been made by the common carrier to the

commission that the increase is justified.
(iii) The commission may, after a hearing,
suspend, alter, or modify the increase,
ib") This section does not apply to any rate changes
of an electrical or telephone cooperative that meets
ill of the following requirements:
(a) The cooperative is organized for the pur
pose of either distributing electricity or providing
telecommunication services to its members and

the public at cost, "At cost" includes interest
costs and a reasonable rate of return as deter

mined by the cooperative's board of directors.

(b) The cooperative's board of directors and
any appropriate agency of the federal govern
ment have approved the rate increase or other

rate change and all necessary tariff revisions re
flecting the increased rate or rate change.
(c) Before implementing any rate increases,

In formal adjudicative proceedings:
U) Within a reasonable time after the hear

ing, or after thefiling ofany post-hearing papers
permitted by the presiding officer, or within the
time required by any applicable statute or rule of

the agency, the presiding officer shall sign and
issue an order that includes;

(a) a statement of the presiding officer's
findings offact based exclusively on the evi
dence of record in the adjudicative proceed
ings or on facts officially noted;

(b) a statement of the presiding officer's

conclusions of law;

(c) a statement ofthe reasons for the pre
siding officer's decision;

(d) a statement of any relief ordered by

the agency;

(e) a notice of the right to apply for recon
sideration;

(0 a notice of any right to administrative
or judicial review of the order available to

the cooperative has held a public meeting for al!

aggrieved parties; and

its customers and members. The cooperative
shall mail a notice of the meeting to all of the

sideration or review.

^cooperative's customers and members not less

•than ten days prior to the date that the meeting
is held.

Id) The cooperative has filed its tariff revisions

reflecting the rate increase or other rate change
with the commission, who shall make the tariffs

available for public inspection.

(7) Procedures for the implementation of a pro
posed rate increase by a telephone corporation having
bss than 5,000 subscriber access lines are as follows:

(a) li) The proposed rate increase may be
come effective upon the filing of the proposed
tariff revisions and necessary information to
support a determination by the commission
that the proposed rate increase is just and

(g) the time limits applicable toany recon

(2) The presiding officer ma\ use his experi

ence, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge to evaluate the evidence.

(3) No finding of fact that was contested mav
be based solely on hearsay evidence unless that
evidence is admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

(4) This section does not preclude the presid

ing officer from issuing interim orders to:

la) notify the parties offurther hearings;
(hi notify the parties ofprovisional rulings

on a portion of the issues presented; or

(c) otherwise provide for the fair arid effi
cient conduct ofthe adjudicative proceeding.
1988

reasonable.

tii) The telephone corporation shall pro

63-46b-16.

Judicial review — Formal adjudica
tive proceedings.

vide 30 days' notice to the commission and
all potentially affected access line sub
scribers of the proposed rate increase.

the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a

lb) d) The commission may investigate
whether the proposed rate increase is just

person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

and reasonable.

(ii) If the commission determines, after
notice and hearing, that the rale increase is

unjust or unreasonable in who.e or in part,
the commission may establish the rates,
charges, ur classifications that it finds to be
just and reasonable.

tc) The commission shall investigate and hold
a hearing to determine whether any proposed
rate increase is just and reasonable if 10% or

more of the telephone corporation's potentially
affected access line subscribers file a request for
agency action requesting an investigation and
hearing,
1989

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on

la) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu
tional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdic
tion conferred by any statute;

(ci the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;

ie) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro
cedure or decision-making proceFs, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were

illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determi
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;

ib) the agency action is:
d) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency hy statute;
iii i contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iiii contrary to the agency's prior prac

tice, unless the agency justifes the inconsis
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in

consistency; or

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. ia««
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THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH

REPORT AND ORDER

DATED JUNE 19, 1990

-

BEFORE THE

PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Application
of US WEST

COMMUNICATIONS

DOCKET

NO.

90-049-03
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Approval of an Incentive Regulation
Plan.

REPORT

AND

ORDER

In the Matter of the Investigation
into the Reasonableness of the
Rates and Charges of US WEST

DOCKET

NO.

90-049-06

COMMUNICATIONS.

JJ?.SUED:

SHORT

June 19 , 1_9_ _9 1

TITLE

1990 General

Rate

Case

SYNOPSIS

The Commission herein orders a reduction in revenue require
ment of $19,799,000. The reduction is based on a stipulation by the
parties

capital,

on

all

issues

except depreciation expense and cost of

which is set by the Commission at 12.2 percent rate of

return en common equity and 10.93 percent rate of return on invest

ment. Revenue requirement reductions ordered in this docket, the sum
of two interim reductions and this final one, total $38,748,000. In
addition, the Commission adopts a proposal to invest in central

office and transport plant and equipment to modernize and upgrade the
network^ The Commission also formulates an "incentive regulation"
plan which,

if implemented, would permit the Company to retain a

share of excess earnings, if any, over the allowed rate" of return, as
an incentive to promote more efficient utility operations.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 2, 1990, US WEST Communications (USWC or the

Company) filed an application with the Commission seeking approval of

an incentive regulation plan.
the

case.

As part

description

of

its

of the

Docket No. 90-049-03 was assigned to
application,

proposed plan,

USWC provided

a general

which contained both

incentive

regulation and network modernization proposals.

On March 16, 1990,

the

filed a Motion to

Committee of Consumer Services

(Committee)

Dismiss Application and Strike Docket on the ground that Senate Bill
115,

the legislation that enacted Utah

(1991), had not yet become law.

Code Ann.

Section 54-4-4.1

On March 26, 1990, USWC filed its

detailed Utah Incentive Regulation Plan.
On

(Division)

March

28,

1990,

the

Division

filed a Petition in Docket No.

of

Public

90-049-06

Utilities

seeking an

investigation into the reasonableness of the rates and charges of
USWC and requesting a hearing to consider an interim rate reduction
of $5.7 million.

On April 27, 1990, the Committee withdrew its Motion to

Dismiss when USWC agreed that its application be deemed to have been

refiled on April

27,

1990.

In its Order of May 10,

1990,

the

Commission ruled that USWC's application and other pleadings relating
to incentive regulation would be deemed to have been refiled as of

April 27, 1990 without the necessity of actually refiling them.

In

the same order, the Commission ordered that Docket Nos. 90-049-03 and

90-049-06

be

"consolidated

for purposes

of hearing

only,"

and
C* f" *""* ••"•'
•J './ '.J '^)

DOCKET

NO.

90-049-03

and

06

-6-

established a schedule for filing of testimony and for hearings.

The

Commission

the

required

that

analyses

of

both

the

incentive

modernization plans consider the current definition of

and

"universal

service" as well as what would be required when the term of a plan
ended.

In

late April

199 0,

the

Division and the Committee

filed

testimony in support of their requests for an interim decrease.
May

1,

1990,

the

Committee

filed

a

motion

requesting

that

Commission reduce rates on an interim basis by $16 million.
18,

1990,

USWC

filed responsive testimony regarding

interim rate decrease.

On
the

On May

the proposed

The Division filed supplemental testimony on

May 18 and May 23, 1990, increasing its requested interim decrease to

$8.6 million.

Hearings were held on May 24-25, 1990.

Following the

hearings, various parties filed briefs summarizing their positions
regarding the proposed interim rate decrease.

On June 22, 1990, the

Commission ordered an interim rate decrease of $10.65 million, based
on a 1989 test year, 11.8 percent return on equity, and adjustments
consistent

with

Commission

also

those

ordered

determined

that

in

Docket

the

No.

standards

88-049-07.
for

The

interim

rate

decreases and increases need not be the same.

On June 29, 1990, USWC filed its direct testimony on

incentive regulation issues, as well as amendments to its proposed
Utah Incentive Regulation Plan.

On July 12, 1990, the Commission

issued its order amending the schedule.

On July 20, 1990, parties

(other than USWC) filed position statements on incentive regulation
issues.

on August 14, 1990, the Commission issued its Second Amended

Scheduling Order revising some of the filing and hearing dates.
J

On

t'VT n --. —
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August

27,

1990,

various parties

requirement calculations.
Scheduling

Order

Deseret News.

was

filed their preliminary revenue

On September 8-9, 1990, the Second Amended

published

in

the

Salt

Lake

Tribune

and

the

In early October 1990, various parties filed testimony

on rate of return and capital structure issues.

On October 24,

1990,

all

parties

filed testimony in

response to USWC's proposed incentive regulation plan.
30,

1990,

USWC,

the

Division,

the

Committee,

and

On October

AT&T

entered

a

Stipulation and Joint Motion on Revenue Requirement Issues, resolving
most revenue requirement issues,

and calling for a further interim

reduction of $8,238 million to be implemented January 1, 1991.

On

October 31, 1990, James L. Barker, representing himself and six other

interveners, filed a Request for Declaratory Order challenging the
constitutionality

of

54-4-4.1,

the

statute

that

enables

the

Commission to adopt earnings sharing plans like the one proposed by
USWC.

On November 1,

Scheduling Order.

Fourth

Amended

1990,

the Commission issued its Third Amended

On November 23, 1990, the Commission issued its

Scheduling

Order

in which

it ordered

parties

consider the effects of demand for service on depreciation,

to

and

stated that the determination of revenue requirement must address the
persistence of overearnings.

In addition,

the Commission ordered

that the interim rate reduction be spread on an equal percentage

basis to residence and business local exchange services, toll, and
switched access,

excluding nonrecurring charges,

and stated the

Commission's determination of its authority to order investments to
upgrade the system.

On November 26, 1990, the parties filed rebuttal
A

~^:-:;-;;0
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testimony
December

on
4,

Commission

rate

of

1990,
issued

return

pursuant
a

Revised

and
to

capital

the

Public

structure

request
Notice

of
of

the

issues.

On

Company,

the

Hearing,

which

was

published in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News on December

8-19, 1990, and which was mailed directly to all persons and entities
who had filed letters with the Commission indicating an interest in
incentive regulation and network modernization issues.
8,

1990,

and

On December

the parties filed surrebuttal testimony on rate of return

capital

Commission

structure

held

hearings

and

issues.

on

on

On

the

December

Stipulation

rate

of

17-19,

and

Joint

capital

the

Motion

on

Revenue

Requirement

issues.

By order issued January 3, 1991, the Commission approved the

Stipulation pursuant to its terms.

return and

1990,

structure

On January 11, 1991, the parties

filed briefs on rate of return and capital structure issues.

On

January 16, 1991, all parties filed rebuttal testimony on incentive

regulation issues.

On January 18, 1991, the parties filed testimony

on depreciation represcription issues.

Also on January 18,

1991,

several parties filed briefs and motions responding to Mr. Barker's

Request for Declaratory Order.

On January 22,

filed direct testimony on rate design issues.

1991,

the parties

In late January and

early February 1991, various witnesses filed additional testimony on

depreciation represcription issues.

The Commission held a hearing on

February 3, 1991 on depreciation represcription.
1991,

Mr.

Barker

filed

constitutional issues.

a

Reply

Also on February 8,

Memorandum

regarding

the

On February 15, 1991, the parties filed

surrebuttal testimony on incentive regulation issues and rebuttal
i• ,<-> r- «;> -f' l*f
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testimony

Commission

on

rate

design

issued

an

Declaratory Order.

issues

issues.

order

On

dismissing

February

Mr.

22,

Barker's

1991,

Request

the

for

Hearings on incentive regulation and rate design

commenced on

February 28,

1991 and concluded on

March 13,

1991.

On April 19, 1991, USWC, the Division and the Committee

filed position statements regarding disputed issues relating to the
Stipulation and Joint Motion on Revenue Requirement Issues.

On April

26, 1991, the same parties filed responsive position statements.
May

1,

1991,

USWC

moved

that

the

Commission

accept

the

On

position

statements as evidence in this proceeding and sought oral argument.
On May 15, 1991, USWC, the Division and the Committee presented oral

argument on the disputed issues relating to the Stipulation and the

position statements were accepted as evidence in this proceeding.

II.

DISCUSSION,

FINDINGS,

AND CONCLUSIONS
REQUIREMENT

WITH RESPECT TO REVENUE
A.

STIPULATION

On

October

30,

1990,

the

parties

entered

into

a

Stipulation that was intended to resolve all revenue requirement
issues except depreciation and cost of capital, which were reserved
for

later

hearing.

Following

hearings

on

December

17th,

the

Commission adopted the Stipulation by order issued January 3, 1991.
The

October

Stipulation was

based

on

the

first

six

months of 1990 actual results of intrastate operations then available

and the Company's budget estimates

for the calendar year 1990.

'-0153G3
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Attached

to

the

Stipulation

was

a

Joint

Exhibit

adjustments to actual results were identified.

in

which

32

The value of 23 of

the adjustments were to be held fixed, including the June 22,

1990

interim

nine

rate

reduction,

and

the

value

of

the

remaining

adjustments were to be updated when actuals for all 12 months of 1990
became known.

The intent of the signatory parties to rely on the

Stipulation

as

crafted

adjustments

is

made

and

clear

to
in

exclude

consideration

paragraphs

six

and

of

seven

further
of

the

Stipulation.
The Stipulation is a negotiated settlement of revenue
requirement

issues,

as distinct

from each party advancing its own

interest through discovery and hearing,
every single issue.

in an adversarial way,

on

Negotiation is a process of compromise in the

interest of reaching an end result that each party is able to accept.
The

Commission

compromise

has

before,

important details.

criticized
because

it

this
leaves

process
the

of

bargaining

Commission

The Commission knows only outcomes.

unaware

and
of

In addition,

and perhaps most importantly, some issues have been "decided" in the

course

of

the

negotiations

Commission's attention.

without

having

been

brought

to

the

Therefore, the Commission has been reluctant

to accept stipulations in recent major cases, and, where stipulation
seemed

the prudent course,

has sought to confine them to purely

technical as distinct from policy issues.
In the current docket,

stipulation was entertained as

the reasonable course in order to free up Company and regulatory
resources

to

deal

with the

Company's

incentive and

modernization
i .r\ - *> '• Q
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proposals.
the

Also, it seemed revenue requirement issues, according to

parties,

could

be

resolved

in

conformance

with

Commission

decisions rendered in the previous, recently concluded Docket No.

88-049-07.

Since the issues were not to be reargued, the policy

aspect was removed, and resolution would be on technical grounds.
It

is

in

this

context

that,

later

in

the

docket

proceedings, parties began to argue the meaning of the Stipulation's

limitation on updates and adjustments of test year data.

USWC

proposed four new adjustments to test year data, on issues the other

signatory parties had not seen at the time the Stipulation was signed
and which had the effect of increasing revenue requirement.

The

Division then sought to update several of the 23 adjustments which
the Stipulation said could not be updated and which had the effect of

decreasing revenue requirement.

The Committee argued that the plain

meaning of the Stipulation prevented either the introduction of new

adjustments or the updating of fixed adjustments,

and urged the

Commission to reject them both.

The Commission could not have been presented a more

penetrating example of the problematic nature of stipulations.

Here,

signatory parties could not agree what their own words meant, and
seized this dispute as an opportunity to advance their own interests

on what otherwise might have been reasonable grounds.

USWC argued

its proposed new adjustments were of the sort routinely permitted in
the normal fashioning of a test year.

With the full 12 months of

1990 actual results of operations information in hand, the Division
^

*' O
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argued the superiority of these "actuals" to the budget information
upon which the Stipulation was based.
When the Commission accepted the Stipulation on January
3, 1991, the nature of the document as a compromise based on the best
information

That

each

then available to the parties was

party

Stipulation,,

must

have

given

and might on some

up

clearly understood.

something

in

signing

the

issues have argued differently

if

cfiven the chance in an adversarial proceeding, goes without saying;
that is the very purpose of negotiation in a settlement conference.
It is what is meant by stipulation.

Parties cannot now come back to

the Commission and attempt to redefine things to their own advantage.
To do so places the Commission at an unacceptable disadvantage and
severely compromises case proceedings.
full examination of contested issues.
the 1990

state

The record does not contain
The Division has not audited

information and neither the Division nor the Committee can

what,

except

for

the

agreement

reached

in

the

Stipulation

itself, the test year would ideally be.
There

has

also

been

some

discussion

about

what

the

parties could, did, or should have understood was contemplated by the
Stipulation.

At this point in time, all that is important is what

the Commission understood to be stipulated to by the parties at the

time it accepted the Stipulation.

None of the adjustments now argued

for by USWC or the Division were considered open issues by the
Commission.

On this basis,

the

Commission has two choices.

The

Stipulation can be accepted without alteration except as specifically

permitted by its terms, or the case record can be reopened ^fp;r_%
W
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receipt of further information intended to redefine the test year.
Reopening the record is not acceptable.

To do so would be tantamount

to beginning the revenue requirement determination anew.
doubt

that each moment's

money.

This

the

delay

Commission

in

reducing rates costs

cannot

countenance.

Commission concludes the Stipulation must be
unaltered.

Parties are,

further examine

rates as

There is no

as always,

ratepayers

Therefore,

the

accepted essentially

free to bring a new action to

soon as this order

is

final.

The Commission finds that the new adjustments proposed

by the Company are not permitted by the terms of the Stipulation and
are

therefore

proposed

by

rejected.

the

The

Division

are

Commission
not

finds

permitted

that

by

the

the

updates

terms

of

the

regarding

the

Stipulation and are likewise rejected.
There

exists

one

remaining

interpretation of the Stipulation,
June

interim

ordered

that

$10,655,000
this

rate
rates

pending

proceeding.

reduction.
be

a
As

reduced

final

On
to

order

implemented

dispute

that being the treatment of
June

22,

achieve

a

1990,

the

revenue

the

Commission

reduction

cf

establishing

permanent

rates

the

reduction

totalled

interim

in

$10,711,000 effective June 22, 1990, for local exchange service, July
1, 1990,

for 800 and OutWATS services, and July 18,

toll and switched access services.

1990,

for message

In the Stipulation the parties

have agreed to properly annualize and normalize 1990 actual revenues

to reflect the realized $10,711,000 revenue decrease on a prospective
annual

bas i s.
.

",f~ n
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What is in dispute is the method by which the interim
reduction

is

Stipulation
actual

entire

to

to

be

annualized.

mean that the total

19 9 0 revenues as

year

The

as

Stipulation.

shown

The

Company

$10.7

interpreted

million be

removed

the
from

if the reduction had been in place for the

in

the

Division

Joint

Exhibit

the

Committee

and

attached

to

the

interpreted

the

Stipulation to mean that the method of annualization should reflect
the mid-year timing of the reduction and that the $10.7 million shown

in the Joint Exhibit was to illustrate the parties' agreement to the
total reduction to be considered as the basis for annualization.

In

order to fully reflect the realized $10,711,000 revenue reduction on

a prospective,

annualized basis as agreed to by the parties, the

Commission finds that actual 199 0 revenues need to be reduced by
$5,080,000

to

account

for

the

mid-year

timing of the

interim

reduction and thereby remove the impact of the higher rates in effect
only during the first half of 1990.

B.

DEPRECIATION

On

November

23,

1990,

USWC

submitted

its

depreciation study to both the Federal Communications

(FCC)

and this Commission.

projection-lives

and

triennial

Commission

This study proposed changes in the

future-net-salvage

approved by the Commission in 1988.

parameters

previously

In conjunction with the rate

case and the Incentive Regulation Plan, the Commission requested that
the Division review the study and report to the Commission with

recommendations.

Following its review of the study, the Division
* ;"\ ~ *? •-> o
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conducted an audit and held discussions with USWC's corporate staff
in

Denver.

On January 18, 1991, USWC filed direct testimony and on
February 5, 1990, rebuttal testimony detailing the depreciation rates
for the three-year period January 1, 1991 through December 31,

1993.

This study involved a detailed examination of historical data coupled
with expert evaluation of the plans,

trends, developments and other

factors that impact on the future life expectancy of existing plant
and equipm.ent.
The Company, through witness Jerry D. Harris, testified

that

the

depreciation

study

was

prepared

in

conformance

with

extensive depreciation study guidelines established by the FCC.
study

process

required

an

extensive

analysis

of

each

The

depreciable

plant account to determine the appropriate projection life,

future

net salvage and retirement curve shape which constituted depreciation
rate parameters.

The

Company

proposed

to

increase

its

annual

Utah

intrastate depreciation expense by $7,391,000.

The Division submitted its analysis of the depreciation
study to the Commission through testimony filed by Division witness
Larry Fuller.

The Divis ion recommended two alternative equi pr.ent

life and depreciation expense proposals.

The first alternative was

based on "business as usual" absent the modernization proposal and
would

decrease

annually.

intrastate

depreciation

The second alternative

expense

by

$9,337,000

included changes that would

be

justified if the Commission approved the modernization plan with or
i .'> "Z ^ ~ A
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without an Incentive Regulation Plan.
in

a

decrease

in

intrastate

This alternative would result

depreciation

expense

of

$4,441,000

annually.

The

providing
study

comments

and

Committee

filed

testimony

concerning USWC's

recommended

a

1991

decrease

in

by

Utah

Michael

Arndt

depreciation

the

annual

rate

intrastate

depreciation expense of $7,151,000 annually.
The

Commission heard

testimony

on

February

6,

1991

concerning the differences in equipment service lives and deprecia
tion philosophies recommended by the different parties.
USWC

stated

that

the

purpose

of

depreciation

is

to

recover the capital investment of the Company over the useful life of

the investment and that such recovery is accomplished by the proper
estimation of expected lives of the assets.

The Division stated that the first objective of the

depreciation review is to establish depreciation rates based on Utahspecific evaluations of the projected service lives of the various

existing equipment investment accounts.

A secondary objective is to

establish

expenses that would

overall

annual

depreciation

help

synchronize investment requirements for future equipment that will be
replacing the existing equipment.

The Committee proposed that the depreciation rates the

Commission approves be applied to the Company's average 1990 plant
investment.

Use of the 1990 average depreciable plant investment

would produce the necessary matching of revenues,

expenses and

investment for the 19 90 test year.
.. ...
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Considerable testimony on depreciation represcription

was directed towards the correct interpretation of depreciation
accounting.

The

Committee

asserted

that

constitutes customer contributed capital.
presented

evidence

that

depreciation

depreciation

expense

The Company argued and

expense

is

an

accounting

mechanism to recover investors' funds for capital expenditures.

The

Commission agrees with the Company's definition of depreciation

accounting. However, this Commission determines depreciation policy.
In past decisions, the Commission has granted shorter asset lives and

thereby increased depreciation expense.

One result of this policy

has been to protect the Company from the risks of technological
obsolescence.

Another has been to enhance the Company's positive

cash flow thus enabling it to continue to expand and modernize the

Utah infrastructure.

The Commission finds that there is an implied

relationship between its depreciation policy and its expectations for
prudent and economic future investments.

The Commission

finds

that the Division's

proposed

depreciation parameters and associated depreciation rates consistent

with the proposed Modernization Plan should be applied for the
purpose of determining test year revenue requirement.

Booking of the

new depreciation expenses shall be ordered retroactively to January
1,

1991.

In the future, the Commission will require the use of

average plant balances for the purpose of computing depreciation
expense.

(
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C.

COST

1.

OF

CAPITAL

COST OF

EQUITY

CAPITAL

Witnesses

presented

equity

cost

for USWC,

of

the Division,

capital

and the

testimony

in

Committee

this

docket.

Testifying for USWC, Peter C. Cummings placed equity cost at 14.5 15.0 percent,

and argued that a

finding in favor of the incentive

form of regulation necessitated the addition of 50 basis points or an

equity return award at the high end of the range.

witness,

Dr.

Roger A.

Morin,

A second company

generally supported Mr.

Cummings'

position, but in final testimony estimated equity cost as 13.5 - 14.0

percent.

Dr. George Compton, witness for the Division, gave a range

of ll.l -11.6 percent as that within which the cost of equity might,
depending upon the assumptions chosen, reasonably be found.

The

Committee's witness, Dr. Matityahu Marcus, related his estimate of

equity cost directly to the capital structure used in the proceeding:
11.3 percent,

if USWC's; 11.8 percent,

if USW Inc.'s.

Witness Cummings developed his equity cost estimate by
analyzing

three

groups

of

companies,

which

he

selected

to

be

comparable to USWC, using the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and the

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) models.

CAPM

approach,

and

checked his

results

He argued in favor of the

for

reasonableness

by

comparing them with returns associated with the S & p 500 (slightly
higher, as would be expected given a utility's lcwer risk), and with
USW Inc.'s cost of new debt.

Since the latter is approximately 10

percent, an equity return four to five percentage points higher is
reasonable, he asserted.

Moreover, issuance costs should be included
•" o ^ 9 "i i7
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in the equity return award.
general

Though he agreed that capital costs in

have declined since the

last equity award,

direct testimony was filed in this docket,

and even since

the witness argued that

other relevant factors supported his higher estimate.

incentive regulation,

His claim that

if adopted, would necessitate the addition of

50 basis points, owed to his conclusion that increased risk would be

incurred by USWC (the result of the changed nature of regulation and
the agreement by the Company not to seek rate increases).

According

to the witness, sole reliance should not be placed on the results of

a DCF analysis because at the current time the technique uniformly
gives results that are too low.

the

failure

of

current

One possible reason, he asserted, is

market

price

of

common

equity

stock

to

adequately reflect the future value of USW Inc's cellular business.

A key point

in the witness's analysis is the

firms in samples of alleged comparability.

use

of nonregulated

This, he asserted,

is a

legal requirement arising under the Hone and Bluefield decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court.

awarded

in the

He did not dispute, however, that the return

last docket,

11.8

percent,

had

been

sufficient

to

permit, as legally required under these decisions, the Company to
raise capital at reasonable rates.
the

Company

largely

to

acknowledged

is close

to

100 percent

depreciation

that USWC

The. witness did acknowledge that

and

has

deferred

lower

internally
tax

risk than

financed,

sources.

its parent,

owing

He

also

USW

Inc.

The second rate of return witness for the Company, Dr.

Morin, asserted that several methods, and not simply the DCF, must be

used to estimate equity cost.

Thus, he applied risk premium, CAPM,
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and DCF methods to sample companies.

A particular point he made was

the difficulty of estimating the dividend growth rate,
'g'

in the DCF formula at moments,

economic conditions.
over-estimate
strongly;

the

hence,

other models'

obtained;

applications

such as the present,

of unusual

According to the witness, the DCF may under- or

cost

of

capital

when

interest

rates

are

moving

its results should be evaluated in the context of

results.

When the results

closely around a particular value,
is

the variable

but

are

when,

at

as

in

variance,

from several

models

cluster

a good indication of equity cost
this

he

case,

asserted,

the

the

results

of

analyst

DCF

should

question whether the model's assumptions adequately reflect current

conditions.

They do not, he contended.

Emerging competition and a

tendency toward deregulation are putting telecommunication utilities

in a different risk category than electric and natural gas utilities,
he stated, making them more like industrials generally.

He agreed

with Mr. Cummings that USWC is a less risky entity than its parent,
USW Inc., however.

Sample firms to be used to estimate equity cost

for the utility must be selected on the basis of comparable risk, and

for this purpose no single measure of risk is alone sufficient,
according to the witness.

Selection of sample firms is therefore a

difficult analytical task, but this is no reason simply to rely on
telecommunication companies—the seven regional holding companies—
alone, he said.

Doing so is defective analysis owing to inherent

circularity of reasoning involved, according to Dr. Morin.
of

this

and

his

assertion

that

utilities

are

now

Because

more

like

industrials as to characteristics of risk, Dr. Morin based his equity
'-,
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cost

estimate

on

a

sample

composed

equally

of

regional

holding

companies and industrials.
Dr.

Compton,

witness

for

the

Division,

stressed

the

point that all evidence showed a decline in capital costs since the
last rate case.

this

docket

allowed,

Based on his analysis,

should not

a return on equity award in

be higher than the

11.8

percent currently

the range of reasonable estimates now being

percent.

11.1 - 11.6

His explanation for why this is 300 and more basis points

below Company witnesses' recommendations lies generally in the degree
of

emphasis

supporting

placed
choice

upon
of

the

DCF

comparable

model
firms.

and

the

Dr.

analysis

Compton

of

risk

stated

that

comparability of risk is indicated by similarity of results obtained

from DCF analysis, and questioned the wisdom of relying on the risk
measure 'beta' as company witnesses had done.

played by beta in portfolio analysis,
task of

selecting comparable

firms

He indicated the role

distinguishing this from the

fcr rate of

return

estimation.

The witness supported inclusion of flotation costs in theory and, as
to the appropriate version of the DCF model to use, supported one

that incorporates the quarterly dividend adjustment.
however,

alter

these because,

his

final

recommendation

to

account

He did not,
for

either

of

in his opinion, they were offset by other factors.

Testifying

for

the

Committee,

Dr.

Marcus directly

related his equity cost recommendation to capital structure, arguing

that USWC is less risky than its parent, USW Inc., as is its capital
structure.

Thus, if USWC's capital structure is employed, the proper

equity return is 11.3 percent, he stated, whereas, if the capital
m't
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structure is to be the parent's, equity return should be 11.8.

His

recommendation is that USWC's capital structure and equity return are
what is at issue in this proceeding and,
adequately,

they

are

what

appropriate equity award is

DCF model
which

is

because

and argued
one
the

of

this

the

bulk

50

of

should

be

considered.

11.3 percent.

is

appropriate

largest
its

since both can be estimated,

in

revenues

Dr.

from

the

Marcus employed the

for a company

the U.S.,
is

Hence,

is

a

like USW,

stable

entity

telecommunications

operations, and is continuously analyzed by at least a dozen security
analysts.

It is the sort of company for which there are no directly

comparable

firms,

he

stated.

In

fact,

owing

to

the

points

enumerated, direct observation is appropriate; there is no compelling
need to seek proxies, he testified.

Comparable companies cannot be

selected on the basis of a single risk measure like beta, as Company
witnesses had done,

in any event, according to Dr.

Marcus.

Other

risk measures, including those employed by Dr. Morin, give different
results, thus requiring the exercise of judgment by the witness.

He

argued beta is unreliable if used to select comparable firms.

In

particular, the beta indication that telecommunications utilities are

riskier than natural gas and electric utilities, as asserted by Dr.
Morin on the basis largely of his beta analysis, cannot stand, said
Or.

Marcus.

He

asserted,

moreover,

that

the

difference

between

regulated utilities and unregulated industrials is a critical one

that cannot be ignored in the selection of comparable firms.

Dr.

Marcus did not support inclusion of issuance costs in an equity
return award for this company because the Company issues stock at
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prices well above book value, benefitting existing shareholders by an
amount greater than such costs might be.
on book value,

Regulators set return based

he stated, and book value had gone up.

Moreover,

the

facts alone do not justify allowance for issuance costs, according to
the witness,

equity

in

i f only because such costs apply to the sale of common

the

market.

internally, and,
were

the

Company,

by

contrast,

can

finance

as a supporting point, no evidence shows such costs

transferred

suggests

The

to

DCF

USWC

model

at

divestiture.

cannot

be

relied

Nothing
upon,

at

he

this

averred,

time
and

arguments to the contrary are misleading if based on the notion that
things are in flux, for in fact, things are always in flux.

There is

also evidence for the proposition that the DCF may now be overvaluing

equity cost,

given Company witnesses'

be undervaluing stock price.

testimony that the market may

This is at least as credible as these

witnesses' assertion that the DCF-determined equity cost is too low,
according to Dr.

Marcus.

The Commission believes it necessary to
costs of equity of USWC,
parent

corporation,

the regulated utility,

though analysts

entity which issues common stock.

may

focus

estimate the

not USW Inc.,
on

USW

Inc.

as

the
the

All witnesses agree that USWC is

not as risky as USW Inc., and this fact, considered alone, argues for
an equity award lower than would be indicated by an analysis of USW.
Dr. Marcus,

for example, quantifies this risk difference at 50 basis

Domts .

When the DCF analysis is performed consistently and in

line with our discussions and decisions in recent orders, it becomes
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difficult to argue for an equity award much above the existing 11.8
percent

arises.

There

is

no

ambiguity

about

the

fact

that,

"hroughout the economy, since the last USWC rate case, capital costs
have

trended

downward.

This

trend

has

meant

that

all

witnesses

reduced their recommendations between the filing of direct testimony
and the close of

case,

the hearing,

a short time

later.

Nor does this

in spite of the efforts of Company witnesses, produce new

evidence or persuasive argument to convince us to revise our negative

views of the capital asset pricing model and risk premium approaches
to estimation of equity cost.

Moreover, the Company's argument that

reliance on a DCF analysis to estimate the cost of equity must
produce, under current circumstances in the industry and economy, an
unreasonable result, fails on this record.

This is the case princi

pally because their analysis of comparable companies was not convinc

ing.

The determination of risk similarity, which is the heart of the

approach,

was not adequate.

Were this a complete summary of our conclusions, a
return award at, or, more probably, below the current allowed return
would be inescapable.

But the fact is, near term conditions in the

industry and the economy are quite unsettled.

We have on this

record, for example, expert witness opinions that are diametrically
opposed.

Company witnesses have argued that the DCF underestimates

equity cost because the model cannot be relied upon during times of

strong interest rate movement and because the market has not yet
properly valued the future potential of a present Company position in
cellular.

The Committee witness, on the other hand, testified that
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the

DCF might

be producing a cost

of

equity estimate that

is too

high, if the opinion of Company executives that the market currently
undervalues

USW's

common

stock

is

reliable.

Expert witness disagreement is not unusual.
performance

analysis,

of

the

common

lack

stock

of

in

the

agreement

magnitude--of change is notable.

market

as

is

to

so

But where

critical

future

to

the

direction--not

This difference of opinion seems

rooted in appraisals of general conditions in the economy; that is,
where things now stand in relation to the business cycle, and how the
market price of USW Inc.'s common stock can be expected to move with

respect

to

Commission

it.

is

These

aware

appraisals

that

are

utility

decidedly

stock

relationship to interest rate changes.

price

different.

movements

The

bear

a

Should interest rates go up

in the near future, as may be the case if the attention of policy
makers

shifts

from

recession

to

inflation,

the

market

price

of

utility common stock, ether things being equal, would tend to fall
and the cost of equity to rise.
Too much should not be made of such speculation,

not

least because no coherent form of it appears on the record--though it

is

generally acknowledged that utility comm.cn

interest rates vary inversely.

stock prices and

The testimony of Company witnesses

stands for the proposition that this relationship is weakening as
telecommunications firms begin to look more like industrials.

their point is disputed.

It does,

however,

But

focus attention, and

quite properly, on uncertainty, the basic problem a cost of capital
witness must confront.

Any model employed has its principal value in
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providing a structure by which uncertainty can be managed.

This

value derives mainly from a consensus among experts that the model is
useful and produces results that can be relied upon.
the DCF, the growth component,
but the model

For example, in

'g', cannot be known with certainty,

gives an acceptable way of estimating

it.

The DCF

permits an evaluation of market price on the basis of the future flow
of dividends and the investors'

required rate of return (estimated,

of course) ; the problem of estimating

'g'

is to

infer what growth

rate in dividends is currently being expected by investors.

But by

one technique of analysis or another, each model permits its user to

grapple with the uncertainty of the future, and to do so in ways that
have been found acceptable.
The

Commission's

required rate of return.

task

is

to

estimate

the

investors'

The models used by witnesses present a

range of estimates of the cost of- equity capital.

Required rate of

return and cost of equity capital may differ for several reasons,

including the allowance of flotation costs, adjustments for manage
ment performance, and other factors.

finds

the

required

return

exceeds

In this docket, the Commission

the cost

of

capital

estimate

produced by mechanical application of the DCF model.

Estimating investors' required return is an exercise of

informed

judgment.

At its heart,

the problem

is placed

in an

uncertain future, where many things, both known and unknown, affect
outcomes.

The problem is complex and subtle.

Mathematical models

are a guide and a framework for thinking about the problem, but are

no substitute for the exercise of informed judgment.

Ungualified
; -', - <••,• h
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reliance on model results would be misplaced.

For example,

it is

easily shown on the record in this docket that the DCF may, under

present

circumstances,

both

over-

and underestimate

equity

cost.

Even so, the Commission regards it as more reliable than the CAPM and

risk

premium

approaches,

but

acknowledges

the

effort

of

Company

witnesses to discredit the DCF and to elevate CAPM and risk premium.
The key to the return on equity decision is an award

which adequately compensates investors for willingness to bear risk.
Our knowledge of the determinants of, measurement of, and implica

tions of risk assessment,

is, on this record,

incomplete.

Part of

the reason is to be found in the nature of the problem, as discussed
previously,

and

part

in

the

failure

complete and coherent examination.

of

the

record

The record,

to

instead,

contain

a

contains

expert testimony on various aspects of risk in relation to return,

but only disputes on how well it has been measured.
larly evident

in the comparable

firms entanglement.

firms selected on the basis of one risk measure,
unreasonable,

and

the

more

This is particu

so where

A sample of

such as beta,

other allegedly

is

supplemental

measures the analyst may have employed seem to confound choice rather

than to clarify it.

The Commission finds that no single measure of

risk can be sufficient to establish the risk comparability of firms.
The U.S.

Supreme Court decisions,

Hope and Bluefield,

cited by witnesses cannot reasonably be read to require comparison of
a regulated utility with non-regulated firms.

These entities are so

unlike one another that, whatever the merit of attempting to escape

circular

reasoning,

the

difficulties

in

establishing

risk
.,

, 'JO
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comparability have not been overcome on this record.

finds

that

this

task has

not

been

accomplished,

The Commission

and,

were

it

a

straightforward requirement of the Court, as Company witnesses seem
to

assert,

no

supplemented.

decision

could

be

made

unless

This, the Commission rejects.

the record is clear.

the

record

were

On one point,, however,

Attraction of capital under reasonable terms is

a test articulated by these Court decisions.
decision must be compatible with it.

A return on equity

Evidence is uncontroverted that

the Company has been able to attract capital favorably with the 11.8
percent return on equity awarded in the previous docket.

Through testimony, USWC has attempted to liken itself
to an unregulated company, loosely fitting the market's 'industrials'
category.

This

effort

has

conclusion

even

though

recognizing

failed.

The

that

industry is changing in significant ways.

Commission

the

draws

this

telecommunications

Such changes have yet to

disturb the essential characteristics of USWC as a regulated provider
of essential services in this jurisdiction:

the well known aspects

of a monopoly position'in the relevant market, the trust relationship
between utility and consumers, and the imposed constraints upon both
prices charged

for services and rate of return.

As conditions

change, tae Commission may, in future dockets, conclude otherwise.
Without dispute,, capital costs have declined since the

previous rate of return decision of 11.8 percent, and even since the

filing of direct testimony.

Taken alone, this would argue for

reduction in allowed return.

But other compelling factors have a

role to play.

The record on risk-return comparability, while not
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complete,

on

balance

suggesting

increasing

risk;

the

questioned

reliability of model results during unsettled moments in the economy
and

industry;

the

large,

even

contrary,

di fference

in

results

obtained by witnesses for the Company compared with witness Compton
for the Division using CAPM; the knowledge that the utility nay to a
degree be shedding certain utility characteristics; and the ambiguous
record

on

expected

behavior

of

stock

price,

are

all

influential

considerations which must be evaluated in the context of a wide range
of cost of equity results obtained by witness application of models.

The Commission concludes there is no reason to grant an award at the
upper end of the range, and indeed there are reasons why this would
be

error.

The

equity return,

Commission

is

convinced

a

reduction

in

the

current

though advocated by witnesses for the Committee and

the Division, would likewise be in error, given the risk implications
of the changing industry and the status of the general economy in
relation

thereto.

The Company repeatedly stressed that its discretionary

investment

decisions

are driven by profitability considerations,

meaning in part that economic analysis, or business case analysis, is
employed to rank alternatives.

Implied at tines

and explicit at

times was the message that jurisdictional rate of return allowed bv

commissions could be the determining factor.

The rate of return on

equity

in the

service

in Utah

is 11.8

territory.

per cent,

The

the

Company's

lowest

witnesses

14-state USWC

labeled

that

rate

unreasonable and made the connection between it and discretionary
investment a imod

for the state.
* - f\

•):;•; JQ
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It

is

equity,

as

distinct

highest

in

the

Company,

allowed

14

however,

not

past

the

fact

from

states,

that

what

is

and has

the

allowed,

been so

argued

that

expected

actual

rate

of

investment decisions.

earned

of

return

Utah

is

among

in

in

rate

return,

rate

is

the

recent years.
of

return,

what

is

on

The

based

on

related

to

Nevertheless, the Commission notes that in the

recent past when the allowed rate of return in Utah was among the

highest, no discernably different pattern of discretionary investment
decisions

affecting Utah appeared.

The Commission concludes that

aistorical evidence does not reveal a clear relationship between
either allowed or earned rate of return on equity on the one hand and
the amount of discretionary investment in the state on the other.

Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledges the logic of
the

relationship

decisionmaking.

between

rate

of

return

and

investment

Regulation presumes a reasonable management.

This

is a time when states are in a sense competing for high-tech
additions

to

equipment.

The Commission concludes that it is prudent to take these

considerations

and

into

refinements

account

of

when

telecommunications

determining

rate

pi ant

of

and

return.

Together, they argue for an addition to the cost of capital estimate
produced by models.

The Commission is concerned enough with the factors

enumerated in the discussion to raise the allowed return on equity
capital to 12.2 percent from the existing 11.8, and finds this return
to be reasonable.

:;o
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2.

CAPITAL

STRUCTURE

Because

debt

is

cheaper

than

equity,

and

interest

expense on debt is tax deductible, the higher the debt ratio, other
things being equal, the lower the cost of capital.

The trade off is

that increases in the debt ratio increase financial risk.

It could

be said that management should employ as much debt as is prudent,
given this trade off,

while regulators must be sure that too much

equity is not employed in order to prevent an increase in the cost of

capital that could be harmful to ratepayers.

Company witnesses

argued that because business risk is increasing, the debt ratio must

be decreased in order to maintain bond ratings.

decreases

financial

shareholders.

But

risk,
the

maintains

lower

debt

bond

A lower debt ratio

rating

(higher

equity)

and

protects

ratio

costs

ratepayers more, other things being equal, by increasing the cost of

capital.

This appears on this record to be true even though a higher

bond rating reduces the cost of financing.
principle,

Clearly,

at least in

there is a financially prudent capital structure which

could be employed for ratemaking purposes that would yield the lowest
cost for ratepayers.

The
ratemaking

docket.

proper composition of

purposes

is

one

issue

the capital

before

the

structure

Commission

in

for
this

A related issue, whether to use USWC's or USW Inc's capital

structure,

captured equally as much attention.

Neither is hypo

thetical, but the equity return recommendations may vary according to
the choice since financial risk differs.

r:..;.:o
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As pointed out in previous discussion,
acknowledged

that

business risk).
risk)

USWC

is

Moreover,

is greater.

a

less

risky

entity

(lower

capital

Company witnesses argued in favor of

USWC's

capital.

A strong capital structure—more eguity,

structure

assures an acceptable bond rating

and

ratepayer

is similar to

that of

to

determine

overall

interests,

they

cost

of

in adverse times

(preferably AA),

witness Morin also argued that the
Company

USW

The equity ratio is 60.4 percent for USWC, while

employing

shareholder

than

USW's capital structure risk (financial

for USW it is 48.2 percent.

both

all witnesses

thus

protecting

stated.

Company

equity ratio advocated by the

peer companies;

otherwise he

recommend use of a hypothetical capital structure.

would

Committee witness

Marcus testified that the variation in equity ratios between the two
structures had not existed in previous rate cases, when in fact the

ratios had been almost the same.

He speculated that the divergence

might be a transitional phenomenon, which should,
encouragement

(a lower equity award),

disappear.

with Commission
Witness

Marcus

urged the Commission to be aware of the parent company's ability to
control the amount of equity in the capital structure, of USWC,

wholly owned subsidiary.

a

Witness Compton generally supported use of

"JSWC's capital structure, asserting that an equity ratio of approxi

mately 60 percent is not unexpectedly high.

He noted that a hypo

thetical structure with 55 percent equity would be acceptable and
called attention to the lack of preferred stock in the capital
structure though it is usually found in that of the energy utilities.

In total the equity share may only appear high, and, therefore, Dr.
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Compton

supported

maintenance

of

a

AA

bond

rating,

which

he

associated with the higher equity ratio.

No witness advanced a hypothetical capital structure in
this docket.

Each was confident that an actual capital structure,

either USWC's or USW Inc.'s, could, with justification, be employed.
In this case,

the Commission finds that the weight of the evidence

supports a higher equity ratio found in the USWC capital structure.

As

with the equity award decision,

there are compelling arguments

that this is an unsettled time, that business risk may be increasing,
and that bond ratings may bo jeopardized by a low equity ratio.

All

witnesses supported use of USWC's capital structure for determination
of the overall rate of return.

Witness Marcus, however, did tie his

recommended equity return to the capital structure—11.3 percent if
USWC's; 11.8, if USW Inc.'s—to alert management that the Commission

should tolerate a divergence in the two capital structures only for
a short period of time.

The Commission finds that USWC's capital

structure, composed of 60.4 percent equity and 39.6 percent debt, is
reasonable for purposes of determining the overall rate of return to

be granted in this docket.
percent,

this

produces

At the allowed equity return of 12.2

an allowed overall

rate

of

return of

10.93

percent.

D.

SUMMARY

The actual

well

as

the

positions

1990 intrastate results

of

the

parties

with

of operations as

respect

to

the

determination of revenue requirement are summarized and presented in
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Table 1 below.

The unadjusted actual 1990 results excluding imputed

directory revenues show the Company earned a rate of return on equity
equal to 13.35 percent, exceeding the 11.80 percent allowed rate of
return on equity used to establish the rates in effect during 1990.
The Company's interpretation of the October Stipulation

and

its

recommended

adjustment

to

depreciation

expenses

had

the

effect of reducing the rate of return on equity expected to be earned
during the test period to 11.33 percent.

Given its recommended 13.5

percent allowed rate of return on equity, the Company had proposed to
increase revenues by $9,804,000.
The

effect

of

the

Division's

and

the

Committee's

adjustments was to raise the rate of return on equity expected to be

earned

in the test period to 16.57

respectively.

Given

an

11.35

percent

percent and 17.19
allowed rate of

percent,
return on

equity, the midpoint of the range recommended by Division witness

Compton,

the

$23,434,000.

equity,

Division

had

Given

11.3 0 percent

an

proposed

to

decrease

allowed

rate

recommended by Committee witness Marcus

Communications capital structure,

revenues
of

return

by
on

for the US West

the Committee had proposed to

decrease revenues by $26,527,000.

The

Stipulation

and

Commission's

adjustment

to

findings

with

depreciation

respect

expenses

to

result

the

in

increasing to 16.58 percent the rate of return expected to be earned

in the test period.

Given the Commission finding of a 12.20 percent

allowed rate of return on equity, the Commission finds that revenues
should be reduced by $19,799,000.
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TABLE 1

REVENUE REQUIREMENT
Summary of the PoS.tioiih of tin; I'arties
and Commission Decision

1000 Utah Intrastate Results of Operations

Test Period ($000)
1990

Actual

(Exel. Directory
Revenues]

Company

Division

Committee

Commission

1. Total Opera;.i;l; Revenue

315,730

3 •3,037

320,00 J

3:"(,;G8

319,208

2. Total Opernti::,; Expense

252,016

253,1-13

240,075

237,491

240,109

10,427

12,172

17,LM1

10,752

15,742

-135

51

200

_4,"3

-4n3

53,1r.8

48,373

02.593

<;-;,504

02,SO4

457,107

404,800

401,073

403,120

403,126

11.63%

l'l 41%

13 50'"".

13.94 g

13.57\-c

8. Earned Rate "f Return on Equity

13.35%

11.33%

16 54%

17.15%

10 5 7 %

9. Allowed Rate of Return on Equity

11.80%

13.50%

11.35%

11 30%

12 20%

10.69%

11.71%

10 41%

in 38%

10 93%

;5- 52-)

;j:o,7oo)

3

Total Incori'.r T.>.:<••<

4. Other Income

5

RATEMAKIN'; INCOME

6. RATE BASE

7

Earned Rate of Return on Rate Base

10. Allowed Rate of Return on Rate Baae

30,804

11. Recommer.de : ('h-m.-r m Revenues

Absent

the

two

interim

rate

(523 434 1

decreases

revenues in the test period would be $338,217,000.

of

this

docket,

With the Juno 22,

1990 interim reduction of $10,711,000, the January 1,

1991 interim

reduction of $8,233,000, and the final decrease of $19,799,000, test:

period revenues will have been decreased by a total of $33,748,000 to

$299,469,000, representing an 11.4 percent decrease in prospective
rates as a result of this docket.

The Commission also notes the 1990

test period revenue requirement is about 6 percent lower than the
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1988 test period revenue requirement of $319,047,000 found in Docket
No. 88-049-07, despite the growth in access lines and minutes of use
during that period.

HI-

DISCUSSION.

FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS WITH RESPECT TO

REVENUE SPREAD AND RATE_DESIGN
A-

COST-OF-SERVICE

I-

BACKCROUND

AND

OVERVTEW

Since divestiture

in

1934,

the Commission has

accorded a

rising priority to cost-of-service studies in ratemaking decisions.
There have been three general rate cases since divestiture,
Nos. 84-049-01, 85-049-02 and 88-049-07.

Docket

In both Docket Nos. 84-049-

01 and 85-049-02, the Commission stated that the relationship between
cost incurrence and service provision was inadequately explored and
the respective records were inadequate for pricing decisions.
consequence,

the Division was requested to

provide

As a

the Commission

with telephone cost-of-service studies.
In

cost-of-service
Commission.
Company's

Docket

model,

DCOS
19 87

was

No.

termed
created

prototype

cost-of-service model,

88-04 9-07,

DCOS,

the

for

ovor

Management

termed MM18.

a

Division

its

fi rst

tvo-yo.ir

Marketing

The

DCOS

submitted

review

period

by

the

from

the

Information

model

its

System

and disputes

concerning its study methods were described on pages 89-111 of the
Report and Order issued October 18,
As

model,

the

a

1989 in Docket No.

result of the Commission's

Company

and

the

Division

review of the

were

ordered

in

88-049-07.
initial

DCOS

Docket
for-

No.

i .1 f-
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88-049-07 to investigate several issues.

the Committee to participate.

The Commission also invited

The parties held several meetings,

some of which the Commission Staff attended.

On April 6, 1990, the

Company, the Division and the Committee submitted their Joint Report
to the

Commission.

Cost-of-service issues addressed in the Joint

Report included a peak method for allocating traffic sensitive (TS)
costs, a method for allocating non-traffic sensitive (NTS) costs, an

examination of DCOS product definitions and corresponding tariffed
rate elements,

the

correlation of DCOS

information with the

test

period employed in the determination of revenue requirement, and
future updates of the DCOS model.

The Joint Report detailed the

positions of the parties on the above issues and identified areas of

agreement and/or disagreement.

The most significant disagreement

concerned the allocation of non-traffic sensitive costs.

The prototype MMIS model has since been abandoned by the

Company and replaced with a new model designed for use throughout all
14 states served by the Company.

In addition, basic changes had been

made in the new MMIS model to incorporate the new USOA accounts and
procedures adopted by the ECC.

Eor these reasons, the Division had

to virtually reconstruct its DCOS model subject to its own resource
constrai nts and the time limitations imposed by this case.

The

Division's current version of the DCOS model basically duplicates the
essential parts of the latest version of the Company's MMIS model.
Every revenue, expense and investment category or portion
thereof that requires a separate direct assignment or allocation is
shown in the DCOS model.

Within DCOS, 946 Utah intrastate investment
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and

expense

items

and

a number of

allocated to 54 product groups.

revenue

items

are

assigned

or

The DCOS model employs 19 exogenous

allocation factors developed from external data and special studies
and 139 allocation factors developed within the model.
The current version

of

DCOS

again contains

an

investment

translator which is used to reconcile Central Office Equipment and

Outside Plant investments contained in separations categories with
the amounts booked in Uniform System of Accounts (USOA) subaccounts,
the latter being inputted into the cost-of-service model.

The current DCOS study utilized 1989 actual
expenses.

The

average of

1989

rate
actual

base

utilized

was

obtained

revenues and

from

a

12-month

investments.

• The Company did not file its own embedded cost-of-service

study.

The Company stated that since its MMIS model is an integrated

14-state model, it is therefore limited in its ability to accommodate

every state specific requirement.

Furthermore, the Company agreed in

Docket No. 8S-049-07 to use the general format of the DCOS model in

future rate cases and to argue for modifications where appropriate.

2.

UNO IS PUTED ISSUES

Upon review of the DCOS study submitted by the Division in

direct testimony, the Committee recommended several modifications to

which the Division agreed.

The Committee recommended that customer

deposits be excluded from and cash working capital be included in the

determination of rate base, consistent with the treatment of these
items in the revenue requirement phase of this case.
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Some private line investments had been included with message
service

service

investments

products.

reports

in

identified

The

which

thus

and

the

were

subsequently

Committee
private

providing

for

referred

allocated

to

to

detailed

line

investments

their

allocation

were

to

message

separation
separately

private

line

products.

Investments in Non-Pair Gain Circuits, a category of Central
Office Equipment,

had been allocated to access products only.

The

Committee recommended these investments be allocated to all products.
Automatic number identification equipment which identifies

and records message billing data,

as well as

other types of

local

switching equipment which are only required for or used proportion
ately more for message-rated toll and switched access services were
allocated to

flat-rated local products.

The Committee recommended

that these costs be allocated to toll and switched access products
based on the number of messages for which billing data is available.

The additional circuit equipment necessary to provide the

higher quality and more costly transmission characteristics required
by data and other private lines had been allocated uniformly to all
types of access lines.

The Committee recommended that these costs be

allocated to the private line products.

The Committee also recommended that 50 percent of local TS

investments be allocated based upon relative number of peak calls and
50 percent based on relative duration of peak calls.

;:3
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3.

DISPUTED

a.
In

ISSUES

Allocation of Imputed Pi rectory Revenues
Docket

No.

88-049-07,

the

Commission

found

with

the

Committee that the imputed Yellow Page directory revenues were to be

included

in

Product Nos.

the

residential

local

exchange

access

products

(DCOS

5 and 7) .

In the current case, the Company has again recommended that

imputed directory revenues should not be allocated to local exchange
access
argued

products but should be displayed separately.
directory

revenues

are

generated

by

The Company

business

customers

purchasing Yellow Pages advertising and are not produced by residence

customers.
access

To allocate imputed directory revenues to local exchange

products

would

blur

the

study

results

and

undermine

the

usefulness of the cost-of-service study.

The Division recommended that imputed directory revenues be
allocated to local exchange access product groups (DCOS Product Nos.
1,

3, 5, 7, 12, 14, 21, 23, 30, 33) based on the relative number of

local exchange access lines.

The Division argued that all local

exchange access lines and trunks create directory listings and all

Lines and trunks should be credited with imputed directory revenues.
The Committee, consistent with the prior Commission order,
recommended that the directory revenues remain with the residential

local exchange access products (DCOS 5, 7).

The Committee argued

that Judge Greene allowed the local operating companies to retain the

directory services in order to provide support for universal service.

In the "Modification of Final Judgment," dated August 24, 1982, Judge
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Greene

stated

that

Yellow

Pages

directories

were

left

with

Bell

operating companies rather than AT&T for the purpose of providing
support

to

local

exchange

rates,

since

the

loss

of

revenues

from

directory advertising would require large rate increases for local
service.

Further,

"...large rate increases of this type will reduce

the number of households with telephones and increase the disparity
between low-income and well-off citizens.

This

result

is

clearly

contrary to the goal of providing affordable telephone service for

all Americans."

(US v AT&T,

552 F.Supp.

131 (1982), p.193-4)

From Judge Greene's statements it is not clear whether the

objective

of

retaining

directory

revenues

with

local

operating

companies is to promote lower rates for both residential and business
customers

or

residential

customers

alone.

Under

the

Division's

recommendation that imputed directory revenues should be allocated
based on the relative number of access lines,
customers

account

for

67

percent

of

all

and since residential

1990

access

lines,

the

Division provides a fair interpretation of Judge Greene's intentions.

The
revenues

exchange

Commission

should be

access

therefore

allocated

products

to

all

based

on

finds

that

residential

the

imputed
and

relative

directory

business

number

of

local

local

exchange access lines.

b.

Weekend Adjustment to_Peak Usage A]location Factor

In Docket No. 88-049-07, the Commission ordered the separa

tion of usage or traffic sensitive (TS) costs into set-up and holding
costs,

with

during

the

set-up

peak

costs

period

allocated

based

and holding costs

on

the

number

allocated

of

calls

based on the

0
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duration of calls during the peak period.
October 18,
and

develop

1939,
a

In its Report and Order of

the Commission also ordered the Company to design

new statewide valid

Usage Study (SLUS) .

sample

for

the

Subscriber

Line

The reports were to show minutes of use for each

intrastate product on an hourly basis by day of the week in order to

identify an appropriate peak period for allocation purposes.

The new

SLUS data required for full implementation of the DCOS model is still

in the developmental and collection stage.

provide

1990

Commission.

data

from

the

modified

The Company has yet to

SLUS

as

ordered

by

the

Also the 1988 and 1939 data were flawed due to training

problems incurred when switching the SLUS program from decentralized

to centralized control and operation.

Therefore the only valid data

available for determination of relative peak use was the 1987 SLUS
data provided in Docket No. 88-049-07 which identified minutes of use

for intrastate products by hour of the day but not by day of the
week.

Stating there was no reliable information to do otherwise,

the Division determined the peak period to be the three busy hours of
each day including weekends.

By default, the Division obtained the

relative minutes of use during the peak period from the 1987 SLUS
data submitted in Docket No.

88-049-07.

The Committee argued that residential

higher

percent

customers.

of

their

calls

during

customers make a

weekends

than

business

Ignoring this difference by treating weekend calls like

week-day calls, as the 1987 SLUS does, would over-allocate costs to

residential products and under-allocate costs to business products.
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As evidence indicati.ng that the weekend is off-peak, the Committee
referred

to

local

measured

service

rates,

and

intrastate

and

interstate toll rates, all of which have discounts which apply during
the

weekend

hours.

The Committee recommended that the variation in weekday
versus weekend toll usage be used as a proxy to remove the effect of

weekend

usage

from

the

determination

of

the

peak

period.

The

Committee argued that any error in the study results induced by the
use of toll information to approximate a weekday peak period would be
less than that due to ignoring the difference in usage between the
weekday and weekend periods.

While the Division agreed with the

philosophy of the CCS recommendation, the Division argued that toll
usage was not an accurate reflection of local usage.

The Division

recommended proceeding on this issue later in the year,

after the

case, to which the Company agreed.
The Company has had sufficient time to revise and submit a

currently valid subscriber line usage study.

The impact of the

Committee's recommendation is significant and cannot be ignored.

The

Commission therefore finds with the Committee that for purposes of

this case, toll usage information should be employed to distinguish
weekday

from

weekend

usage

in

the

determination

of

relative

use

during the peak period.

c.

Assignment of the End Use Line Charge (EULC) Revenues
and Allocation of Non-Traffic Sensitive Costs

In Docket No. 88-049-07 the Commission stated that exchange
access supports and is inseparable from all uses made of the telecom-
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A.s a consequence, the Commission found that the

local exchange access products (DCOS Product Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 14,

21, 23, 30, 33) should be allocated only a portion of the non-traffic
sensitive

(NTS)

reallocated

costs.

to

Therefore a portion of NTS costs must be

products

other

than

local

exchange

access.

The

Company, the Division and the Committee agreed that a portion of the
NTS costs be reallocated to toll usage and switched access products
(DCOS Product Nos.

18,

20,

In the DCOS model,

47,

54-57).

all categories of Central Office Equip

ment and Outside Plant investments were allocated based on usage or

were directly assigned with the exception of three categories which
constituted

NTS

investments:

Circuit Equipment.
a

category

Equipment,

Equipment.

of

Loops,

Pair

Gain

and

Non-Pair

Gain

Investment in Loops, totalling $426,708,706,

Outside

Plant,

and

totalling $39,883,557,

investment

in

Pair Gain

is a category of

is

Circuit

Central Office

Both were allocated based on adjusted relative length of

1989 access lines.

Investment in Non-Pair Gain Circuit Equipment,

totalling $41,414,337,' is a category of Central Office Equipment and
was allocated based on adjusted relative number of 1989 access lines.

These three categories, the NTS investments, accounted for 52 percent
cf Central

Office Equipment and Outside Plant

in Service,

and

38

percent of total Plant in Service.

There were two issues in dispute.

The first was whether the

revenues obtained from the End User Line Charge (EULC) and associated

NTS costs were to be assigned to local exchange access products or
assigned to interstate switched access products.

The second issue
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concerned

the

adjustment

of

the

NTS

allocation

factors

so

as

to

reallocate a portion of NTS costs from local exchange access products
to toll usage and switched access products.
In the FCCs Part 36 separations procedure,

the interstate

Basic Allocation Factor (BAF), formerly the Subscriber Plant Factor
(SPF) , was used to allocate NTS costs to the interstate jurisdiction.

For 1990, the Company's interstate BAF equalled 28.4768 percent.

The

End User Line Charge (EULC) , formerly the Subscriber Line Charge
(SLC), and the interstate Common Carrier Line Charge (CCLC) are rate
elements

authorized

access services.
of

access

by

the

FCC

interstate

toll

and

switched

The EULC is a flat monthly charge paid by end-users

lines to the Company

interstate

for

CCLC is

for

a usage-based

interstate toll

charge

paid by

service.

The

interexchange

carriers to the Company for switched access service to originate and
terminate interLATA calls using the Company's facilities.

and

the

interstate

CCLC

rate

elements

are

designed

to

The EULC

collect

revenues to cover the interstate portion of local exchange costs,

including the NTS costs allocated to the interstate jurisdiction
based

on

the

interstate

BAF.

Since EULC revenues are collected from end-users of access

lines,

the Division recommended that these revenues be directly

assigned to the exchange access products from which they originated.
Under this approach, the revenues collected from the interstate EULC

rate element were assigned to local exchange access products and the
revenues

collected

from

the

interstate

CCLC

rate

assigned to the interstate switched access products.

element

were

Therefore the
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Division recommended that one half of the NTS

to

the

BAF

be

allocated to local exchange access products and the other half,

or

14.2384

interstate

percent,

products.

be

jurisdiction

reallocated

on

to

the

the

basis

investments allocated

of

interstate

the

1990

switched

access

The Division also recommended that the NTS investments be

reallocated to the intrastate toll usage and switched access products
based on 1989 relative minutes of use, or 6.0477 percent and 0.6431
percent,

respectively.

In

total

the

Division

recommended

that

20.9292 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from local exchange
access to toll usage and switched access products.

The Company argued that if EULC revenues are assigned to

exchange

access

products

as

recommended

by the

Division,

then

interstate switched access minutes of use relative to total minutes
of use be used to reallocate NTS investments to interstate switched
access products rather than an arbitrary one half of the interstate

BAF.

This resulted in a reallocation of 13.5625 percent of the NTS

investments to the interstate switched access products rather than

the Division's recommended 14.2384 percent.

The Company agreed with

the Division's recommendation that the reallocation of NTS invest

ments to the intrastate toll usage and switched access products be

based on relative minutes of use.

In total the Company recommended

that 20.2533 percent of NTS investments be reallocated from local

exchange access to toll usage and switched access products if EULC
revenues were to be assigned to local exchange access products.

Since EULC revenues are designed to cover a portion of
interstate costs, the Committee recommended that the EULC revenues in
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addition to the interstate CCLC revenues be assigned to interstate
switched

access

recommended

products.

that

all

NTS

As

a

investments

consequence,

the

Committee

allocated

the

interstate

jurisdiction based on the interstate BAF,

to

or 28.4768 percent,

reallocated to interstate toll and switched access products.
Committee

also recommended that NTS

investments be

be
The

reallocated to

intrastate toll and switched access products based on 1990 intrastate

BAFs for intrastate toll and switched access, or 11.8996 percent and
1.0402
that

percent,

41.4166

respectively.

percent

of

NTS

In

total

investments

the
be

Committee
reallocated

recommended
from

local

exchange access to toll usage and switched access products.
The Company argued that if EULC revenues are assigned to

interstate switched access products as recommended by the Committee,
then relative minutes of use be used to allocate NTS investments to

intrastate toll usage and switched access products, as recommended by
the Division, rather than intrastate BAFs.
recommended 35.1676 percent of NTS

in total the Companv

investments be reallocated from

local exchange access "to toll usage and switched access products if
EULC

revenues

products.

were

to

be

assigned

to

interstate

switched

access

The Company also recommended that the reallocation of NTS

investments to other than local exchange access products continue to
be addressed in informal meetings between the Company, the Division
and

the

Committee.

The recommendations of the parties with respect to the

reallocation of NTS investments are summarized in the following
table:

o
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TABLE 2
REALLOCATION of NTS

EULC Revenues

INVESTMENTS

in

EULC

Revenues

ir

Local Exchange

Interstate Switched

Access Products

Access Products

Company

D ivi si on

CoiTmi t tee

Company

Interstate Toll

& Switched Access

14.2384%

13.5625%

28.4768%

28.4768%

6.0477%

6.047/^%

11.8996%

6.0477°%

0.6431%

0.6431%

1.0402%

0.6431%

Subtotal

20.9292%

20.2533%

41.4166%

35.1676%

Local

79.0703%

79.7467%

58.5834%

64.8324%

Intrastate

Toll Usage
Intrastate

Switched Access

Access

The

Division's

recommendation

mixes

both

interstate

and

intrastate revenues and costs whereas the Committee's recommendation

maintains a separation between interstate and intrastate operations.
It is the latter approach which

pricing decisions.

is more relevant

for intrastate

The Commission therefore finds with the Committee

that both EULC revenues and the current NTS investments allocated to

the interstate jurisdiction as provided by the 1990 BAF be allocated
to interstate switched access products.
'Whereas this Commission has no authority over the determina

tion of the NTS investments allocated to the interstate jurisdiction,
the Commission does have authority over NTS investments allocated to

the

intrastate

jurisdiction

and

the

method

by

which

the

NTS

investments are allocated among intrastate products.
Relative number and length of access lines are modified bv

relative minutes of use to provide a measurable, state-specific means
,.- . -; v7
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of sharing intrastate NTS costs among intrastate products.

The

original Subscriber Plant Factor was based primarily on a multiple of
Subscriber Line Usage.

The Basic Allocation Factor is based on an

industry-wide average of interstate Subscriber Plant Factors.

Thus

to use intrastate BAFs would result in the allocation of intrastate

NTS investments based on some multiple of industry-average intrastate
usage rather than state-specific information.

The Committee argued that if usage is to be the basis for

allocating NTS costs, then it is necessary to recognize the effect on

usage of the different rate structures for local and long distance

service.

Since long distance service is on a message-rated basis,

its usage is curtailed relative to flat-rated local service.

Thus

while BAFs are not state-specific, they do recognize the availability
of the network for long distance service on a basis more comparable
to

local

service.

The Commission is required by statute to determine rates

based on state-specific cost information.

To the largest extent

possible, it is desirable that allocation factors be based on current

state-specific information as well.

While the Committee's point is

well taken, information is insufficient to adopt the recommendation.
Therefore, the Commission for the purposes of this case finds with

the Division and the Company that the NTS investments be reallocated

to intrastate toll and switched access based on state-specific
relative minutes of use rather than intrastate BAFs.

DOCKET

NO.

90-049-03

and

06

-50-

d.

Classification of Some of the Local Central Office
Switching Equipment Costs as Non-Traffic Sensitive

It

is

acknowledged by all

parties

that a

portion of the

investment in local switching, a category of Central Office Equip
ment,

is

NTS.

$222,022,302

Equipment.
the

or

In

1989

investment

44

percent

of

the

in

local

investment

switching
in

totalled

Central

Office

Prior to implementation of the latest USOA procedures,

telephone

companies

separately

classified

Equipment investments into TS and NTS categories.

Central

Office

Thus the prior

versions of MMIS and DCOS models differentiated between TS and NTS

investments in local switching equipment, with TS allocated based on

relative usage and NTS based on relative number and length of access
lines.

In the latest USOA procedures, the separate classification of

investments in local switching equipment into TS and NTS categories
has been eliminated and telephone companies are no longer required to

make this accounting separation.

maintains

As a result,

records that separate investments

equipment into TS and NTS categories.

USWC no longer

in local switching

Consequently,

in neither

current version of MMIS nor DCOS is the TS/NTS distinction made.

The

current separation of central office investments and expenses to

interstate are based on usage.

The Commission would prefer not to

have NTS investments allocated based on. usage but concludes, that

there is insufficient information to modify MMIS or DCOS at this

time.

We direct the Company and the Division to provide additional

information to the Commission in order for us to determine if
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separate

identification and allocation of the

NTS

costs will

be

appropriate in the future.

g-

Allocation of Accelerated Depreciation Expenses

The Company has stated that current Central Office Equipment

provides adequate service and testified that the general growth in
demand for services is the basis for equipment replacement.

The

Committee, however, testified that such equipment is replaced more

rapidly to meet the demand for non-basic services than is necessary
to provide basic services.

Therefore the Committee recommended that

the additional depreciation and amortization expenses caused by the
accelerated replacement of central office equipment be allocated to
the

non-basic

services.

The Division argued that keeping step-by-step offices in the
network would retain higher overall costs and would maintain substan

dard

service

to

customers.

The

Division

also

stated

that

its

recommended depreciation rates for Central Office Equipment were

based only to a minor degree on the revenues from custom calling and
other

vertical

services compared

to

ether

justifications.

The

Company also disagreed with the Committee's recommendation, terming
it an implementation nightmare with respect to a cost allocation
system.

The Commission rejects the recommendation of the Committee.
f.

Allocation _of_j;nco^e Taxc_s

In DCOS, all income taxes are allocated to each product
based on each product's allocated share of rate base.

The Committee

recommended that income taxes be allocated to each product based on
' •" '" * O* ,>
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relative

taxable

income.

In

Docket No.

79-035-12

the

Commission

found the allocation of income taxes based on relative rate base "to

be appropriate in cost studies designed to determine class revenue

requirements where each class is assumed to earn the jurisdictional
rate of

return,

and directs

that this approach

be used

future." (Report and Order, April 12, 1982, page 9)

in the

To the extent a

class or product does not earn the jurisdictional rate of return,
income taxes allocated based on taxable income distorts information
necessary for pricing decisions.

The Commission affirms its earlier

decision in Docket No. 79-035-12 and rejects the recommendation of
the Committee.

4.

SUMMARY

Two DCOS studies incorporated the undisputed issues and

Commission findings with respect to the disputed issues as discussed
above.
4.

The results of these two studies are provided in Tables 3 and

Table 3 aggregates into 9 broad market categories the results for

the 54 product groups shown in Table 4.

Doth

investments.
1939 revenues.

studies

were

based

on

actual

1989

expenses

and

The first study, termed Actual, was based on actual
The second study, termed Proforma, annualized actual

1939 revenues to reflect the rate changes that have occurred between

1989 and the present, i.e. the revenue reduction ordered in Docket

38-049-07 effective November,

1989, and the revenue reductions

resulting from the two interim reductions ordered in the current
, : ,.J 1
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docket, effective July, 1990, and January, 1991, respectively.
studies used the

Both

1987 SLUS data.

TABLE 3

AGGREGATE SUMHART
COST-OFSERVICE

STUDr

RFSULTS

Rate of Return on Rate Base

1989 Revenue, Expanses j-vi I rwest;rients

Actual
ASIC

LOCAL

EXCHANGE

PrcfoTra*

DCCS Fr^n.ct

PRODUCTS

RESIDENCE

10.98%

0.14%

BJSIKESS

44.94%

29.93%

1-4, 2-24

com

-4.21%

-5.53;;

9, 12-15, 61

-22.03%

-23.58%

16.01%

5.14%

TCL
SUITC-ED ACCESS

33.28%
38.18%

26.95%
33.54%

17-20, 47, -9, 5C
53, 55, 5/", 64

PRIVATE LIKE

-9.61%

-9.76%

38, 63R

19.94%

15.67%

C T1- E R

INTRASTATE

INTERS'A'E

5-8

25,30,3'.,3.5,3-,36,37,40,
42,44,4;, R,•:->:,62,65,66

TRANSPORT PRODUCTS

-s:

DEREGULATED PRODUCTS

INTESTATE SWITCHED ACCESS
DEREGULATED

15.50%

"5.5C%

-108.-6%

-1CS.-6S

51, 52, 54, 56 5;
45D, 6 3D

12.3-;.;

'ALL EARNED RA'E CF RETURN
-••E-ALL A„"-:-:Zz? RATE OF RETURN

15.68%
10.69%

9.46?
' . 7 j

'

" Prorcrrr.n ^c^usts revenues for trie rate reductions Ton: 19;',9 to the

present rissuirinq quantity sold in 19S9 is uni h.intjrd.

In

Table

3

there

are

four

broad

markets

•r

local

exchange

services consisting of residence, business, coin telephone, and other
exchange

services.

There

are

three

broad

markets

for

intrastate

transport services consisting of toll, switched access, and private
lines.

The

remaining

two broad markets are

access and deregulated services.

interstate switched

The overall rate of return earned
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TAB! E 4
COST-OF-SERVICE

DCOS Product

STUDY

Rate of

SUMMARY

RESULTS

Return on Rate Base

1989 Revenues, Expenses, and Investments
Actu, I

Aggregate

DCOS Group

P-oduct

RESIDENCE"

5

Residence

LOCAL

6

Residence - Flat Usage

EXCHANGE

- Flat Access

7

Residence

8

Residence - Measured Usage

- Measured Access

BUSINESS

1

Business - Flat Access

LOCAL

2

Business - Flat Usage

EXCHANGE

COIN

3

Business - Measured Access

4

Business - Measured Usage

21

PBX

22

PBX - Flat Usage

23

PBX

24

PBX - Measured Usage

9

Revenues

75,862,458
42,730,664
1,539,197
655,294
42,305,713
21 ,130,344

708,5 70
64 7,698
9,523,589
8,242,160
410,378
568,734

- Flat Access

- Measured Access

Public Telephone

TELEPHONE

12

Public Access Line - Access

LOCAL

13

Public Access Line - Usage

EXCHANGE

14

Semi Public Coin - Access

15
61

Semi Publi c Coin - Usage
Booth Advertising

CTWER

25

Centron I Features

LOCAL

30

Centron Custom - Access & Featun

EXCHANGE

31

Centron Custom - Usage

33
34

Centrex - Access £ Features
Centrex - Usage

36

Info Services (976, 960, 900)

37

Versanet

40

Mobile

42
44

Custom CalIing
Remote Call Forwarding

6,176,321
708,553
473,281
459,714
7/6,020
347,692

46

Inside Wire • Embedded

Listing Services

62

Emergency Services (911)

65

Other Services

66

ISDN

INTRASTATE

17

IntralATA InuardUAlS - Access

TOLL

13

IntraLATA Inward WATS - Usage

19

IntraLATA Outward UATS - Access

20

IntraLATA Outward UATS - Usage

*7

IntraLATA Message ToU & Options

49
50

Operator Services
Directory Assistance - End Us^r

INTRASTATE

53

Intrastate Silling S. Collection

SWITCHED
ACCESS

55 Carrier Feature Group AaB
57 Carrier Feature Group C&D

4.93%

30.13%
6.76%
87.43%

70.41%
20.45%

19.64%
524.48%
82.07%

11.50%
70.17%
718.04%
-26.64%

46.56%
510.95%
-29.43%
215.19%
1122.99%

2,323,156
-26.62%
4,901,998
5.05%
1,391,851
-26.19%
565,020
-21.24%
430,459
-24.80%
213,273
-56.00%
47,887
-33.39%
226,789
-44.57%
8,692,739
32.82%
588,001
-26.11%
17,106 - 1563.61%

45R Regulated Time S Materials
60

Profo rnid*
RCR

31

4,540,630
1,009,900

52.20%
-20.24%
433.05%

547,046
9,815

-!57.o0%

-166.64%

586,937
6,095,969
208,392
1,627,518
63,117,125
6,553,165
3,818,095

Revenues

58,9/5,782
35,778,838
1,255,199
5/2,064
36,634,319
13,610,821
620,964
627,943
',587,556
6,177,570
340,403
542,109
6,176,321
6o2,3o4
468,661
412,200

ROR

-5.10%
16.6 5%
-1.21%
68.40%
52.95%
11.7 /%
6.88%

547.4 0%
52.81%
-4.09%
48.72%

750.00%
-27.24%
38.Rv/„
553.52%
-40.25%

771,906
34 7,692

224.17%
1122.99%

2,324,419

-27.43%

4,929,258

5.26%
-31.74%
-21.33%

1,048,4 73

565,332
396,535
212,848
47,887
240,036
8,697,460
588,001
17,106
31

4,474,692
1,009,542
5^7,046
9,315

-26.92%
- 56.86%
-33.39%
-42.71%

32.67%
-27.77%
-1561.05%
52.20%
-22.40%
427.07%
-166 . 70%
-157.62%
11.44%
122. K%

- 19.12;

553,375
5,612,926
195,377
1,485,230
58,35-,738
7,508,549
3,81)5,312

142,735 3281.50%
2,268,341
31.35%
2,700,550
33.42%

1-2,735

3281.30%

2,119,917
2,541,097

15.50%
138.27%
6.80%
51.37%

34.20%
-10.61%

2.52%
42.47%

26.13%
13.;::%
-1v.<=9%

962,487

81.48%

9o?,487

26.15%
28.56%
51.48%

I>,TRAS;A;E
35 Pnvnre L •ne - Scecial Access
PRIVATE LUF 63R Diyip.ic

16,133,142
53,310

-8.7-%
-70.69 4

lo, 1 57,9.%
53,310

- 70.:;; •;

INTERSTATE

3,561,605
7,009,783
27,310,303
74,254,930
17,237,174

229.65%

3,561,605
7,009,783
27,^10,303
74,254,930
17,28/, 174

229.65%

5,182,328

•108.55%
-31.17%

5,182,328

-103.55%

0

0

-31.17%

478,149,470

15.68%

436,243,338

9.46%

64

51
52
54

Contract Services (SNFA)

Directory Assistance - Carrier
Interstate Billing 8. Collection
Carrier Feature Group A\3

56 Carrier Feature G. oup C^D
53

CEREGULATED

Private L ine

450 Premise Service
630 Protocol Conversion

Overall Earned Rate of Return on Rate Base:
Overall Allowed Rate of Return on Rate Base-

Based on an Allowed Rate of Return on Equity of:

36.87%
44 .03%

5.49%
32.29?

10 69*

1K80%

.

71

36.8 7%
44.0 5%

5.49%

32.28%

— ••*•>•

1220%

Profnr™ adjusts revenues for the rate rcdut tions from 1989 1„ th*>

present assuming expenses, investments, and quantities sold in 1989 are unchanged.

•::::?.3
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on rate base shown in the 1989 Actual study was 15.68 percent as
compared to the authorized rate of return of 10.69 percent.
The results of the 1989 Actual study showed comparable rates of
return

earned

by

business

local

exchange,

intrastate

toll

and

switched access services, all considerably above the overall earned
rate of return.

Residence local exchange service provided a rate of

return approximately equal to the authorized rate of return.

The

remaining services, coin telephone, other local exchange and private
line

services

all

showed negative rates

of return.

Other

local

exchange services consist primarily of Centron and Centrex business

services, custom calling features and listing services.
The results of the Proforma study reflect the spread decisions
of Docket No. 88-049-07 and the two interim decreases of the current

docket.

The revenue reductions in Docket No. 88-049-07 were spread

to reduce residential and business local exchange revenues by 17
percent and

10 percent,

respectively,

services receiving none of the reduction.

have been

spread to

residence and

produce an equal

business

switched access revenues.

local

exchange

with

intrastate transport

The two interim decreases •

percentage reduction

for

and

and

intrastate

toll

The usefulness of the Proforma study is

severely limited in that the effects of time and growth on operations
have been ignored.

Only prices have been updated to the present,

effectively yielding proforma revenues as the product of 1989 usage
and 1991 prices.

The determination of jurisdictional revenue requirement was
based on a stipulated 1990 test year, the DCOS studies were run on

1989 information, and the relative usage information employed in the

DCOS studies were from the 1987 SLUS data. This lack of consistency- *?j ,\
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of

information

among

the

phases

unsettling to say the least.
parties

to

provide

of

the

ratemaking

process

is

The Commission strongly encourages the

ratemaking

information

from a consistent time

period.

The
Division

Commission
with

1990

finds
SLUS

that

the

information

Company
and

is

other

to
199 0

provide

the

information

necessary to allow the Division to perform a DCOS study based on 1990

actual results of operations consistent with Commission findings in
this docket.

The Division shall perform and report the results of

the 1990 DCOS study with the Commission and make available the study
to the Committee and any other interested party.

The results of the

forthcoming 1990 DCOS study shall be employed by the Division to

evaluate

Company

tariff

filings.

No

tariff

filings

will

be

considered in the absence of 1990 DCOS analysis.

The current version

of

the

DCOS

model

recurring from nonrecurring revenues and expenses.

does

not separate

To aid in pricing

decisions, the Commission encourages the Division to investigate
incorporating this separation in future versions of the DCOS model.

B.

REVENUE SPREAD AND RATE DESIGN

The Commission's determination of utility product or service

prices

(rates)

is guided by ratemaking or pricing objectives.

Certain of these objectives are attained when rates are based on the

costs of providing the services.
other

Cost-based rates thus are means to

ends.

It is the fact that the several pricing objectives may
conflict; that is, the attempt to attain one may lead away from
attainment of another.

The Commission's pricing decisions therefore
" .; j J yy
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inherently involve trade-offs.

They are balancing decisions.

If

basing rates on cost of service is one primary consideration,
another, at times leading to opposite pricing choices, is setting
prices to attain the social goal of universal service.

Nevertheless

cost of service information must be the starting point, and, assuming
the costing information is good enough to permit it, the manner in

which prices deviate from cost of service will give some indication
of the policy decisions the Commission has made.

Circumstances facing the industry and the Company today have
both changed the priority of the ratemaking objectives and added
other considerations.

The Company thus has argued that service
o

prices must be a function of two things, long-run incremental costs,
as a floor below which prices

should

not fall,

and

a market-

determined ceiling, above which prices would be self-defeating.
Market analyses, including demand elasticities, thus have a newly
acquired importance.

In the.long transition from value-of-service pricing to costof-service pricing, concerning which the Commission has commented

previously, the type of. cost information to be employed, embedded or

incremental, has been disputed vigorously. As the preceding section
makes clear, embedded cost-of-service information, developed under

this Commission's careful guidance, continues to hold sway in this

jurisdiction.

Moreover, it has an increasing importance for spread

decisions, for regulatory responses to anticipated tariff restructure
requests or new product filings, and as the means by which crosssubsidization claims will be addressed.

The Company's long-run incremental cost information has not

been subject to the same sort of rigorous regulatory scrutiny, and
i JO
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has carried less weight in pricing decisions.

Company testified that only residential
below long-run incremental cost.

dial

In this docket,

tone

1 ine

the

is priced

But given the Commission's decision

in Docket No. 88-049-07, that the dial tone line rate is designed to
recover only a portion, not all,

of the non-traffic sensitive costs

of the local loop, such information is insufficient to effect a price
change in any event.

Parties

have

testified

to

the

importance

of

market

relationships among various services, and these relationships mean,

in their view, that if the price of a particular service is changed,
other

related

service

prices

must

change

Relationships between business and residential,

switched access,

and extended area service,

in

proportion.

and among toll,

are principal among

these. There is on the record, however, scant evidence other than the

anecdotal, concerning market characteristics either in general or in
specific.

In sum,

embedded and incremental costs, relationships among

services, market analyses, and social objectives such as universal

service, guide pricing decisions.

The quality and reliability of

information on the record about each of these, however, is far from
being equal, as will become apparent in the following discussion of
individual pricing decisions.

USWC presented the testimony of Lloyd Tanner, Donald K. Mason,

Dr. H. Craig Petersen, Mary Ellen Young, Leslie D. Lanksbury, Dallas
R. Elder, Dan A. Purkey, Timothy F. Young, Robert H. Brigham, and
Steve L. Hill.

Witnesses for the Division were Larry Fuller and

Lowell E. Alt; for the Committee, William Dunkel; and for MCI, Dr.
Nina

Cornell.

; '•'• ;';7

DOCK ET

NO.

9 0 - 04 9 - 0 3

a nd

06

-D9

1.

EXTENDED AREA SERVICE

(EAS)

The Company testified that extended area service rates should

be reduced by 13.5 percent.

Resulting rates would be in excess of

long-run incremental costs, as shown by Company studies.
also

asserted

that

such

a

reduction

would

not

increase

pressures for this service since rates vary by area.
the Division,

The Company
localized

According to

EAS charges for business customers are in some minor

respects inequitable, creating the need for adjustments that can and
should be made in this docket.

The Committee's position is that EAS

charges should be reduced by the same percentage as the Commission
finds

appropriate

in this

docket

for residence

and business

basic

exchange service prices.
The Commission did not reduce EAS rates in the last rate case.

The Division' s DCOS model does not show EAS as a separate service
category.

The embedded costs of EAS are not shown separately on the

record but are included in residence and business usage categories,

both of which show more than adequate returns.
run

incremental

parties,

costs

have not been

The Company's long-

thoroughly

analvzed

by the

though its testimony that proposed reductions would vie Id

prices above such costs was not disputed.

Key to this pricing

decision is the long-standing relationship tying EAS prices to these
for toll and switched access services and the parties' testimony that

prices

for each should be reduced by the same percentage.

The

Commission has been concerned that EAS not be priced to encourage a

shift from toll.

Testimony indicates this would not be expected to

occur should reductions be such as to preserve the relationship.
Though

lacking

both

cost

and

market

information

of

the

desired

specificity, the Commission finds the weight of the evidence suooorts. -

i,3
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reduction

reduction

of

in

EAS

prices.

revenue

Considering

requirement

ordered

the
in

magnitude

this

docket

of

the

and

the

relationship among the services, the Commission finds a reduction of
fill

EAS

rates

by

11.8

further

finds

the

percent to be appropriate.

minor

adjustments

to

remove

The Commission

EAS

from

certa in

business services, as proposed by the Division, to be appropriate.

2.

TOLL

SERVICES

Proposals

to

Telecommunications
presented

by

the

revise
Service

and

restructure

(MTS),

parties.

The

OutWATS,
Company

aspects
and

800

proposed

of

Message

Service

to

combine

were
MTS

mileage bands and to reduce generally the rates for the first minute

and each additional minute of use.

This would simplify the rate

structure and, by making proportionately greater rate reductions in
the longer mileage bands, bring rates closer to cost of service.

It

would also reduce the disparity between intra- and interstate rates.

3ased on its

cost-of-service

and market

analysis,

the Division

supported a reduction in and restructure of these rates.

According

to the Committee, its .cost-of-service analysis does not support a

reduction of MTS rates, which earn a return below the average for all
services and which are low relative to similar rates in other states.
Moreover the service is growing rapidly, stated the Committee.

It

did not oppose the restructuring of mileage bands,- however.
The Company proposed to revise OutWATS usage rates and to

decrease the access line charges in response to what it styled as
competitive

pressures.

The

Division

was

in

agreement.

The

Committee's cost analysis indicated no basis for rate reduction and
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its witness testified that the decline in OutWATS volume owed partly
to USWC's

toll

The

volume

Committee

discount services.

testified

that

the return shown by cost-of-

service analysis for 800 Service was much higher than that for either
OutWATS

or

MTS

and

therefore

did

not

oppose

the

reduction

and

restructure proposed by the Company and supported by the Division.
The Commission did not reduce toll rates in the last rate case

except as a consequence of the equal-percentage spread of the interim

rate reduction.

There is an intuitive but not carefully examined

relationship among toll,

switched access,

indicate that toll services are overcarning.

and EAS.

DCOS

results

These overearnings, as

indicated by the Division's DCOS Model, are derived from the usage
priced services.

The flat access portions of these services are not

earning as much as most other services.

The Commission finds that

preserving the relationship between toll, switched access, and EAS

requires a reduction in toll similar to that for EAS, that is, an
11.6

percent

reduction.

The

Commission

further

finds

the

restructuring of toll, proposed by the Division, and of OutWATS and

800 service (inward WATS usage) rates proposed by the Company, and
supported by the Division, and not contested by the Committee, to be
reasonable.

3.

SWITCHED

ACCESS

The Company proposed a number of changes in switched access
rates.

In order to encourage carriers to seek customers more distant

from their points of presence,

for example, rural customers, the

Company would reduce rates in the longer distance mileage bands while

increasing them in the four shortest ones.

Because the difference
. •• :\
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between the local switching rate elements LSI and LS2 is being phased
out

by

the

ECC,

the

jurisdiction as well.
(CCLC)

should be

Company

argued

for

its

elimination

in

this

The intrastate Carrier Common Line Charge

reduced,

accord!ng to the Company,

as a movement

toward a target level, which is based on Subscriber Line Usage (SLU).
Moreover,

the

intrastate CCLC rates

for the closed end of WATS

and

800 usage should be removed, stated USWC, in order to discourage

switched access network bypass.
charges

in

line with costs,

In a move to bring installation

and to

be

consistent with

interstate

tariffs, the Company proposed to restructure certain identified local

transport nonrecurring rates.

The Division generally supported the

Company's proposals, with the caveat that usage rates should produce

returns consistent with toll services.

The Committee argued that

prices should remain as set following the January 1,
reduction.

1991 rate

If this were done, the CCLC could be removed from the

closed end of WATS and 800 services since CCLC revenues would be lost
m any event if large customers shifted to USWC private line service.

A revenue-neutral rate restructuring would also be acceptable, stated
the

Committee.

The Commission accepts the relationship between toll, switched
access,

rates,

herein.

and EAS as the rationale for reduction in switched access

given the reduction in toll and EAS rates to be ordered

The Commission finds the proposed restructuring of switched

access services to be reasonable, and further finds that switched
access rates should bo reduced by 11.7 percent.

3 3.: i i
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4.

PUBLIC

COMMUNICATION

SERVICES

To cover what it termed direct and imputed costs, the Company
proposed an increase in the local coin message charge from $0.25 to

$0.35.

Arguing that the Commission should give USWC's cost study no

weight because

it

is

defective,

$0.25 local payphone charge.

the Committee would maintain

the

According to the Committee, a large

proportion of payphone revenues are derived from toll, access, and
other non-local services which that study does not consider.

The

Division also recommended against raising the coin rate, strongly
objecting to USWC's attempt to impute its competitors' rates as costs
of providing coin service, and arguing that its cost study failed to
include important categories of revenues.

The Commission finds that the cost-of-service analysis of coin

service presented by the Company is inadequate.

There is no support

on

for

the

record

for

an

increase

in

the

rate

coin

service.

Furthermore, there are public interest reasons why coin rates should

not be increased even if shown to be underearning.

The Commission

finds that the $0.25 coin rate should be retained.

5.

RESIDENCE

LOCAL EXCHANGE

The Company emphasized that residence rates have been reduced,
on a percentage basis,

considerably more than other services since

1987 and therefore recommended that dial tone line and usage rates be

returned (raised) to the levels in effect prior to the January 1,
1991 interim rate reduction in this docket.

The

universal service

goal cannot be used to rationalize further reductions, the Company
asserted, and called the Commission's attention to the fact that any
reduction in EAS rates would benefit residence subscribers.

The
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Division's DCOS analysis provided support for maintaining these rates
at the January 1, 1991 level, it testified.
further

reduction

in

residence

rates

The Committee argued for

based

on

universal

service

considerations, amplified by claimed linkage between such rates and
economic

development

and

quality

of

life

improvements.

Local

exchange services are the foundation for most other services, the

Committee noted, and in general recommended further, equal percentage
reductions from January 1,

1991 levels for residence and business

local exchange and EAS rates.

The Commission is relying on the DCOS analysis

presented by

the Division and the Committee in this docket to support reduction in

rates of various services.

DCOS displays the results of past pricing

decisions, indicating earnings by service categories.

On this basis

there is no showing that residence rates should be further reduced.

The Universal Service implications of reducing residence recurring
rates are ambiguous at best,

argument for further reduction.

and are therefore an insufficient

The Company argued that its long-

run incremental cost analysis shows that residence dial tone line

service is priced too low.

The Commission notes, however, that this

cost analysis does not include an appropriate allocation of non-

traffic sensitive costs, as determined in Docket No. 88-049-07, and

has otherwise not been accepted by this Commission.

On balance, the

Commission finds that further reduction of residence recurring rates
is not warranted at this time.

5- BUSINESS LOCAL EXCHANGE

USWC testified that the business dial tone line rate should be

reduced to $15.80 and argued that usage and related service rates
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should be returned to June,

1990 levels,

alignment with residence rates.

in order to achieve better

The Division testified that business

rates should bo reduced sufficiently to reduce the business-residence
ratio to 2:1.

This would require a reduction in dial tone line rate

to $15.00, a movement justified by much higher than average earnings,
as

shown

by

the

DCOS

service efficiencies.

results,

and

promotion

of

future

business

The Committee argued that basic exchange rates

should be maintained at January 1991 levels, then reduced a uniform

percentage,

but yielding

residence ratio.

no change in the prevailing business-

That ratio can be justified on several grounds the

Committee stated.

As determined by the Division's DCOS analysis, business dial
tone line is earning substantially more than most other services.

There is no other evidence on the record to suggest that a reduction

in this rate would be inappropriate, and there is testimony from both
the Division and the Company that it should be reduced.
dockets

the

greater

than

Commission
two

based

has
on

accepted

a

assumptions

In past

business-residence
such

as

business

ratio
drives

modernization of the network more than residential and business usage
comes at the peak and therefore drives costs.
this is still appropriate.

Evidence suggests that

The DCOS analysis does not indicate a

need to reduce the business usage rate,

other than as will occur

owing to the EAS rate reduction to be ordered herein.

The Commission

finds that business dial tone line rates should be reduced 11.8
percent.

,.t
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OTHER

BUSINESS

AND RESIDENTIAL SERVICES

The Division recommended increasing the price of the hunting

charge to $4.00 per line in order to maintain a proper relationship
between business service and trunk service.

The Company and the

Committee agreed with this recommendation.

Hunting

Increment

and

Open

Switch

Protection

rates

have

recently been reduced as a result of the equal percentage spread of
interim rate decreases.

The Commission finds that the Division's

recommendation should be adopted.

8.

PBX TRUNK

SERVICES

Both the Company and the Division recommend an unbundling of

the hunting element from the Companion Line trunk rate and pricing
this element equal to the hunting increment for business services.
The Committee did not object to this recommendation.

The Commission

finds this is consistent with previous decisions which unbundle

elements of telecommunication services and is a step toward the
building-block approach recommended by MCI.

The Commission further

finds that one-way-out trunks should be priced the same as two-way
trunks with hunting as the Division has proposed.

9.

OBSOLETE

EXCHANGE SERVICES

The record contains evidence that it is more costly to provide

multi-party service than to provide one-party service.

One-party

service is a superior alternative, makes the network operate more
efficiently, and is a standard this Commission has established for

telephone service in Utah.

Four- and eight-party service currently

receives a 20 percent discount from one-party service rates.

No
A

)
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party

recommended changes

in the

rates

for

these

services.

The

Commission, however, desires to further examine the pricing rationale
for multi-party and other obsolete services,

and encourages the

parties to address these issues.

10.

NONRECURRING SERVICES

The Company, the Division,

and the Committee offered similar

recommendations for pricing certain nonrecurring services, such as

assigning and changing numbers, installation charges, and temporary
suspension

of

service,

with

the

exception

that

the

recommended lower residential installation charges.
argued

that

installation

charges

have

been

a

Committee

The Committee
barrier

to

the

attainment of Universal Service and have prevented individuals who do

not qualify for Lifeline or Link Up America programs from receiving
telephone service.

One of this Commission's

Service.

goals

is

promotion

of Universal

The only compelling testimony concerning price as a barrier

is that concerning the adverse effects of nonrecurring charges.
Therefore, the Commission finds that the Committee's recommendation

to reduce residence installation charges is reasonable and should be

adopted. The Commission finds that the remaining nonrecurring charge
recommendations of the parties are reasonable and should be adopted.
This

concludes

the

Discussion,

Findings

and

Conclusions

concerning rates for services for which the parties explicitly
recommended changes.

The Commission is aware that the tariff rate

elements bear relationships such that these deliberate changes will
cause many other changes not addressed either in testimony or in this

^0
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section.

All of these changes will be displayed in a final table to

be attached to this Report and Order.

IV.
A.

NETWORK MODERNIZATION

INTRODUCTION

In

this

case

the

Company

has

submitted

a

proposal

for

modernization of

its network in conjunction, with

its incentive

regulation plan.

According to Company witness Phillip S. Selander,

the proposed modernization investments will be "a beginning or seed

for the network of the future [and] they will give us the fiber optic
and

digital

building

blocks

from which

we

can

expand."

The

modernization plan would accelerate the installation of new central

office switching and interoffice facilities in order to support the
wide variety of capabilities and services that the network of the
future may require.

Thus,

Company witnesses testified that the

modernization plan is an important investment in Utah's future.

B.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PLAN

The modernization plan,

as presented by the Company,

is

primarily aimed at upgrading rural central offices'and laying a fiber

optic network to facilitate telecommunications for educational,
governmental and hospital use as well as for residential and business

customers. This would permit high-speed, high-capacity data transfer

and accommodate two-way video transmissions in support, for example,
of "distance learning." The upgrade would improve service for rural
customers,

the Company stated.
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The modernization plan the Company originally filed on March 2,
1990, called for $103 million in additional capital to be invested in

Utah.

$52.46 million of the investment is for the replacement of 46

electro-mechanical central office switching equipment with digital
switching

equipment

and the remaining $51.67 million

interexchange fiber optic cable.

is for new

When in place, according to the

Company, high capacity transmission would exist from Brigham City to
Cedar City, with digital radio extensions to Logan, Price, St. George
and Vernal.

The plan also included the construction of local fiber

networks to connect central offices to universities, colleges and

high schools.

The Company stated that all projects would be compl

eted within 54 months from the date of the Commission's order in this
docket.

The

Company's

proposed

plan

was

revised

in

response

to

testimony by the Division and the Committee, and by the Company's
conclusion that five of the central offices in the original plan and

transmission from Brigham City to Logan would hit "hard triggers",
i.e., growth would exhaust capacity, requiring an immediate upgrade
in order to maintain service.

The Company's witnesses Robert C.

Fuehr, Kirk R. Nelson, and Phillip S. Selander, in later filings and
oral

testimony,

proposal.

described

the

Company's

revised

modernization

The revised plan proposed an upgrade to digital technology

of the 41 remaining electro-mechanical central offices.

The central

office upgrade and facility augmentations needed to support such
upgrades to digital technology were estimated to cost $36.35 million

on a total state basis and $25.76 million on an intrastate basis,
over a five-year period.
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The second part of the
fiber optic and digital

revised plan is an expansion of the

infrastructure "backbone" so that it runs

from Logan to St. George, with upgraded digital microwave extensions
to

Vernal

and

Price.

The

Company

consented

to

the

Division's

recommendation that the fiber optic extensions in support of higher
education and distance learning,

i.e.

local

fiber optic loops from

central offices to every college, university and high school, would
be installed only when economical.

The estimated capital cost of the

fiber extension is $21.5 million.

The commitment to lay fiber cable

to all colleges,

universities and high schools and school district

offices when economical requires the investment of $33.88 million in
discretionary capital.

C.

BENEFITS

All

OF

MODERNIZATION

parties

to

this

case

agree

that

there

are

substantial

benefits to be gained from modernization in general and the Company's
proposed modernization plan in particular.

Mr. Fuehr testified that

"communications will become an even more critical link than it is

today in the economic well-being and development of a highly mobile

and technical society.... Telecommunications will play [a role] in

enhancing the global competitiveness of Utah businesses."

Company

witness Dr. Davidson testified that in order to remain economically
competitive,

networks.

states would have to upgrade their telecommunication

He alerted the Commission to the consequences of inade

quate investments

in new technology:

"Without modernization to

provide higher quality, lower 'cost and advanced services, the gap
between public and private offerings will, widen, sophisticated users

will shift increasingly to private networks and the remaining users
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and

impact

enhanced

of

services

inadequate

at

public

telecommunications capacity on local economic and social conditions

remains to be seen, but it could place selected regions and segments
of society at a distinct disadvantage."
Company witness Selander stated that educational

technically
combined

would

with

justify

government

the
and

proposed
research

enhancements,
needs,

project is even more economically feasible.

digital

infrastructure

would

allow

the

needs alone

the

but

when

modernization

The enhancements in the

system

to

carry

variety and greater quantity of traffic more economically.

a

wider

According

to the Company, its new capabilities would include distance learning,
a higher education library network, and a research network connecting

universities,
computer.

digital

Utah State University's ComNet and the state government's

communications

testified

promote

colleges and businesses to a centrally-located super

that

the

economic

requirements

increase

development

in

could

be

met.

telecommunications

in general

and

rural

The

Company

services

would

development

in

particular.

A number of public witnesses testified in favor of fiber optic

extensions to colleges, universities and high schools in support of
distance learning.

Mr. Steven Hess, Director of the Utah Educational

Network, testified that it was his organization's goal to extend its

distance learning service to every rural high school and applied
technology center in need of the service, within the next five years.
He further testified that the extension of fiber to those facilities

would provide the capacity needed for such expansion.

Dr. Bartell C.

Jensen, Vice President for Research at Utah State University (USU)
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and Dr. Glenn R. Wilde, Executive Director of the Merrill Library and
Electron!c Distance Education at USU,

testified that the communica

tions network proposed by U S WEST would provide the capabilities of
two-way interactive video at community sites,
and

universities

proposed

U

S

in

WEST

the

state.

network

They

would

schools and colleges

further

provide

a

testified
critical

that

and

the

needed

backbone service to make a statewide educational and training system
workable.

Mr.

Will Gardner of BYU,

and Chairman of UTAHNET, a Task

force chartered by the Utah State Advisory Council

for Science and

Technology to study the needs for high capacity telecommunications in
Utah, testified that upgrading the telecommunications infrastructure

to reach schools

(especially in the rural areas)

with interactive

television capabilities would be the single most effective way to
upgrade the educational posture of the entire state.

In addition, the Commission has received many letters from

educators, community leaders and concerned citizens in support of the
modernizati on proposal.

The Company, the Division and the Committee offered testimony
that

the

proposed

central

office

upgrades

would

make

enhanced

services and capabilities available to all USWC's customers, includ

ing rural customers presently unable to obtain such services as equal
access to interexchange carriers and such custom calling features as

call waiting, call forwarding, speed calling, and 3-way calling.

In

addition, the upgrades will provide for more accurate and clearer

transmission of voice and data.

Further,

the upgrade will allow the

offering of additional CLASS services when the Company begins to
market thorn in the state.
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The Commission finds that the central office upgrades will
provide more accurate processing of dialed digits, faster touch tone
services,

faster call completion,

accurate data transmissions.

clearer conversations and more

The Commission further finds that the

modernization plan will enable USWC to provide new services that are
not currently available in Utah.

In addition, the Commission finds

that the proposed investments would be of benefit to and would meet

a wide variety of residential, business, educational, governmental
and research needs, and concludes that the Company's proposed moder
nization program is clearly in the public interest.

D.

RISKS OF MODERNIZATION

The Company maintained that the proposed investments contained

in its modernization plan,

and in particular the investments in

upgrading central offices, were discretionary and would not be made

in a business-as-usual environment. These investments, although
yielding benefits to the state and its citizens, might get
subordinated to other investment opportunities.

The Company main

tained that modernization investments, while providing net benefits,
are riskier in that the expected earnings received by USWC are less
than the expected earnings on other possible investments.

The

Company claimed that only the opportunity to earn higher profits

through a change in regulatory form would induce it to carry the
additional risks of modernization investments.

USWC maintained that

the modernization plan is a good faith effort to demonstrate its

intent to further its investment in Utah. The Company believes that
by making investments that have high social benefits but low internal
"" 0
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rates of return to the Company, it demonstrates its commitment to the
public interest.

The

Company

also

argued

that

discretionary

modernization

investments can be risky in that they may not be incorporated into
rate base.

If the regulatory body determines that an investment is

not prudent, then the shareholder must bear its cost.

The Division

pointed out that in the recent past there has not been a case where
a major USWC investment had been excluded from rate base and, there
fore,

the

risk to the

understanding

Company's

past

of

this

Company

is

minimal.

Commission's

investments

is

It

contended that an

regulatory

necessary

to

treatment

of

the

analysis

of

the

any

regulatory risk of a particular future investment.
The Company asserts that it may turn out that the demand for

high capacity transmission is limited at present causing the revenues

generated to be insufficient to fully cover costs.

But the testimony

of the other major parties was to the effect that if the investment

is included in rate base, rates will be set to recover the costs, and
thus the Company will be protected.
Both the Division and the Committee testified that most of the

central offices included in the modernization plan are scheduled to

be replaced by 1996 in the Company's business-as-usual budget.

Thus,

the plan would accelerate already planned investment by just

a few

years.

The Commission

finds

there

is substantial

evidence on the

record that the modernization investments will benefit Utah in the

near and long term future and are, therefore, a prudent risk for
ratepayers.
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Therc was considerable testimony on the record by the Division

and the Committee asserting that depreciation policies adopted by the

Commission have provided the Company the opportunity for rapid
recovery of investment.

The Company therefore has the ability to

respond to rapid changes in technological innovation and emerging
new,

specialized customer demands without undue rate shocks to the

general body of ratepayers.

The Commission finds that the Commission

has protected the Company's recovery of investment by adopting
liberal depreciation policies.
Company witness Dr. William H. Davidson warned the Commission

that it should not prescribe by order additional investment in the

state of Utah.

Any such effort could be circumvented by a reduction

of investment elsewhere in the state.
argued,

This could degenerate, he

into a situation where the Commission is forced to micro-

manage the Company and thus assume responsibility for the investment

decisions of the Company.
desire for such a role.

The Commission ought not to have any

According to Dr. Davidson, the principal wav

to increase investment in Utah is to increase the rate cf return on

investments.

He testified that the incentive plan is the most ef

ficient wiy to raise the rate of return.

The. Commission admonishes the Company aga inst compensator-/
decreases in investment in ether areas.

There is evidence on the

record of the Company's planned investment for the state absent an

incentive plan.

The Commission does not wish to see any gross

deviations from those plans. USWC's investments in the state must

insure a high quality of service as determined by this Commission.

Appropriate regulatory measures will be taken to insure such quality
of service.
USWC possesses a certificate' of convenience and
.1
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necessity
throughout

and
its

franchises
service

to

provide

territory.

essential

public

The Commission

services

finds

that

the

Company has the obligation to provide such services, determined by
this Commission, so long as it holds that authority.
The

Company

also

contended

that

its modernization

plan

in

conjunction with the incentive plan increases its risk exposure.
Such risk raises shareholders' required rate of return and therefore

should be reflected in the incentive plan.

Thus, the Company argued

in favor of a gap between the authorized rate of return and that

above which a sharing of earnings with ratepayers would commence.

The Company maintained that it is at risk if the cost of capital
increases.

The Commission finds that such risk is attendant to the

incentive plan alone and should not affect any decision on moder

nization.

The Commission finds that neither the Company nor the

ratepayer bears inordinate risk in modernizing the remaining electro
mechanical

central

offices,

extending

its

digital

"backbone"

infrastructure, or the fiber optic extensions as contemplated by the
Company's proposed modernization plan.

E.

C_)MMISSION AUTHORITY

The Company has persuasively argued that the benefits of rural

upgrade and modernization are substantial and those benefits are

detailed herein and throughout this record. All parties are agreed
that the public interest would be served by the modernization program
proposed by the Company.

At issue is the Company's insistence that

the program is uneconomical without a change in regulatory framework
as it has proposed in its incentive plan and that the Commission is
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without authority to order modernization unless the Commission finds
that the upgrades will be economical.

As clearly stated above, we do not agree that we must make such

a finding.

Nonetheless, we are of the view that the program may on

the whole be economical.

economics

The Company submitted three studies on the

of modernizing

the central

Utilization Criteria (CL'CRIT) model.

offices

using

its

Capital

The first study was submitted

in response to the Committee's interrogatories concerning moderniza
tion.

This response used data from a 19 88 study on the then 54

remaining electro-mechanical central offices in the state.

The study

narrowed its analysis to the originally proposed 46 offices and con
cluded that modernization of these offices as a whole was uneconomic.

However,

as pointed out in the Committee's testimony,

the study

excluded the additional revenues that would be generated by the new

services available from the upgraded offices.

The Company updated

this study by including these additional revenues and excluding five
central

offices

that had

reached

"hard triggers".

This

study

indicated that three of the central office upgrades were economical,
19 were marginally economical and 19 were uneconomical.

Taken as a

complete package, the investment was deemed by the Company to be mar
ginally ecencmi cal.

Mr.

Fuehr ordered a new CUCRIT study in December of 19 90 and

late-filed with the Commission on February 13, 1991.

This study

examined the economics of the 41 central offices that were included
in

the

revised

modernization

modernization was uneconomic.

plan.

It

concluded

that

such

Because this study was late filed,

however, the parties could not adequately assess it.
Commission cannot rely on it to make a finding.

Therefore, the

m addition, there
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is no formal analysis on the record concerning the economics of the
fiber optic backbone and central office interties.

In sum, the evidence purporting to show the Commission that the

modernization

program

is

uneconomical

is

not

persuasive.

The

Commission finds that the Company"s studies are not conclusive and

may not include all of the benefits identified on the record, and
therefore the Commission cannot conclude that the proposed central
office modernization is uneconomical.

The Company cites two cases, the Mulcahv case (Mulcahv v. PSC.

117 P. 2d 298, 1941) and the Lifeline case (M_gjjntain States Telephone

v- psc/ 1988) in support of its position that the Commission cannot

order

the

Company

to make

expenditures

which

are

uneconomical.

Neither of those cases is convincing. The Mulcahy case is a trucking
case in which the Commission was required to determine whether or not

to grant a trucking company an operating certificate over opposition

from an already certificated carrier for the same territory.

In

dictum the Court discusses the criteria for determining whether
public convenience dictates that a new carrier be certificated in the

territory and refers to the need to have the patronage for the
service to justify the expense of rendering the service.

That fact

situation is completely different from the one facing the Commission

.nere.

In this case the Commission is considering the advisability of

.aaving a regulated utility upgrade its service. There is no debating
whether or not another phone company should be granted a certificate

in USWC's existing service territory.

Clearly, the criteria for the

entry of a competitor into an existing utility's service territory
would be different and more stringent than the criteria for requiring
an existing utility to upgrade its service.

it is not unreasonable
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in the Muloahy case, as opposed to this one, that the Court should

require that the would-be competitor's rates be cost-justified so as
not to be predatory.

The

Lifeline

case

stands

for

the

proposition

that

the

Commission lacks a specific delegation of legislative authority to
have the customers of one utility in this state bear some of the cost

of a program for the customers of another utility in this state.

This present case is not dealing with separate utilities—it is

dealing only with USWC.

The issue is whether or not the Company

should be required to provide upgraded service for its own customers,
not the customers of another utility.

In the Li fel ine case the Court

determined that the Commission lacked a legislative delegation of
authority to direct the Company to surcharge its customers for a
statewide pool of Lifeline program funds that would be used for the

customers of all phone companies.

That has nothing to do with the

Commission's authority to order an upgrade in the utility service
offered by a utility to its customers.

These are apple and orange

issues.

There are multiple

authority

to

require

statutory references to the Commission's

adequate

service

which

supplement

the

Commission's general jurisdictional grant at 54-4-1:

The

commission

jurisdiction to
utility

is

hereby

supervise

in this state,

vested

and

with

regulate

power

every

and

public

and to supervise all of the

business of every such public utility in this state, and
to do all things, whether herein specifically designated
or in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient
in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction.

The first of these is 54-4-7, which is a clear and plain
statement of the Commission's authority to regulate and supervise the

•

j
)
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services and commodities provided by utilities and order changes
where present services are no longer adequate.

Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that
the rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances,

facilities, or service of any public utility, or the
methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission,
it,
are
unjust,
storage
or
supply
employed
by
unreasonable,

unsafe,

improper,

inadequate

or

insufficient, the commission shall determine the just,
reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules,

regulations,
practices,
equipment,
appliances,
facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished,
constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same

by its order, rule or regulation.
Section 54-4-8 is

in the same vein.

Whenever the commission shall find that additions,
extensions, repairs or improvements to or changes in the
existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities or other

physical property of any public utility or of any two or
more public utilities ought reasonably to be made, or
that a new structure or structures ought to be erected to

promote the security or convenience of its employees or
the public or in any way to secure adequate service or
facilities, the commission shall make and serve an order

directing that such additions,

extensions,

repairs,

improvements or changes be made or such structure or
structures be erected in the manner and within the time
specified in said order.

Section 54-Sb-ll charges the Commission with making available
to

customers

throughout

telecommunications services.

the

state

high-quality,

universal

Section 54-3-1 requires that utilities

provide equipment and service which promotes the safety, health,
comfort and convenience of its customers.

The adequacy and convenience of service and equipment can

change over time. Operator-switched calls and multi-party lines were

once considered adequate; obviously, they no longer are. The Company
itself has admitted on this record that the simple ability to
complete a call in today's environment does not constitute adequate
service. The Commission finds that service to certain customer areas
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is not adequate by present day standards and that the modernization
program is necessary at this time to provide all customers in this

state with adequate and convenient service. It is, therefore, in the
public interest.

We conclude that it is for this Commission to

determine what is necessary and convenient in the way of utility
services, require the utility to provide it and allow that provider
an opportunity to earn a fair return on its investment.

F.

SUMMARY

The Commission recognizes that telecommunications provides
beneficial externalities. A modern telecommunications infrastructure

permits the efficient and economical flow of information, to the

benefit of consumers of all sorts.

As a result, it also may promote

economic development.

Prudent and properly timed modernization

is an important

requirement facing the telecommunications industry. Therefore, it is
a necessary element of good regulatory policy to promote economic and

timely modernization.
This Commission will encourage timely,
socially beneficial investments, and will allocate corresponding
costs fairly and equitably.

The Commission has found that the public interest requires the
Company to undertake its modernization plan, whether or not its

proposed incentive plan is approved. USWC will have the opportunity
to earn its allowed rate of return on the proposed modernization

investments and, therefore, will be compensated for the risk of such
investment.

The Company must not provide discretionary modernization

investment at the expense of investments otherwise undertaken to
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maintain high quality service for the general body of ratepayers,
however.

The Company's investments in the state must insure high

quality service,

as determined by this Commission.

Appropriate

regulatory measures will be taken to insure that this occurs.

The

Commission

finds

that

existing

services

are

no

longer

adequate and concludes that the modernization plan is justified in

that it brings telecommunications in Utah in lino with
service expectations.

Therefore,

present day

it is appropriate to order the

Company to provide central office upgrades estimated to cost $36.35

million and fiber-optic extensions so that the fiber optic infra
structure extends from Logan to St. George, with digital microwave

extensions to Vernal

million.
costs

and Price,

at an estimated cost of $2.1.5

These figures are represented by the Company to be the

associated

with

these

modernization

investments.

The

Commission is ordering the modernization of the network, not the
Company's estimated costs.

The investments will be subject to the

normal prudence reviews in future rate cases.

As previously noted,

the Commission, in the past, has not found the Company's investments
to be unreasonable or excluded, them from rate base.

The Division and the Company supported the proposed extension

of fiber to colleges, universities and high schools only where deemed

to be economically justified. As noted above, originally the Company
proposed that the estimated $33.88 million to extend fiber to such

institutions would be a part of the overall modernization plan.

The

Commission is satisfied by the testimony on the record, including
that of the public witnesses, as to the benefits of such extension.
The Commission finds that fiber to the colleges, universities and

high schools in the Company's territory is in the public interest and
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The Commission further finds that

the Company must work with the Division and the various interested

educational interests in the state to devise a program entailing the
investment for extending fiber to these institutions as part of the
total modernization plan.

Such plan shall include details of the

rates to bo charged education for use of the network.

Institutions

should be required to sign contracts, or otherwise demonstrate that

they will

utilize the

fiber optic service and pay the rates

determined, before construction is authorized.

Such plan shall be

submitted to the Commission within three months of this Order.

The

Commission further finds that all modernization investments must be

completed within 54 months of the Order, and booked as completed.

V.

INCENTIVE REGUIATION PROPOSALS

In this proceeding, both USWC and the Division made proposals
for the adoption of so-called "Incentive Regulation" plans in this

jurisdiction.

In essence, incentive regulation is based upon the

assumption that traditional regulation does' not provide sufficient

incentives for regulated utilities to operate as efficiently as
possible.

Incentive regulation allows the utility to earn in excess

of the authorized rate of return on equity with the hope that such
overearnings will provide a greater incentive to management and
employees to undertake additional efficiencies.

A.

DISCUSSION OF PLANS

1.

USWC

PLAN:

The term of USWC's plan is four years, commencing January 1,

1991 and terminating December 31, 1994. During the term of the plan,
")
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no increases in basic rates would be permitted except as a result of
changes

in

four

"pass-through"

categories:

Commission-approved

accounting changes required or allowed by Generally Accepted Account
ing Principles

(GAAP),

changes in federal tax rates,

FCC-mandated

separations changes and Commission ordered changes in depreciation
rates.

Other rates would also be frozen, except for limited, revenue

neutral adjustments approved by the Commission.
been

Commission approved as

rate

flexible or

changed without Commission approval.

Services that have
detariffed

could be

USWC would be precluded from

filing a rate case except where a full calendar year's earnings were
lower than a 10.5 percent return on equity.

The Company would be

allowed to retain all earnings up to a 14.0 percent rate of return on
equity.

All

earnings

above

14.0

percent would

be shared with

customers on a 50-50 basis by annual credits on customer bills in the
year following that in which overearnings occurred.

2.

DPU

PTAN:

The Division's proposed plan differs from the USWC proposal in

several respects.

The. Division wants the sharing point .to begin at

the same level as the authorized return on equity ordered by the
Commission in this proceeding, instead of the 14.0 percent level.
Under the Division proposal, no pass-through rate adjustments are
allowed.

Instead of a firm,

four-year term for the incentive

regulation plan, without regulatory review, the Division proposes a

five-year plan with a mid-point review and the option of an early
termination of the plan if it is found to not be in the public
interest. The Division's plan proposes a procedure for indexing the
authorized return on equity in order to minimize the risk to the
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Company of fluctuating capital costs during the term of the plan.
The remaining differences are minor.

B.

POSIT TONS OF THE PARTIES

1.

US__WEST COMMUNICATIONS

In its testimony in support of its plan, USWC attempted to
establish

the weaknesses

in traditional

regulation

which would

justify the adoption of a significant departure from the current

regulatory method.
summarized as

a.

The perceived weaknesses can be grouped and

follows:

Traditional regulation does not provide sufficient incen

tives for efficient managerial and employee performance.

Under

traditional regulation, management and employees do not share in the

rewards of increased efficiency since the resulting overearnings are

returned to ratepayers after a brief period of regulatory lag.
Evidence cited in support of this position is as follows:

(1)

Common Sense - It is intuitively obvious that greater

financial rewards would motivate management and employees to increase
their efficiency and upgrade their performance.

(2)

Traditional - Traditional regulation is essentially a

"cost-plus" arrangement between the utility and regulators, there-

tore, absent regulatory lag, overearnings resulting from efficiency

gains are passed on to ratepayers rather than used to reward manage
ment or employees for improvements in efficiencies.

(3)

Regulatory Lag - Regulatory lag is an insufficient

incentive to undertake incremental increases in efficiency.
b.

Traditional regulation retards the rate of technological

innovation, delaying both the adoption of new technologies and the
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introduction of new services.

This is because incremental earnings

derived from such new technologies or services ultimately inure to
the benefit of ratepayers and not the shareholders.

Furthermore, new

efficiencies derived from technological advances are also lost to the
shareholders,

thus providing a disincentive to their introduction.

The evidence cited by the Company in support of this argument is as
follows:

(1)

Common Sense - it is again intuitively obvious that the

loss of additional revenues from new offerings and new efficiencies
does not provide incentives to the Company to introduce them.

(2)

Earnings/Risks - The opportunity for additional earnings

will compensate the Company for the additional risks that flow from

introducing new and untested technological changes and products.
c.

Traditional regulation has an anti-investment bias.

Since

the Company is not able to earn a sufficiently high return on
investment, it fails to invest in the basic infrastructure.

The

evidence provided here is to the effect that if the Company had a
choice as to where to make "discretionary" investments, it would
surely make those investments in activities and jurisdictions where
the return was greater.

In

addition

to

the

criticism

of

traditional

regulation

summarized above, USWC asserted that incentive regulation would have

the positive benefits that would accrue from reversing the negatives

of traditional regulation. There would be greater efficiency, more
rapid deployment of new technologies and services, and added

investment in this jurisdiction.
that

incentive

Additionally, the Company argued

regulation protects

customers

from undue

rate
~)
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increases during the term of the incentive regulation plan, because
of the freeze on rate increases.

USWC did not agree with major provisions of the Division's

incentive plan,

specifically,

the absence of a gap between the

authorized rate of return on equity and the sharing point,

the

floating rate of return on equity, the absence of pass-throughs, and
the term of the plan.

2.

DIVISTON OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

To one degree or another, the. Division agreed with many of the

justifications for incentive regulation put forth by the Company.
Specifically, Division witnesses asserted that there is always room

for

improvement

processes.

and

additional

in addition,

the

efficiencies

in

the

management

Division contended that potential

benefits might include additional sharable earnings to the ratepayers
from the annual credit procedure, instead of all of those earnings
above the authorized rate of return being lost by the ratepayers
through regulatory lag.

Potential benefits might also include the

acceleration of new technologies and services, and regulatory costs
might be reduced as a result of incentive regulation.

The

Division

argued,

however,

that

there

substantiate the likelihood of such benefits.

is

no

way

to

Division witnesses

characterized their proposal as an experiment - one designed to
protect ratepayers from harm, and perhaps even benefit them, while

allowing the Company to prove the benefits of incentive regulation.
The

Division,

however,

disputed

certain

portions

of

the

Company's plan, specifically, the gap between the authorized rate of

return on equity and the 14 percent sharing level, which the Division
;

j

DOCKET NO.

90-049-03

and 0.6

-SO-

characterized

as

a

Company

windfall.

In

addition,

the

Division

criticized the pass-through provisions because they allow single-item
rate cases which are prohibited under Utah law.

The absence of a

raid-plan review with the option of termination if it is not resulting
in

benefits

to

the

ratepayers

is

also

a

problem

the

Divis. on

identified.

3.

COMMITTKE

OF

CONSUMER

SERVICES

The Committee proposed elements of an incentive plan of its
own,

pursuant to a request by the Commission.

However,

the bulk of

its testimony was in opposition to the plans of both the Company and
the

Division.

The

Committee's

arguments

in

opposition

to

the

implementation of an incentive plan are summarized as follows:

a.

The Committee argued that prior to approving an incentive

regulation plan, Utah law requires a finding by the Commission that

rates

under

an

incentive

regulation

plan

would

be

"just

and

reasonable," which they interpret to mean equal to or less than rates
under

traditional

regulation.

The

Committee

contended

that

the

evidence clearly shows that rates under incentive regulation would be
higher than under traditional regulation, therefore the Commission
cannot approve any incentive regulation plan.

b.

The Company plan violates Utah law because it limits the

right of the Division, the Committee or any other party from filing
a rate case or order to show cause during the pendency of the plan.
c.

The provision calling for pass-throughs under the Company

plan is in violation of Utah law inasmuch as it would allow for
single item rate cases.
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The Division's mechanism for a floating rate of return on

equity may also be a prohibited single-item rate case.

e.

There

is

insufficient

evidence

to

justify

even

the

Division's "test" of an incentive regulation scheme.
f.
of

the

Incentive regulation may create a disincentive on the part
Company

to

invest

in

the

basic

telecommunication's

infrastructure because it could earn a higher return on depreciated
plant than on new plant.

g.
rate

The

proposed rate

freeze would block potential,

future

decreases

h.

Employees and management have sufficient incentives under

existing regulation since their pay is based on comparable industry
standards

and

includes

bonus

and

profit-sharing

plans

funded

at

ratepayer expense.

4.

MCI

MCI argued that the Commission should not approve the incentive

regulation plans of either the Company or the Division.

However, if

the Commission were to adopt the changes to the plans proposed by MCI
witness
through s,

Dr.

Cornell,

specifically,

changes

the starting point of sharing,

ceiling, MCI would not oppose the plan.
sharing,

Dr.

dealing

with

pass-

the sharing method and a

With respect to earnings

Cornell recommended an increasing percentage for the

Company as earnings grow to ensure that the Company is not rewarded

for the easy efficiencies that already should have been implemented.
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5.

CONTEV,

Contel argued in favor of the theory of incentive regulation,
out

did

not

address

Division plans.
is,

in

the

specifics

effects

to

the

USWC

or

the

of

reasonably monitored to protect against the
possible

mistake

(by

the

regulator)..." in the belief that such a plan,
beneficial

of

It encouraged the Commission to adopt a plan that

"A balanced plan,

adverse

detail

the

customer,

the

investor,

utility

or

the

"...can bring results
and

the

public."

It

further argued that any finding for or against an incentive plan in
this

docket

ought

not

to

dictate

the

application

of

incentive

regulation to other utilities.

C-

DISCUSSION

AND

FINDINGS

We are being asked to make a significant departure from the

current scheme of regulation in the state of Utah.

Committee

witness

Dunkel,

traditional

relatively well in this jurisdiction.

regulation

As noted by

is

performing

Ratepayers have received a

series of rate reductions over the past four years, the Company
continues to earn in excess of its authorized rate of return and the
telephone

customers.

network

appears

to

have

met

the

basic

needs

of

its

In addition, telephone subscribership in the state is at

an all time high level (96.5 percent as of March, 1990) and is well

above the national average of 93.3 percent.

No one argues that the

system is perfect, but concrete evidence that it is failing in any
major respect is absent from this record.

On the other hand, the

record in this case shows that the promised benefits of the incentive

regulation proposals before the Commission are speculative and the

possibility exists that unless a specific incentive regulation plan
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is carefully crafted, there is risk of harm to the ratepayers.

That

could occur in the form of higher rates than ratepayers would have

otherwise paid, or a windfall to shareholders in the form of higher
earnings than their investment risk would otherwise justify, as will
be discussed in more detail later.

In light of this, the Commission

must approach the abandonment of traditional regulation and current

methods

of

carefully.

balancing ratepayer
Accordingly,

and

shareholder

the Commission

finds

interests

very

that there must be

evidence that a specific incentive regulation plan will be of benefit
to ratepayers and in the public interest before the Commission will
adopt such plan.

A review of the record shows that neither the Company nor the
Division plans, as currently constituted, fully meets this standard.
The evidence on the record does not substantially corroborate the
assertions made by proponents of incentive regulation either in their
attacks on traditional regulation or in support of the benefits of
incentive regulation:

1•

Assertion that traditional

regulation does

not provide

sufficient incentives for efficient performance and that the proposed
incentive plans will result in increased efficiencies.

law,

Under Utah

public utilities have the clear responsibility to provide

service that is "...efficient, just and reasonable." U.C.A. Sec. 54-

3-1.

It is therefore the obligation of the utility,

in effect a

condition of its right to operate as a public utility,

efficient.

to be

Inefficiency, and particularly knowing inefficiency,

would result in unjust and unreasonable charges for the utility's

services which UCA 54-3-1 prohibits and deems unlawful. It is highly
questionable whether it should be necessary to reward shareholders
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with additional earnings

in order to encourage the utility to

be

efficient.

The

Company stated

in this docket

that USWC

is

an efficient

operation, current service is adequate, and that it is more efficient
today than it was five years ago.

In addition, it testified that its

Utah operations compare favorably with those of the other states it

serves.
advances,

This is due to a number of factors, including technological
existing incentive and bonus plans for management,

employee access to a profit-sharing plan.

and

The Company also testified

that competition has driven it to become more efficient.

The proponents of incentive regulation were not able to produce

concrete evidence that their incentive regulation plans would produce

the results promised.

The Company indicated that the employee

compensation plans would not be modified in order to insure that the

rank and file employees would be allowed to share in the earnings to
be generated under the incentive plan.

They were not willing to guarantee that gains in efficiency
would result from the adoption of an incentive plan.

The Company could not specifically identify areas in which

efficiencies would result from their incentive regulation plan, nor
could they identify examples from other jurisdictions that have

adopted incentive regulation plans of efficiencies that resulted or

positive impacts upon ratepayers from sharing of revenues. In fact,
there was testimony on this record that at least one experiment
INYNEX) had produced just the opposite effect. The Company admitted

that there does not exist any quantifiable measure of efficiency
gains arising from incentive plans.

i 7" I
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One of the major witnesses sponsored by the Company in this
proceeding was Professor Davidson who spoke in favor of

incentive

regulation as a means of addressing the emergence of competition on
the national and international scene.
testified

that

the

Company's

Yet other Company witnesses

incentive

regulation

plan

was

not

designed to meet the concerns of competition.
The Company could not produce an analysis of the impacts upon
the ratepayers of incentive regulation.

Company witnesses testified

that it is impossible to quantitatively demonstrate that rates under
an

incentive

plan

will

traditional regulation.

be

equal

to

or

lower

than

rates

under

There was, however, testimony by the Company

that adoption of an incentive regulation plan would increase the cost

of capital to the Company due to higher risks.
witnesses

testified

that

one

of

the

In addition, Company

advantages

of

incentive

regulation is that it encourages "risk taking" by the Company but
that ratepayers would be exposed to the risk of Company failure since

investment made during the course of the incentive plan will be in
rate base at the end of the plan.

Of

all

of

the •arguments

put

forth

by

the

proponents

of

incentive regulation, the one with the most appeal is the one with no

basis other than "intuition".
to

increase

its

properly crafted

If we make it possible for the Company

earnings by becoming more
incentive plan,

efficient

through a

including an assurance that

the

rates that we begin with are such that the Company will not enjoy a

windfall, the promise of increased earnings is motivation enough that
efficiencies will probably result.

Another argument in favor of a

carefully crafted plan is that the sharing of overearnings,

the

annual accounting of earnings, and the allowance of a return of their
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share of the earnings in some manner in the subsequent year, permits
the ratepayers to receive at least some benefit of overearnings.

In

the past several years of consistent overearnings by the Company,
such overearnings have benefitted only the. shareholders.

There is

also appeal in the argument of the Division that even though the
promised benefits of incentive regulation are speculative,

if the

plan is crafted in such a way that the ratepayers are not harmed,

then it might be in the ratepayers' interest to try the "experiment"
for a few years in order to test the theory of incentive regulation.
The Commission finds that the record does not fully support the

arguments by proponents of incentive regulation that the Company
lacks incentives to be efficient under current regulation. It further
finds that the record is deficient in evidence that the incentive

regulation

plans

proposed

in this

proceeding

will

create the

incentives for efficiency promised. There is also an absence of

evidence to fully support the contention that ratepayers will benefit

from the adoption of the Company•s or the Division's proposed
incentive regulation plans.

2.

Assertion that traditional regulation retards the rate of

technological innovation which will be corrected under an incentive

regulation plan.

This argument flies in the face of a long-

established principle, that if the Company is allowed the opportunity
to earn the allowed rate of return (market cost of capital) on its
utility investment, and with rates linked to that investment in the
form of rate base,

the utility has an incentive to increase

investment in order to increase the absolute level of its profits.
The Company offered no concrete evidence to counter this widely
accepted view.

The Company did not offer any example of investments
•- "7 13
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not

made,

technologies

withheld

from

Utah

because

of

a

lack

of

incentive, or services not offered in Utah because the Company had no
incentive to earn additional revenues.

The Company has asserted in a number of proceedings before this
Commission, and in this proceeding, that it faces a serious threat

from competition.

It is hard to accept the theory that the Company

would withhold introduction of new technologies or new services that
would help

it meet that competition

simply because an incentive

regulation plan did not exist in Utah. There is evidence, however,
that

USWC

has

invested

considerable

sums

in

recent

years

in

introducing new technologies and improving the telecommunications

infrastructure

generally.

In

addition,

it

appears

that

the

independent telephone companies that operate in the state have had

the incentive under traditional regulation to modernize their systems
to a maj or degree.

There is also evidence that liberal depreciation policies, such
as those adopted by this Commission since 1985, have a more direct
and substantial impact upon modernization decisions than would an
incentive regulation plan.

Some Company witnesses argued that under traditional regulation

the Company is put at risk in its modernization efforts by arguments
that certain investments are not prudent, yet the Company offered no

evidence that this Commission has ever declared any investment by the
Company to be imprudent and thus not allowable in rate base.

The Commission therefore finds that there is insufficient

evidence to justify the assertion that traditional regulation, as
implemented in this jurisdiction, discourages modernization or the

introduction of new technologies or services.

Furthermore, the

' l"t74
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Commission

does

not

find

valid

the

evidence

on

this

record

which

purports to substantiate the assertion that adoption of incentive

regulation would lead to more rapid deployment of new services or
technologies.
3.

The

argument

investment bias.

that

traditional

regulation

has

an

anti-

Much of the analysis set forth above under Section

b also applies to this assertion.

It appears that the essence of

this argument is that the Company is discouraged from investing in
activities and jurisdictions where the return is not as high as other

jurisdictions or business opportunities.

In fact, Company witnesses

asserted on the record that all the Company is really after is a
higher return on its investment.

The Commission finds that a

commitment by the Company to the provision of public service and an
opportunity to earn the allowed rate of return equal to the market

cost of capital, as determined by this Commission,

provides an

appropriate long-term basis upon which investment decisions should be
made by the Company.

4•

The specific elements of the Companv Plan rejected by the

Division and the Committee.

a.

The proposed gap between the authorized rate of return and

the sharing level of 14 percent.

We believe that the evidence on the record shows that such a gap
would result in a windfall to the Company at the expense of the

ratepayers. The studies of Division witnesses Compton and Henningsen
substantiate this conclusion.

Testimony of MCI witness Cornell to

the effect that such a gap would reward the Company for "easy
efficiencies" is further evidence. The Commission therefore finds
that the record does not justify the existence of a gap between the
t •T J:)
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rate of return authorized by the Commission in this proceeding and
the point at which the ratepayers begin to share in the results of
Company efficiencies.

b.

plan.

The proposed pass-through items proposed in the Company

One of the more public assertions made by the Company both

before the proceeding began (as established in the numerous letters

received by the Commission in support of the proposed modernization

and incentive plans, which letters were apparently generated in large
part by the active lobbying of the Company) and during the course of

the proceeding, was that rates would be frozen during the duration of
the incentive regulation plan.

Yet the Company has requested that

rates be allowed to increase in the event the four designated pass-

through items

require it.

The parties that argued against the

inclusion of pass-throughs contended that by selecting items that

would in all likelihood result in increases in rates, but excluding
factors that would in all likelihood result in additional revenues to

the Company is not fair to ratepayers.
such

pass-throughs

are

single-item

declared illegal in this jurisdiction.

It was further argued that
rate

cases

which

have

been

The Commission finds that the

arguments against pass-throughs are persuasive and we will not allow

them in any plan approved by the Commission.

c.
and the

The absence of a mid-term review of incentive regulation
absence

of a means

of bringing

an action

before

the

Commission to consider termination of a plan.

The arguments are based in large part upon public policy, i.e.,

it is not wise to deprive the Commission and other regulators of a

mechanism for reviewing in detail and in public this significant
departure from the regulatory norm.

There was also argument that
-

r v o
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depriving regulators of this opportunity would be

in violation of

Title 54 of the Utah Code provisions which set out the duties of the
Division and the

incentive

Commission.

regulation plan on

We find that any restriction in an

the right of the Commission,

the

Division, the Committee or any other party to request a review of an
approved plan would not be in the public interest.

We do, however,

note that in order for an incentive plan to succeed in the manner

contemplated,

that there must be

a presumption that

it will

be

allowed to proceed for a period of several years, absent a clear
showing that it is not in the public interest.

Based upon the foregoing,

the Commission cannot adopt the

incentive plan of either the Company or the Division as presented to
the Commission.

We find that the adoption of such plans in their

current forms would not result in the promised efficiencies or

investments nor would they be of benefit to the ratepayers of this
state.

This hearing is unique in the respect that we are proceeding
pursuant to a statute that allows the Company to opt out of a plan
approved by the Commission (54-4-4.1).

We interpret this statute to

give us some discretion in crafting an alternative plan that we
believe would be in the public interest.

Based upon the record before us, and in conformance with the

findings heretofore entered by this Commission, we approve an
incentive regulation plan with the basic elements to be set forth
hereafter.

It is our intention that the Company and the other

parties be given the opportunity to review these basic elements and
engage in discussions concerning them. If the Company chooses to

reject the plan as proposed, it may so notify the Commission pursuant
,

t

*

t
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to the aforecited statute.

If it chooses to accept the plan as

outlined, the Commission would order the parties to meet to draft the
details of such a plan and to submit them to the Commission for its
consideration and approval.

The Commission is approving the following plan based upon the
arguments already stated above that proper monetary incentives may
increase the efficiency of the Company, and as argued by the Divi
sion, that if carefully crafted to protect the interests of the

ratepayers,
public

an experiment in incentive regulation may be in the

interest.

In addition,

the Commission

finds

that

the

following plan will allow the ratepayers to benefit by receiving a
share of overearnings of the Company that may result from the Company
earning in excess of its authorized rate of return.

The Commission finds that an incentive regulation plan based
upon the following general principles will protect the interests of

ratepayers, could produce a more efficient operation by USWC, will
allow a proper experiment in incentive regulation and is in the
public interest:

1.

Rates will be frozen except as modified pursuant to item

6 hereafter and subject to revenue neutral changes in rates ordered
by the Commission as a result of contemplated cost-of-service
monitoring on a regular basis.

2.

Regulation of the Company will continue in all respects as

with traditional regulation, except as modified by this Order.
3.

The starting point for sharing between the ratepayers and

shareholders shall be at the authorized rate of return on equity set
by the Commission in this Order, 12.2 percent.

:t7.s
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4.

Earnings

by the

Company between

12.2

percent and

13 .2

percent on equity will be shared 80 percent to the ratepayers and 20
percent to the shareholders.

Earnings between 13.2 percent and 14.2 percent shall be shared
60 percent to the ratepayers and 40 percent to the shareholders.

Earnings between 14.2 percent and 17 percent shall be shared 50
percent to the ratepayers and 50 percent to the shareholder.

Earnings in excess of 17 percent shall all be returned to the
ratepayers.

5.

There will be no pass-through adjustments.

6.

The

ratepayers'

share of earnings in excess of

12.2

percent will be calculated as soon as possible in the next calendar

year.

Disposition of such share will

be determined by the

Commission, after hearing, in one or more of the following ways:
a.

one-time credits against the customers' bills;

b.

permanent rate reductions or restructuring;

c

investment in the infrastructure in addition to that

ordered herein.

7.

The term of. the plan is for five years.

The Commission

can terminate the plan at any time if it is convinced that the public
interest justifies termination. At any time during the duration of

the plan the Company can request a rate case.

In addition, at any

time the Division or the Committee can request the Commission to

undertake an investigation of the rates and charges of the Company.
However, the Company, the Division and the Committee will have t

o

overcome the presumption that it is in the public interest that th

o

plan be allowed to go the entire five-year experimental period.
i 79
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8.

The plan will include the service performance standards

proposed by the Division in this proceeding.

It is the Commission's

intention, however, to conduct a comprehensive examination of quality
of service and to assess the adequacy of these standards within six

months following adoption of the incentive plan.

9.

The Company will devise and implement a method of sharing

a portion of the excess earnings earned under this plan with
employees

of

the

Company.

Such

plan will

be

filed with

the

Commission.

10.

The

Company

will

continue

monthly reports as to its earnings.

to

file

with

the

Commission

In addition, the Company will

file quarterly reports detailing efficiencies resulting from the
plan.

11.

Division

The

will

Company

will

evaluate,

file

annual

with

the

intrastate

Commission,

revenue

and

the

requirement

determination on both an actual and a prospective test-year basis.
12.

The Division will file with the Commission the results of

annual cost-of-service studies using the DCOS model.

The cost-of-

service studies are also to be on an actual and prospective test-year
basis

and to

requirement.

be consistent

The

with the determination

cost-of-service

studies

shall

be

of

revenue

performed

utilizing accounting information and special studies, such as access
lines and minutes of use, from the same time period.

By design, the above sets out the minimal details concerning
the Commission's ordered incentive plan.

The Commission is convinced

that the details of the plan can be worked out by the parties within
a relatively short time period.
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ORDER

NOW,

THEREFORE,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

USWC reduce its revenues by $19,799,000 in accordance with

the spread and rate design portions of this Order.
2.

USWC incorporate the revenue reduction into its rates and

schedules

in

conformance

with

Attachment

A

hereto

and

file

appropriate revised tariffs with the Commission, which tariffs shall
take effect on July 1, 1991.

3.

USWC implement the central office modernization and fiber

optic extensions described and set forth in this Order and devise a

program in consultation with the Division and potentially affected
educational

institutions

institutions.

for

fiber-optic

extensions

to

those

The details of this program are to be reported to the

Commission within three months of this Order.

The modernization and

extensions shall be completed within 54 months of the Order.

4.

USWC file notice with the Commission as soon as possible,

but not later than 60 days following the date of this Order, of its
acceptance or rejection of the incentive plan detailed herein.

5.

USWC undertake and report the following projects:

a.

Develop a stimulation model for toll, 800, outWATS and

switched access services within one year of the date of this Order.
b.

Track the growth and minutes of usage for the services

listed in paragraph (a) and report them quarterly beginning
October 1,

c

1991.

Provide the Division with 1990 SLUS information and such

other information as is necessary to enable the Division to prepare
a DCOS study based on 1990 actual results of operations consistent
with Commission findings in this case by July 15, 1991.
•♦ V. i
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d.

Provide,

in conjunction with

the

Division,

additional

information on separate identification and allocation of NTS costs
for local switching equipment.

6.

The Division perform and report the results of the 1990

DCOS study to the Commission and make it available to the Committee

and other interested parties.

7.

To the extent the Commission has

inadvertently omitted

from the ordering provisions of this Order any duty or obligation

intended to be imposed upon USWC or the Division, which duty or
obligation is otherwise clear from the language of preceding portions
of this Order, it is hereby incorporated herein by this reference and
made a part hereof.

8.

Within 30 days of the issuance of this Order, an aggrieved

party may file a written .request for review by the Commission.

If

such request is denied in writing within 20 days or deemed denied by
Commission inaction after 20 days, the aggrieved party then has 30
days following such denial within which to petition the Supreme Court
for

review.

DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 19th day of June, 1991.

/I

•<Th

1

U-L^ZkL.

irai^T. Stewart,

Chairman

^9V

"99--^.
James wf Byrne, Commissioner

Stephen /F. Mecham,

Stephen C.

Commissioner

Hewlett

Commission Secretary
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ADDENDUM C

U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

EXHIBIT NO. 10R.4

APPROVED EARNINGS SHARING PLANS
FLOOR
STATE

(A)
ALABAMA

ROE (%)
(B)

AUTHORIZED
ROE

ROE Ci)1

(C)

CD)

TRIGGER

ROE TRIGGER

GAP

(%)

fD-C)

BANDWIDTH

SPREAD HO
( D- B)

13.42

13.8 7

14 .50

0.63

1

7.58

13.00

15.50

2.50

7 . f.»?

CONNECT!OIT

n.no

13.00

13.50

0.50

2 . 50

FLORIDA

11.50

13.20

14.00

0.80

2.50

GEORGIA

12.00

13.00

14 .00

1.00

2 . 00

KENTUCKY

11.68

13.05

14.15

1.10

2.47

13.60

13,60

0

0

oalifor:;ia

MARYLAND2

(3)

0 8

N /A

MIGHT CAN'

12.25

13.25

13.25

MINNESOTA

10.00

12.15'

13,50

1.35

3 . 50

MTSSISSIPRT

12.03

13.26

13.67

0.41

1 . 64

MISSOURI

11.61

12.61

14.10

1.49

9

13.75

13.75

0

N/A

13.25

13.25

0

N/A

NEW MEXICO5

(3)

RHODE ISLAND6

(3)

1 . 00

/|0

TENNESSEE7

12.50

13.40

14 .40

1.00

1 . 90

TEXAS

11.44

12.85A

14.20

1.35

2 . 76

WASHINGTON2

10.42

12.83'

13.72

0.89

3 .30

11.34

13.138

13.94

0.819

2.70 j

AVERAGE

O

V. •**

f:

l:

' ROE at which sharing begins

'Maryland and VV.r.hingion have M>pctMe:ical capital structures Washington's trigger point based on an actual capilnl structure is 13.1 5 Maryland's information
J No floor specified.

••

s undva*b;e. '

v

c- ;

To-

* Derived based on settlement No actual authorized ROE determined.
o
CD

00
CO
O

J Company may die for rate iei:t;f when determined that suoslaniial damage to earnings has occurred.
Come-any p'oh.b ted from d mq rate case.

I! company d:cps ne o.v tne FiOQ l.wc company o.n\ recovers 40 60% of tne difference between actual eamir, :s and '.'he floor.
" Average ROc cf in,,:- e state:, ^iln^: a gap is 13.<IC. (Maryland Michiuan, New Mexico and Rhode Island)
''
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